Photo of Ann Lipton

Ann M. Lipton is a Professor of Law and Laurence W. DeMuth Chair of Business Law at the University of Colorado Law School.  An experienced securities and corporate litigator who has handled class actions involving some of the world’s largest companies, she joined the Tulane Law faculty in 2015 after two years as a visiting assistant professor at Duke University School of Law.

As a scholar, Lipton explores corporate governance, the relationships between corporations and investors, and the role of corporations in society.  Read more.

So, the SEC is out with its proposal to allow companies to choose whether to provide interim reports quarterly or semi-annually.  The Commission currently consists of three Republican members, two of whom seem pretty committed to the idea, so I suspect the “request for comments” is pro forma and the rule will be finalized soon.  

Previously, I posted about how this new rule might affect securities fraud litigation; now that the rule is out, I’ll point out it allows registrants to shift to between quarterly reporting and semi-annual reporting – back and forth – every year, by checking a box on the 10K.  Since the 10K is usually filed around 3 months into the following fiscal year, registrants will already know what the first quarter of the new fiscal year looks like when they make the election to report semi-annually or quarterly.  Which … I mean, Rule 10b5-1 was just changed to add a cooling-off period after amending the plan, you’d think reporting frequency could be at least as rigorous.  I’m sure market norms will develop around sudden changes, but, well, it seems to me to be a recipe for abuse.

Meanwhile, there are already a bunch of

This post highlights a collection of new developments revolving around recent attacks on shareholder rights, in the name of “wealth maximization,” naturally.

First, a couple of weeks ago, I posted about how Indiana went and passed the model proxy advisor act proposed by “Consumer Defense,” which burdens any proxy advice to vote against management, prompting a lawsuit by ISS. (Mike Levin and I also talked about the act on our podcast.) Well, the update is that Glass Lewis has also filed a lawsuit to challenge Indiana’s law – and it turns out, Kansas passed its own version, so ISS is challenging that one, too.

Second, Texas Capital Bancshares, a Delaware corporation, recently held a vote on a proposal to reincorporate to Texas – which failed, rather convincingly. (Interestingly, an even bigger failure – one might say a resounding one, actually – was TCBI’s “advisory” proposal to adopt a 3% threshold for shareholder proposals if the Texas move were approved).

Now, what’s striking here is that TCBI is not a controlled company; its largest shareholders are BlackRock, Vanguard, T. Rowe Price, Dimensional Fund, and State Street – so presumably, these holders were largely opposed to the

This week, we have some new developments in the conservative/Trump Admin effort to control and/or undermine shareholder power.

First, we have these new releases from the Department of Labor.

Now, I previously posted about how ERISA regulation could be used to undermine shareholder voting; these new releases come at the problem from a different angle.  They hypothesize that any proxy advisor serving an ERISA-regulated plan is necessarily an ERISA fiduciary – and, as I understand it, that would potentially include proxy advisors who serve mutual funds that are included in a 401(k) menu.  Notably, proxy advisors’ pivots to offering “research only” products won’t save them; the releases explain even providing research might render a proxy advisor an ERISA fiduciary.

The releases also suggest that the funds themselves included in a 401(k) menu – and the investment advisers that serve them, i.e., BlackRock and its stewardship team – are ERISA fiduciaries.  

All of this would dramatically expand the regulatory ambit of ERISA, and though the administration says the implication is that these entities should only act to maximize plan wealth, what they mean is that (1) any measures pertaining to social responsibility will be treated as

On our podcast, Mike Levin and I previously discussed Exxon’s new retail shareholder voting program.  In sum, Exxon got SEC permission to allow its retail shareholders to adopt standing voting instructions to automatically cast their proxy votes in accordance with Exxon’s management.

I’ve heard a lot of shareholder-rights advocates speak favorably of the program, but I disagree.  I’m all for making it easier for retail shareholders to vote – including allowing them to adopt standing voting instructions (Jill Fisch had a whole thing on this) – but Exxon’s program only allows retail to vote for Exxon’s board.  Exxon is almost certainly expecting that, just as retail tend not to vote much at all, those who opt in to the program will likely never bother to revisit their instructions, leaving Exxon with a banked set of votes to oppose any activist interventions (including, of course, what I call “little a” activism, i.e., shareholder proposals).  The way the program is currently constructed, it’s a board entrenchment device.

Which is why I was happy to see that the New York City Comptroller’s Office, on behalf of the New York City Police Pension Fund, has submitted a shareholder proposal for

From this Law360 article, I learned that Clearway Energy proposes to simplify a complex capital structure. It has two classes of stock that trade on the NYSE: A and C. The A’s have 1 vote per share; the C’s have 1/100th of a vote per share.

It also has B and D shares, held exclusively by CEG, who as a result controls 55% of the company’s voting power.

Clearview proposes a charter amendment to convert the A shares into C shares and, recognizing that this would cause CEG’s own voting power to increase, proposes to fix that problem by putting a bunch of CEG’s shares into a Voting Trust in a mirror voting arrangement that ensures CEG’s voting power does not rise above 55% as a result of the reclassification.

Here is the proxy explaining the proposed changes. As required under Delaware law, for the amendment to take effect, the Class A shareholders must vote in favor.

Anyway, the Law360 article is about a lawsuit filed by the New England Teamsters Pension Fund challenging the scheme as a conflict transaction, because the scheme will allow CEG to sell down its stake while maintaining its voting power. That’s

I am intrigued by this opinion in Walker v. Chidambaran, 2026 WL 787964 (D. Md. March 20, 2026), dismissing a securities fraud complaint against various former officers and directors of an artificial intelligence company called iLearnEngines (“iLE”).

iLE went public in a SPAC merger in 2024, and its SEC filings stated that a significant portion of its revenues and sales came from an unnamed “Technology Partner.”  The Technology Partner and iLE had a complicated web of relationships, buying and selling services from each other, the revenues of which may – or may not – have been netted out against each other (the registration statement appears to have been inconsistent on this point).  Prior to the SPAC merger, the SEC inquired whether the Technology Partner was a related party, and iLE answered no.

(Guess where this is going).

Anyhoo, things started to go south when short seller Hindenburg issued a report on August 29, 2024, identifying the technology partner as Experion Technologies. iLE’s founder and CEO was listed as Experion’s American contact in 2020, and his personal residence was the official residence of Experion Americas in 2022.  Experion India and Experion Middle East and Africa were 35%  and 45% owned

Southwest is (and has long been) a Texas-incorporated company.

After Texas reformed its governance laws, Southwest adopted a bylaw requiring that derivative actions only be brought by shareholders with a minimum 3% stake.

Subsequently, an investor holding only 100 shares filed a derivative action in federal court, alleging that Southwest’s directors breached their fiduciary duties to the company when they abandoned Southwest’s “Bags Fly Free” policy in the wake of an activist intervention by Elliott Investment Management. (It’s a silly lawsuit, whatever). Southwest invoked the bylaw in its motion to dismiss.

The plaintiff offered a number of challenges to the Texas law, including that it was inapplicable to him because he served a demand before the law passed, and that the law was impermissibly retroactive as applied to his claim. In Gusinsky v. Reynolds, 3:25-cv-01816, the court rejected these.

The plaintiff also, however, alleged that Southwest’s directors breached their fiduciary obligations by adopting such a limit on derivative lawsuits in the first place, a claim that the court rejected because … the plaintiff did not have the 3% stake necessary to advance it.

More seriously, it’s worth noting that when plaintiffs in Delaware brought a facial challenge to