Photo of Ann Lipton

Ann M. Lipton is a Professor of Law and Laurence W. DeMuth Chair of Business Law at the University of Colorado Law School.  An experienced securities and corporate litigator who has handled class actions involving some of the world’s largest companies, she joined the Tulane Law faculty in 2015 after two years as a visiting assistant professor at Duke University School of Law.

As a scholar, Lipton explores corporate governance, the relationships between corporations and investors, and the role of corporations in society.  Read more.

In Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12800 (2d Cir. July 24, 2015), the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of state law fraud claims arising out of the sale of hybrid CDOs.  The court spent an extraordinary amount of time discussing the concept of loss causation, although to be honest, I’m not at all confident that the extended discussion actually clarifies matters, at least in those circuits that already follow Second Circuit law on the subject. 

(There is currently a circuit split on the definition of loss causation under the federal securities laws, and a newly-filed cert petition asking the Supreme Court to resolve it.  But I digress.)

What I actually was excited to see was the Second Circuit’s discussion of the conditions under which plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their pleadings.

As I previously posted, courts are all over the map about allowing amended pleadings in securities fraud cases.  Some courts are extremely permissive; others essentially grant plaintiffs only one bite at the apple (although that standard is usually more applicable to federal, rather than state, claims).  Many courts have held that if plaintiffs want the

The Halliburton district court finally issued its decision on the plaintiffs’ renewed motion for class certification – and I’m afraid it’s exactly as incoherent as the most pessimistic predictions might have anticipated.  See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 309 F.R.D. 251 (N.D. Tex. 2015).

The district court recognized that, after Halliburton I, it was prohibited from making loss causation determinations as part of the class certification inquiry.  However the district court did hold that if there is no price movement in response to an alleged disclosure (and there is also no price movement when the misstatement is first made), that fact establishes there was no artificial inflation originally. 

In other words, the court believed that the absence of affirmative evidence of price inflation is evidence of absence, and sufficient to carry the defendants’ burden to prove that any misstatements had no effect on prices.  (To be fair, from the opinion, it appears the plaintiffs themselves urged this position).

The court went on to find that the Halliburton defendants had shown there was no price movement on almost all of the alleged corrective disclosure dates – and so class certification would be denied as to those dates.  However, because there was price movement for one disclosure date – December 7, 2001, the last day of the proposed class period – class certification would be granted as to that date.

The problem is, the plaintiffs were seeking class certification for all persons who purchased Halliburton stock from the start of the fraud until the end of the fraud.  The court’s ultimate determination – that one disclosure date was sufficient and others were not – tells the reader nothing about what class can be certified, as though the court had forgotten the entire purpose of the exercise.  I suppose we’ll find out the class definition if an order follows, but for now, the opinion sheds almost no light on that subject.

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Caribbean Cruise Line recently won an interesting victory when Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal held that it could pursue an unfair trade practices claim against the Better Business Bureau for awarding it an “F” rating.  See Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Palm Beach County, Inc., 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 8497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. June 3, 2015).

This was an unusual holding, because BBB ratings are usually treated as protected “opinion” speech under the First Amendment.  Caribbean Cruise Lines got around that, however, by claiming it was not attacking the rating itself, but BBB’s allegedly false representations regarding its methodology for generating the rating.  The court accepted that BBB’s statements about its methodology were factual and, if false, could be the subject of a lawsuit.

If that sounds familiar, it should – it’s exactly the argument that plaintiffs have used in litigation involving mortgage-backed securities.  Numerous plaintiffs have successfully argued that statements regarding appraisals and LTV ratios were false not because the appraisers’ opinions were false, but because the securitizers falsely described the methodology used to reach those opinions. 

Considering the complaints that have been lodged against the BBB, I suppose

A few days ago, Vice Chancellor Laster issued an interesting opinion in In re Appraisal of Dell.  He held that Delaware’s “continuous holder” requirement for appraisal litigation applies at the record holder level – that is, the level of DTC.  Because in this case, due to a technical error, DTC transferred the ownership of the shares to the beneficial owners’ brokers’ names – the street names – the beneficial owners could not maintain their appraisal petition. 

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This week, the Third Circuit issued is long-awaited decision in Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (.pdf), detailing its reasons for its earlier holding that Trinity Wall Street’s shareholder proposal addressing gun sales was excludable from Wal-Mart’s proxy statement.  The decision is interesting in several respects, not the least of which is an apparent split among the panelists regarding the shareholder wealth maximization norm.

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Crowdfunding’s a popular topic here at BLPB, but here’s a use that hadn’t occurred to me.

