There are always policy questions about the degree to which public regulation should be enforced by government actors, by private actors, or by a combination of both.  In securities law, for example, striking the right balance is a perennial debate.

Which is why I read with interest this New York Times story about efforts to combat counterfeiting in China. 

China has a serious problem with counterfeit goods.  To some extent, that kind of problem can be addressed via government enforcement actions; however, China also suffers from what one might describe as an extreme case of regulatory capture – namely, corruption at the local level that compromises enforcement efforts.

So China has turned to private enforcement, by bolstering its consumer protection laws: consumers who purchase counterfeit goods can get damages equal to several times the value of the product.  And predictably, these laws have spawned a new profession: counterfeit hunting.

That by itself would not be so bad – why not let consumers, acting like private attorneys general, ferret out counterfeit goods?  The problem is, since damages are based on the number of products purchased, hunters purchase counterfeits in large numbers, filling warehouses with them.  They also target minor labeling errors…