Jessica Erickson has just published a fascinating article on the structure of lead plaintiffs’ counsel arrangements in corporate cases.
Erickson documents how Delaware courts have formally identified “factors” that will be used to select lead counsel, but have informally sent the message that the parties must work out the leadership structure amongst themselves. This means that multiple law firms have an incentive to file claims with no intention of performing serious legal work, solely to negotiate a position in the leadership structure so that they can collect a portion of the fees.
This practice not only results in duplicative lawsuits, but allows lawyers to engage in rent-seeking – extracting fees without performing serious legal work – that can damage incentives for the “real” lawyers, and harm the class.
At this point, I just have to interject with an account of my experiences. I was at Milberg Weiss for a few years (though I was more involved in securities cases under the PSLRA than corporate cases). Milberg frequently worked with co-counsel, and most of the time – no matter which firm was formally appointed lead – Milberg was functionally in charge of the litigation. Co-counsel generally was added to the case
