Meredith Ervine at Deallawyers highlights this blog by Milbank on Advance Notice Bylaws. Two things stand out to me.

First, apparently companies are now requiring nominating activists to vote only their long positions, not borrowed shares:

While lending shares of the corporation to cover short sales may provide income for large fund complexes, it is unlikely that these fund complexes (or other long-term holders) wish to promote empty voting in a contested corporate election.  Permitting the voting of borrowed shares by an activist – amplifying the activist’s voting power when there is no meaningful economic stake in the shares being voted – misaligns voting power with the economic consequences of the vote and does not promote good long-term decision making. The Alignment ANB accordingly requires the nominating stockholder and allied participants in the solicitation to waive their right to vote shares in excess of their collective net long position – in other words, to waive the right to vote shares that were borrowed or otherwise subject to an offsetting sale or delivery obligation.

I didn’t know you could do that by bylaw! Do similar requirements apply to incumbents (a la Kiani at Masimo?).

Second, Milbank recommends questionnaires delve into the nominee’s independence from the nominating activist:

In other situations, activists will nominate “independent” directors, …At times, however, the term “independent” is applied rather liberally, …The Alignment ANB seeks to make the connections between nominees and the activist clearer, requiring disclosure of whether the nominee and activist have had discussions to align on a shared agenda for the corporation (and if so, the result of such discussions), on financial, social and family ties, and finally, on whether the nominee is expected to share confidential board information with the activist going forward. The degree of independence of any given nominee will matter acutely to voting stockholders, particularly if they are not fully on board with the activist’s platform or if their financial interests do not clearly align with the activist’s.

In light of SB 21, the concern is … ironic.

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Photo of Ann Lipton Ann Lipton

Ann M. Lipton is Tulane Law School’s Michael M. Fleishman Professor in Business Law and Entrepreneurship and an affiliate of Tulane’s Murphy Institute.  An experienced securities and corporate litigator who has handled class actions involving some of the world’s largest companies, she joined …

Ann M. Lipton is Tulane Law School’s Michael M. Fleishman Professor in Business Law and Entrepreneurship and an affiliate of Tulane’s Murphy Institute.  An experienced securities and corporate litigator who has handled class actions involving some of the world’s largest companies, she joined the Tulane Law faculty in 2015 after two years as a visiting assistant professor at Duke University School of Law.

As a scholar, Lipton explores corporate governance, the relationships between corporations and investors, and the role of corporations in society. Read More