Peter Huang recently published a review of Leo Katz’s “Why
the Law Is So Perverse” in 63 Journal of Legal Education 131 (you can download the
paper via SSRN here).  I have only
briefly skimmed the paper, but I believe there is much of value here for
corporate law scholars. The following
excerpt is from the introduction:

This book is an imaginative tour of legal paradoxes that are
related to the field of social choice, which studies the aggregation of
preferences. In a non-technical and accessible way, Katz discusses many complex
and subtle ideas, using the language of legal cases, doctrines and theories. As
he notes on page 6, some legal scholars have applied social choice theory to
analyze diverse and fundamental legal issues. Two recent examples are how
social choice illuminates the reasonable person standard in torts and other
areas of law and the notion of community standards underlying the doctrine of
good faith performance in contract law…. Katz's book explicates four fundamental legal paradoxes as
the logical consequence of the perspective that legal doctrines entail
multi-criteria decision-making. This means that each of these foundational
doctrines is logically related to a voting paradox and its corresponding
literature in social choice. Katz aptly describes the four legal puzzles he
analyzes by choosing as titles to the four parts of his book these four
questions: Why does law prohibit certain win-win transactions? Why are there so
many loopholes in the law? Why does so much of law have a dichotomous nature?
Why does the law not criminalize all that society morally condemns?

Importantly, Peter adds a valuable appendix entitled, “A
Brief Social Choice Primer for Legal Scholars,” which he describes as follows:

This appendix provides legal scholars a guide to social
choice in general and four distinguished impossibility theorems in particular.
It offers motivating examples and precise statements of those impossibility
theorems. The conventional interpretations for these theorems and the field of
social choice are negative in the sense that most commentators view social
choice theory as mathematically proving that no voting procedure is fair. These
commentators include legal scholars applying impossibility theorems and
concluding that difficulties are unavoidable with all collective or group
decision-making processes. There is a vast social choice literature full of
extensions and refinements of these and other impossibility theorems. Current
social choice research tends to be philosophical or technical. Katz's book
mostly eschews the technical and emphasizes the philosophical. This appendix
does the opposite, while still avoiding mathematical details and emphasizing
conceptual understanding. Additionally, it highlights research by Donald Saari
and his coauthors that explains what goes wrong in these impossibility theorems
and provides benign interpretations and positive versions of them.