For the one BLPB reader who doesn't also check in on The CLS Blue Sky Blog:
Based on an analysis of public communications around earnings announcements, we find that managers are 34 to 43 percent more likely to cite stakeholder value maximization during periods following earnings announcements that fall short of market expectations. This finding is consistent with concerns that the inability to measure stakeholder value may reduce managers’ accountability for firm performance….
Managers seem to be aware that stakeholder-oriented goals may reduce their accountability for performance, but does the manager’s push for stakeholder objectives sway the board’s evaluation of an underperforming manager? We use CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, a measure used in numerous prior studies of CEO evaluation, to determine whether this behavior produces any observable benefit to the manager. Indeed, we find that it does; CEOs that cite stakeholder value maximization as an objective are less likely to see turnover following poor performance.