This week, we have some new developments in the conservative/Trump Admin effort to control and/or undermine shareholder power.

First, we have these new releases from the Department of Labor.

Now, I previously posted about how ERISA regulation could be used to undermine shareholder voting; these new releases come at the problem from a different angle.  They hypothesize that any proxy advisor serving an ERISA-regulated plan is necessarily an ERISA fiduciary – and, as I understand it, that would potentially include proxy advisors who serve mutual funds that are included in a 401(k) menu.  Notably, proxy advisors’ pivots to offering “research only” products won’t save them; the releases explain even providing research might render a proxy advisor an ERISA fiduciary.

The releases also suggest that the funds themselves included in a 401(k) menu – and the investment advisers that serve them, i.e., BlackRock and its stewardship team – are ERISA fiduciaries.  

All of this would dramatically expand the regulatory ambit of ERISA, and though the administration says the implication is that these entities should only act to maximize plan wealth, what they mean is that (1) any measures pertaining to social responsibility will be treated as

Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop

Call for Papers

The University of Illinois College of Law, in partnership with the University of Richmond School of Law, UCLA School of Law, and Vanderbilt Law School, invites submissions for the Thirteenth Annual Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop. This workshop will be held on Thursday, October 22 and the morning of Friday, October 23, 2026 in Chicago, Illinois.

Overview
This annual workshop brings together scholars focused on corporate and securities litigation to present their scholarly works. Papers addressing any aspect of corporate and securities litigation or enforcement are eligible, including securities class actions, fiduciary duty litigation, and SEC enforcement actions. We welcome scholars working in a variety of methodologies, as well as both completed papers and works-in-progress. Authors whose papers are selected will be invited to present their work at a workshop hosted by the University of Illinois College of Law. Participants will pay for their own travel, lodging, and other expenses.

Submissions

If you are interested in participating, please send the paper you would like to present, or an abstract of the paper, to corpandsecworkshop@gmail.com by Friday, June 12, 2026. Please include your name, current position, and contact information in the e-mail accompanying

With proxy season getting underway, I’m sharing the updated list since my post about this in March. We have another 6 companies added to the list since March 23, a rate of about two companies a week. Five announced departure plans were from Delaware and one from Ireland. In terms of destinations, four companies announced for Texas with two announcing for Nevada.

Company NameStock TickerOrigination StateDestination State
1. TruGolfTRUGDelawareNevada
2. Forian, Inc.FORADelawareMaryland
3. LQR HouseYHCNevadaDelaware
4. CBAK EnergyCBATNevadaCayman Islands
5. Cheetah NetCTNTNorth CarolinaDelaware
6. GalectoGLTODelawareCayman Islands
7. Resolute Holdings Management, Inc.RHLDDelawareNevada
8. Forward Industries, INCFWDINew YorkTexas
9. EQV Ventures AcquisitionFTWCayman IslandsDelaware
10. Datadog, Inc.DDOGDelawareNevada
11. Haymaker Acquisition Corp 4HYACCayman IslandsDelaware
12. CDT EquityCDTDelawareCayman Islands
13. eXp World HoldingsEXPIDelawareTexas
14. ArcBest CorpARCBDelawareTexas
15. Texas Capital BancsharesTCBIDelawareTexas
16. ExxonMobil Corp.XOMNew JerseyTexas
17. NL IndustriesNLNew JerseyDelaware
18. ClearOne IncCLRODelawareNevada
19. Liberty Media CorporationFWONA, FWONB,

On our podcast, Mike Levin and I previously discussed Exxon’s new retail shareholder voting program.  In sum, Exxon got SEC permission to allow its retail shareholders to adopt standing voting instructions to automatically cast their proxy votes in accordance with Exxon’s management.

I’ve heard a lot of shareholder-rights advocates speak favorably of the program, but I disagree.  I’m all for making it easier for retail shareholders to vote – including allowing them to adopt standing voting instructions (Jill Fisch had a whole thing on this) – but Exxon’s program only allows retail to vote for Exxon’s board.  Exxon is almost certainly expecting that, just as retail tend not to vote much at all, those who opt in to the program will likely never bother to revisit their instructions, leaving Exxon with a banked set of votes to oppose any activist interventions (including, of course, what I call “little a” activism, i.e., shareholder proposals).  The way the program is currently constructed, it’s a board entrenchment device.

Which is why I was happy to see that the New York City Comptroller’s Office, on behalf of the New York City Police Pension Fund, has submitted a shareholder proposal for

From this Law360 article, I learned that Clearway Energy proposes to simplify a complex capital structure. It has two classes of stock that trade on the NYSE: A and C. The A’s have 1 vote per share; the C’s have 1/100th of a vote per share.

It also has B and D shares, held exclusively by CEG, who as a result controls 55% of the company’s voting power.

