The following comes to us from Bernard Sharfman:

I have slightly revised a key paragraph from the Introduction of my new article, Enhancing the Value of Shareholder Voting Recommendations. This paragraph takes the approach that shareholder voting is really more about authority than accountability. Using this approach has significant implications for the use of board voting recommendations. I would appreciate any comments that you may have on the following:

[S]hareholder voting in a public company cannot be looked at as simply another tool of accountability, i.e., a device to minimize agency costs or enhance efficiency, such as when shareholders file a direct or derivative lawsuit, initiate a proxy contest, attempt a hostile takeover, or take significant positions in the company and then advocate for change (hedge fund activism, here and here). When shareholders vote they are also participating, alongside the board, in corporate decision making. That is, they are temporarily transformed into a locus of corporate authority that rivals the authority of the board. As co-decision makers it is critical that shareholders and those with delegated voting authority, such as mutual fund advisers, have at their disposal informed and sufficiently precise voting recommendations, no matter what the source, including the board of directors. If shareholders and investment advisers with delegated voting authority feel that the board can provide them with the most precise voting recommendations, then those are the recommendations that they should use.