Apparently, a former SEC lawyer is using Kickstarter to fund an investigation into the fees that CalPERS pays for its private equity investments.   

It all started when CalPERS announced that it didn’t know what it was paying in private equity fees.

This was somewhat surprising.  CalPERS has the money, and is assumed to have the sophistication, to bargain for its interests and at least require firms to make the appropriate disclosures.

Nonetheless, it appeared to be in the dark about its own fee payments.

To be fair, NYC’s Comptroller recently claimed to be shocked by NYC funds’ fees, and the SEC has now begun to aggressively investigate private equity fee and expense disclosure.  It even recently settled a case with KKR alleging that it improperly allocated expenses to fund investors that it should have partially absorbed itself.

 Still, one would have thought that CalPERS, of all funds, could protect itself.

Enter Edward A. H. Siedle, who is seeking public support for his investigation of CalPERS’s fees.  Apparently, he’s done this before: he recently issued a crowd-funded report on Rhode Island’s state

Chen Chen, Xiumin Martin, Sugata Roychowdhury, and Xin Wang have posted a paper to SSRN that attempts to identify firms that suffer from poor internal information flow by comparing the relative insider trading profits of high level managers and low level managers.  They find that when lower level managers make higher profits – suggesting that they have better information than higher level officers – the firm’s external financial reporting suffers.

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I’ve just moved down to New Orleans to join the faculty at Tulane Law School (my bio will be updated  … um, eventually), where I’ll be teaching Business Enterprises and Securities Regulation to start.  As you can imagine, Louisiana is quite a change from both North Carolina and, before that, NYC.  One thing I noticed right off the bat is that most of the banks in Louisiana are local/regional institutions – not many national banks have branches here.  Which means that, as a former plaintiffs’ attorney, for the first time in my adult memory I have a bank account with a financial institution I haven’t sued.

(Sidenote: That was actually kind of an issue when I worked for the law firm then-known as Milberg Weiss.  I was told we had trouble getting firmwide health insurance because we’d sued all the carriers and they didn’t want to do business with us.)

Anyway, as I procrastinate from unpacking….

*actual representation of my apartment

….the big news that has my attention is the AIG verdict.  There have already been conflicting views on what it portends for future bailouts, but what fascinates me is how much of the opinion is devoted to the judge’s moral condemnation of the Fed’s actions, and his moral absolution of AIG, even though the relative good or evil of either player was really not relevant to his ultimate holding.

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There have been a few recent articles in the news discussing diversity – or its lack – among lawyers.

First, Deborah Rhode writes in the Washington Post that law is one of the whitest professions.  People of color make up one fifth of law school grads but only 7 percent of law firm partners – and those numbers drop to 2 or 3 percent in BigLaw.  She argues that among other barriers, unconscious bias still plays a role in hindering the advancement of African American lawyers.  She also points out that women, as well, struggle to make partner – perhaps reflecting the difficulty that women have walking the tightrope of being aggressive enough to do their jobs, but not so aggressive that they come off as unfeminine.

Picking up on these themes, the American Lawyer recently published a report on how BigLaw is failing women.  Sometimes, these failures are attributed to demanding work schedules that make it difficult for women to shoulder responsibilities for childcare – which is why one law firm was recently profiled in the New York Times for hiring mainly women, and allowing them to adjust their schedules around their parenting responsibilities.  But flexible work schedules

Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act prohibits anyone from engaging in manipulative or deceptive activities in connection with a securities transaction.  Rule 10b-5, promulgated under Section 10(b), prohibits anyone from “mak[ing] any untrue statement of a material fact” or “omit[ting] to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made… not misleading” in connection with securities transactions.

Recently, several Section 10(b) lawsuits have been filed alleging that companies hired stock promoters to pen enthusiastic articles about the companies’ prospects.  The lawsuits were apparently inspired by an exposé published at Seeking Alpha regarding stock promoter practices.  The CEO of one of the companies involved was ultimately arrested on charges of criminal securities fraud, both for hiring promoters, and for more garden variety manipulative practices.

In all of these cases, the promotional articles did not disclose that they were paid promotions, nor did they accurately disclose their authorship.  Instead, they were either published under colorful pseudonyms like “Wonderful Wizard,” and “Equity Options Guru,” or under more mundane fictional attributions, such as “James Ratz.”  (A name certainly likely to inspire trust….). 

These cases raise a number of interesting technical questions regarding the scope of Section 10(b), not the least of which is, can the plaintiffs get around Janus?

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