Clearview proposes a charter amendment to convert the A shares into C shares and, recognizing that this would cause CEG’s own voting power to increase, proposes to fix that problem by putting a bunch of CEG’s shares into a Voting Trust in a mirror voting arrangement that ensures CEG’s voting power does not rise above 55% as a result of the reclassification.

Here is the proxy explaining the proposed changes. As required under Delaware law, for the amendment to take effect, the Class A shareholders must vote in favor.

Anyway, the Law360 article is about a lawsuit filed by the New England Teamsters Pension Fund challenging the scheme as a conflict transaction, because the scheme will allow CEG to sell down its stake while maintaining its voting power. That’s

I am intrigued by this opinion in Walker v. Chidambaran, 2026 WL 787964 (D. Md. March 20, 2026), dismissing a securities fraud complaint against various former officers and directors of an artificial intelligence company called iLearnEngines (“iLE”).

iLE went public in a SPAC merger in 2024, and its SEC filings stated that a significant portion of its revenues and sales came from an unnamed “Technology Partner.”  The Technology Partner and iLE had a complicated web of relationships, buying and selling services from each other, the revenues of which may – or may not – have been netted out against each other (the registration statement appears to have been inconsistent on this point).  Prior to the SPAC merger, the SEC inquired whether the Technology Partner was a related party, and iLE answered no.

(Guess where this is going).

Anyhoo, things started to go south when short seller Hindenburg issued a report on August 29, 2024, identifying the technology partner as Experion Technologies. iLE’s founder and CEO was listed as Experion’s American contact in 2020, and his personal residence was the official residence of Experion Americas in 2022.  Experion India and Experion Middle East and Africa were 35%  and 45% owned

Save the date! The annual Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop will take place on October 22 and 23 in Chicago, hosted by the University of Illinois College of Law.

A call for papers will be coming soon, but please mark your calendars now!

This annual workshop brings together scholars who address any aspect of corporate and securities litigation or enforcement, including securities class actions, fiduciary duty litigation, and SEC enforcement actions. We welcome scholars working in a variety of methodologies, as well as both completed papers and works-in-progress. 

Thanks to Verity Winship for sending this my way to get out. I’ll also post the call for papers when it comes out.

Picking back up after February’s post, I’ve got an updated list looking at movement between states so far this year in preparation for a panel at KPMG’s Board Leadership Conference this week. This list has grown with another five companies announcing attempts to shift their incorporation jurisdiction since the last update. Some thoughts on the announced moves after the list as well, infographics, and quick note about my new Senior Of Counsel role.

Company NameStock TickerOrigination StateDestination State
1. TruGolfTRUGDelawareNevada
2. Forian, Inc.FORADelawareMaryland
3. LQR HouseYHCNevadaDelaware
4. CBAK EnergyCBATNevadaCayman Islands
5. Cheetah NetCTNTNorth CarolinaDelaware
6. GalectoGLTODelawareCayman Islands
7. Resolute Holdings Management, Inc.RHLDDelawareNevada
8. Forward Industries, INCFWDINew YorkTexas
9. EQV Ventures AcquisitionFTWCayman IslandsDelaware
10. Datadog, Inc.DDOGDelawareNevada
11. Haymaker Acquisition Corp 4HYACCayman IslandsDelaware
12. CDT EquityCDTDelawareCayman Islands
13. eXp World HoldingsEXPIDelawareTexas
14. ArcBest CorpARCBDelawareTexas
15. Texas Capital BancsharesTCBIDelawareTexas
16. ExxonMobil Corp.XOMNew JerseyTexas
17. NL IndustriesNLNew JerseyDelaware
18.

Southwest is (and has long been) a Texas-incorporated company.

After Texas reformed its governance laws, Southwest adopted a bylaw requiring that derivative actions only be brought by shareholders with a minimum 3% stake.

Subsequently, an investor holding only 100 shares filed a derivative action in federal court, alleging that Southwest’s directors breached their fiduciary duties to the company when they abandoned Southwest’s “Bags Fly Free” policy in the wake of an activist intervention by Elliott Investment Management. (It’s a silly lawsuit, whatever). Southwest invoked the bylaw in its motion to dismiss.

The plaintiff offered a number of challenges to the Texas law, including that it was inapplicable to him because he served a demand before the law passed, and that the law was impermissibly retroactive as applied to his claim. In Gusinsky v. Reynolds, 3:25-cv-01816, the court rejected these.

The plaintiff also, however, alleged that Southwest’s directors breached their fiduciary obligations by adopting such a limit on derivative lawsuits in the first place, a claim that the court rejected because … the plaintiff did not have the 3% stake necessary to advance it.

More seriously, it’s worth noting that when plaintiffs in Delaware brought a facial challenge to