We just wrapped up a fascinating discussion group titled “A Very Online Economy: Meme Trading, Bitcoin, and the Crisis of Trust and Value(s)–How Should the Law Respond?” as part of the AALS 2022 Annual Meeting. I co-moderated the group with Professor Martin Edwards (Belmont University School of Law). Here’s the description:

Emergent forces emanating from social and financial technologies are challenging many underlying assumptions about the workings of markets, the nature of firms, and our social relationship with our economic institutions. Blockchain technologies challenge our assumptions about the need for centralization, trust, and financial institutions. Meme trading puts pressure on our assumptions about economic value and market processes. Environmental and social governance initiatives raise important questions about the relationship between economic institutions and social values. These issues will certainly drive policy debates about social and economic good in the coming years.

The group gathered some amazing presenters and commentators for the discussion, including:

Can “hypermaterial” public information about a stock render the company’s (once material) nonpublic internal data immaterial? Consider the following scenario involving social-media-driven trading in a meme stock:

XYZ Corporation’s stock price had been falling over the last month (from a high of $12 down to $10), due to a short-sale attack by a small group of hedge funds. In the past week, a group of individuals in a social media chatroom have attempted a now well-publicized short squeeze, motivated by a desire to punish what they view as predatory behavior by the hedge funds. As a result, the stock price has been driven up to $300, significantly above where the stock was trading before the short-sale attack. The company’s nonpublic data (earnings, etc.) that will be reported next week reflects the “true” price of the company’s shares should be $8. With knowledge of the above public and nonpblic information, XYZ and some of its insiders issue/sell XYZ shares.

Has XYZ and its insiders committed insider trading in violation of the antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act?

Insider trading liability arises under the classical theory when the issuer, its employee, or an affiliate seeks to benefit from

I’ve addressed the recent social-media-driven retail trading in stocks like GameStop in prior posts (here and here). In both posts, I focused on evidence that at least some of this trading seems to pursue goals other than (or in addition to) profit. For example, some of these retail traders claim that they are buying and holding stocks as a form of social, political, or aesthetic expression. My coauthors Jeremy Kidd, George Mocsary, and I recently posted a forthcoming article on this subject, Social Media, Securities Markets, and the Phenomenon of Expressive Trading, to SSRN. The article introduces the emerging phenomenon of expressive trading. It considers some of the challenges and risks expressive trading may pose to issuers, markets, and regulators–as well as to our traditional understanding of market functioning. Ultimately, the article concludes that while innovations like expressive trading “can be disruptive and demand a reimagining of the established order,” market participants, issuers, and regulators would be wise to pause and observe before rushing to adopt defensive strategies or implement reforms. Here’s the abstract:

Commentators have likened the recent surge in social-media-driven (SMD) retail trading in securities such as GameStop to a roller coaster: “You