Previously, I blogged about Mivtachem Insurance v. Furtarom, 54 F.4th 82 (2d Cir. 2022), where the Second Circuit held that false statements about a target company – most of which were included in the acquiring company’s S-4 – were not made “in connection with” sales of the acquirer’s securities, and therefore, purchasers of the acquirer’s stock did not have standing to bring Section 10(b) claims against target company officers.
Inevitably, the same thing came up in a pair of cases about SPACs, where purchasers in the publicly-traded SPAC entity wanted to bring claims based on pre-merger false statements about the target company. A New York district court, following Frutarom, denied the claims; a California district court rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning (and dismissed the claims on other grounds, namely, that at the time of the false statements it wasn’t clear that the target company really was going to be a target company).
Anyway, the California case, which involved the Lucid de-SPAC, was just appealed to the Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit … followed the Second Circuit’s rule. In Max Royal LLC v. Atieva, it held:
As noted above, Blue Chip limits standing to “purchasers or
