I’m sure we’ve all been riveted by the colorful activist campaign led by Elliott Management Corp challenging the board of directors at Arconic Inc.  In some tellings, it’s a classic battle over whether companies should focus on immediate returns to shareholders (and whether activist pressure encourages short-term thinking), or whether companies should invest in innovation and research in hopes of a longer-term payoff.

This week, Elliott’s challenge netted it a scalp in the form of the forced resignation of the CEO, Klaus Kleinfeld, for sending a personal letter to the head of Elliott Management that vaguely threatened to reveal some apparently scandalous behavior undertaken during the 2006 World Cup.  While denying that any such behavior occurred, Elliot Management demanded Kleinfeld’s ouster, and the Arconic Board complied.

But the battle rages on.  Earlier this month, Arconic announced that if investors voted to seat Elliott’s board nominees, it could trigger the change-of-control provisions in Arconic’s deferred compensation and retirement plans, thus forcing Arconic to make a $500 million pay out.

Which just prompted this Section 14 lawsuit by an Arconic investor, accusing Arconic of manufacturing “fake news” because there is, in fact, no risk of a change of control.  At which point, I mourn the missed opportunity for a “wolf” reference.

(The plaintiff’s argument, by the way, is that a set of directors appointed earlier at Elliott’s urging do not count as part of a new controlling group, and therefore Elliott’s latest nominees constitute only a minority of the board.  The case is City of Atlanta Firefighters’ Pension Fund v. Arconic et al., No. 1:17-cv-02840 (S.D.N.Y.).)

Joking aside, courts have recently looked askance at dead hand proxy puts, even if they do have shareholder value-enhancing effects in the context of loan agreements and bond offerings.  The Arconic situation is a bit more unusual, however, because the obligations are to company employees rather than lenders, and I don’t know whether the same economic effects exist in that context.  The fact that the trust at issue was established for “a select group of management and/or highly compensated employees and former employees” raises the specter – in future cases if not this one – of a new twist on the old golden-parachute-as-takeover-defense.  I am curious to see what courts make of it.

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Photo of Ann Lipton Ann Lipton

Ann M. Lipton is a Professor of Law and Laurence W. DeMuth Chair of Business Law at the University of Colorado Law School.  An experienced securities and corporate litigator who has handled class actions involving some of the world’s largest companies, she joined…

Ann M. Lipton is a Professor of Law and Laurence W. DeMuth Chair of Business Law at the University of Colorado Law School.  An experienced securities and corporate litigator who has handled class actions involving some of the world’s largest companies, she joined the Tulane Law faculty in 2015 after two years as a visiting assistant professor at Duke University School of Law.

As a scholar, Lipton explores corporate governance, the relationships between corporations and investors, and the role of corporations in society.  Read more.