Securities class action defendants have a unique talent for convincing the Supreme Court that fact-specific disputes about whether plaintiffs’ evidence is sufficient to meet a legal threshold in fact present critical questions of law on which the highest court in the land must opine.

When it happened in Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. v. Arkansas Teacher Retirement System, 594 U.S. 113 (2021), where the question was whether Goldman’s pretensions to ethical behavior were too vague to impact market prices, Goldman itself changed its argument multiple times, and by oral argument, the parties were in complete agreement on the legal standard.  Ultimately, the Court remanded to the Second Circuit for clarification that it had applied the correct legal standard on which all parties agreed, in an opinion so muddled that I had to write a whole paper about it.

Then, notoriously, there were NVIDIA Corp. v. E. Ohman J:OR Fonder AB and Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank.  In each case, the Supreme Court granted cert to determine if plaintiffs’ complaint was sufficient under PSLRA pleading standards yet, as I noted at the time, “I see no way the Supreme Court can give NVIDIA what it wants without either acting as a district court and weighing this specific complaint and these specific allegations without regard for future cases, or – more likely – adding more artificial rules to securities pleadings.” Happily, the Supreme Court seemed to figure that out after oral argument, and both cases were DIG’d.

But here we go again, with a grant of cert in Robinhood Markets, Inc., et al. v. Vinod Sodha.

The Ninth Circuit sustained the plaintiff’s complaint alleging that Robinhood’s registration statement, in addition to disclosing the its financial results for the first quarter of 2021, should also have disclosed financial information for the second quarter – which had ended thirty days before the IPO.

Here is what the Ninth Circuit held:

all the omissions challenged by Plaintiffs involve the relationship between a prior statement concerning a particular time period and an event subsequent to that time period.  Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Robinhood did not disclose that several financial metrics and key performance indicators declined after the end of the last reported fiscal quarter.  Thus, there was a statement related to a particular time period (i.e., the disclosure of the results from the last reported fiscal quarter), followed by an undisclosed event (i.e., the decline in Robinhood’s performance) that took place after that period. Plaintiffs also allege that Robinhood’s decision to disclose some positive interim results but omit other negative interim results, even though those negative results were provided in prior quarters, was misleading.  Because Plaintiffs’ contention relies in part on the distinction between the previous quarter’s results and the interim results, it also involves the relationship between a prior statement and a subsequent event.  Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Robinhood warned of certain future risks but did not state that those risks had already come to fruition.  Again, Plaintiffs’ theory concerns a prior time period (i.e., the time period during which Robinhood suffered from the risks that had allegedly come to fruition) and some subsequent event (i.e., the later time period during which the risks falsely portrayed as contingent actually came to pass). This case therefore does not require us to draw a distinction between materiality and the duty to disclose. Accordingly, Robinhood was required to disclose “material” interim information.

From this, Robinhood argued that the Ninth Circuit adopted a test requiring disclosure of “material” interim information, and posed the question:

Whether an issuer can be found liable under the misleading-omissions prong of Section 11(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77a et seq., based on a determination that the issuer failed to disclose interim financial information that is material within the meaning of Section 11(a), without an additional inquiry to determine whether the omission rendered any affirmative statement misleading.

Except here’s how the Ninth Circuit preceded that discussion:

we agree with the Second Circuit that this “distinction [between materiality and the duty to disclose] has meaning only in certain contexts.” In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993). On the one hand, “where the issue is whether an individual’s relationship to information imposed upon him a duty to disclose, the inquiry as to his duty is quite distinct from the inquiry as to the information’s materiality.” Id. “On the other hand, where the disclosure duty arises from the combination of a prior statement and a subsequent event, which, if not disclosed, renders the prior statement false or misleading, the inquiries as to duty and materiality coalesce.” Id.  Like the Second Circuit, we find it “difficult to imagine a circumstance where [a] prior statement would not be rendered misleading” in light of an undisclosed event if the “undisclosed information is material.”

Not felicitously phrased, I’ll grant, but the Ninth Circuit pretty explicitly stated that it found a disclosure duty because, under these circumstances, the combination of Robinhood’s affirmative statements about its performance, and omissions concerning the following quarter, rendered the statements misleading.

One could disagree with that take, for sure, but that requires a fact-specific analysis of precisely what statements were made, the degree of divergence from the undisclosed information, and … I really hope the Supreme Court is up for a close read of a 60-page securities complaint and 399-page registration statement, is what I’m saying.

Anyway, at this point, taking any and all bets on whether the Supreme Court concludes by oral argument that there is no dispute as to the legal standard and therefore the only question is fact specific- application, with, I’ll just throw it out there, remand to the Ninth Circuit to clarify whether it applied the appropriate standard.

And another thing. New Shareholder Primacy podcast is up!  This week, me and Mike Levin talk about a variety of AI things. Here at Apple; here at Spotify; and here at YouTube.

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Photo of Ann Lipton Ann Lipton

Ann M. Lipton is a Professor of Law and Laurence W. DeMuth Chair of Business Law at the University of Colorado Law School.  An experienced securities and corporate litigator who has handled class actions involving some of the world’s largest companies, she joined…

Ann M. Lipton is a Professor of Law and Laurence W. DeMuth Chair of Business Law at the University of Colorado Law School.  An experienced securities and corporate litigator who has handled class actions involving some of the world’s largest companies, she joined the Tulane Law faculty in 2015 after two years as a visiting assistant professor at Duke University School of Law.

As a scholar, Lipton explores corporate governance, the relationships between corporations and investors, and the role of corporations in society.  Read more.