There is always something new to discover.

For example, I was reviewing the CLC version (as one does), and I noticed that in the sections providing for stockholder approval (either for director-conflict transactions, or controller-conflict transactions), language was deleted that would specifically have required stockholders be informed as to the nature of a director’s conflict and involvement in the negotiation of the transaction, and the “material facts” of a controller transaction – though this language was retained for approval at the board/committee level. Though stockholder approval must still be “informed,” I rather suspect the deletions were intended to assist with future arguments that conflicts, or flawed “negotiations,” do not undermine the effect of a stockholder vote, when the stockholders were at least informed as to the material terms of the deal.

Screenshots of the relevant deletions, here:

And here:

This is, I believe, the language included in the version of the bill that passed the Delaware Senate.

In recent years, of course, the Delaware Supreme Court has rejected many attempts at stockholder ratification on the grounds that various conflicts or negotiating flaws were concealed from stockholders, and these were the grounds on which Chancellor McCormick concluded that the stockholder vote…

Like this Walgreen’s deal with Sycamore.

Very quick thing I note about it: It includes the equivalent of an earnout, namely, in addition to the cash consideration Walgreen’s shareholders receive, they also receive a “Divested Asset Proceed Right,” or DAP Right, which will entitle them to an additional $3 per share if Sycamore is able to sell VillageMD, (They get 70% of the net proceeds of the sale, up to $3 per share).

I don’t think the merger agreement is public yet, but this from the press release caught my eye:

WBA shareholders will receive, at closing of the Sycamore transaction, one non-transferable DAP Right per WBA share.

Why non-transferable? After all, it would be more valuable to shareholders if they could sell their DAP right, and that way informed traders could price it based on the likelihood of it reaching the $3 max payout, etc etc.

After all, that’s how Bristol did this not long ago, when it acquired Celgene:

If the merger is completed, Celgene stockholders immediately prior to the completion of the merger will be entitled to receive $50.00 in cash, one share of Bristol-Myers Squibb common stock and one contingent value right (each, a “CVR”)

Sometimes I post for a naive audience, sometimes I want to get something out quickly and assume a more sophisticated audience, and with so much movement on SB 21 right now I’m opting for the latter.

So, first – the CLC offered some proposed changes to the law, which you can see here. (Mike Levin and I had just recorded a Shareholder Primacy podcast about the original flavor SB 21; that will still drop tomorrow morning; you can be the judge whether the overall assessment remains good in light of the proposed amendments). Brian Quinn says all that needs to be said about the CLC’s concept of retroactivity; I’ll just highlight what I think is significant.

Under the original version of the law, if the transaction did not involve a controlling shareholder, board level cleansing was achievable even if the board was majority-conflicted. As long as the disinterested directors voted in favor of the deal, it was cleansed – meaning, a board 4-1 conflicted could still cleanse the deal, so long as that single director voted in favor. If the transaction did involve a controlling shareholder, board-level cleansing required the creation of a majority-independent committee, but there was…

Just dropping a quick plug for my post at FT Alphaville on, well, the broad strokes theme we’re seeing in corporate governance.

And another thing: In this week’s Shareholder Primacy podcast, Mike Levin and I discuss the new 13D/13G guidance from the SEC. Available at Apple, Spotify, and Youtube.

Previously, I blogged about whether the proposed legislation is good or bad, including whether it’s good or bad for Delaware.

What I neglected to mention is that it is unequivocally bad for Delaware when normal people start to pay attention to Delaware’s fights.

Exhibit A:

But Delaware’s incorporation laws also provide some rights to shareholders. While shareholders have extremely limited ability to sue over the business judgment of corporate managers, corporations must prioritize them and treat them fairly.

So on Monday I threw up a rather inflammatory post about SB 21, which would dramatically rewrite Delaware law.  (Here’s a post by Eric Talley, Sarath Sanga and Gabriel V. Rauterberg, which takes a more measured tone).

As I’ve talked to people about the law, the first question I get asked is, “Is this a good thing or a bad thing?”  And that’s a really difficult question to answer, because “good” can have many meanings in this context.

Is this good for shareholders?

Well, I find it very difficult to take seriously the notion that the procedures written into the law will have any protective effect for shareholders.  The independence standards of the exchanges are notoriously weak; that’s why ISS and Glass Lewis frequently adopt their own definitions of independence, so much so that the Business Roundtable accused them of proxy fraud. The cleansing standards would insulate transactions by a board that is entirely captured by a counterparty, so long as a single member of that board is independent and votes with the others (a standard that one can easily see being transferred to the demand excusal context).  The definition of controlling shareholder would exclude people…

I suppose it’s gratifying that the proposed changes to Delaware law support the thesis of my new paper, The Legitimation of Shareholder Primacy.  There, I argue, among other things, that Delaware imposes procedural limitations on managerial behavior that function more as a performance to the general public, to grant corporations a social license to operate, than as real constraints.  So, of course, as soon as those limitations started to have even the tiniest bit of actual bite – and in an environment where the prospect of federal preemption is largely nil, and corporate power has reached the point where a social license to operate may no longer be necessary – managers threaten to depart the state, and Delaware proposes of package of statutory changes that undo certainly the last 10 years of Delaware jurisprudence, if not the last 50, in favor of a model of corporate self-policing.

The story actually begins last year, when, in response to the Moelis decision, Delaware rushed to amend its corporate code to add Section 122(18), permitting corporate-governance-by-contract.  At the time, I asked – quite seriously – what is the value of the corporate form? 

This is very much a debate that’s been…