I’ve covered the The Trade Desk proxy here before and how controlled companies might benefit from redomesticating away from Delaware. In his memorandum accompanying the proxy statement, Steven Davidoff Solomon points out that his own analysis does not show any negative premium associated with incorporating away from Delaware. This is how he put it:
As I noted above in Section IV, recent academic studies have found no premium associated with Delaware incorporation, and in some cases, such a premium may even be negative for controlled companies. To provide further information on this issue to the Board, I conducted case studies of the five reincorporations out of Delaware involving companies with a market capitalization of at least $200 million. These companies are Tesla, Inc., Fidelity National Financial, Inc., TripAdvisor, Inc., Cannae Holdings, Inc., and Rezolute, Inc.
Evidence for a possible negative premium for controlled companies incorporated in Delaware comes from an article by Edward Fox, that “finds, surprisingly, that controlled Delaware firms are actually slightly less valuable than similar companies incorporated elsewhere.” (emphasis in original).
Given that recent redomestication announcements for companies with market capitalizations of over $200 million have already been examined, I thought it might be interesting to take