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Joan Heminway

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Professor Heminway brought nearly 15 years of corporate practice experience to the University of Tennessee College of Law when she joined the faculty in 2000. She practiced transactional business law (working in the areas of public offerings, private placements, mergers, acquisitions, dispositions, and restructurings) in the Boston office of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP from 1985 through 2000.

She has served as an expert witness and consultant on business entity and finance and federal and state securities law matters and is a frequent academic and continuing legal education presenter on business law issues. Professor Heminway also has represented pro bono clients on political asylum applications, landlord/tenant appeals, social security/disability cases, and not-for-profit incorporations and related business law issues. Read More

The Washington and Lee University School of Law seeks to hire a faculty member with research and teaching interests in the fields of corporate law, securities regulation, and regulation of financial industries. Our school has a long history of distinction in these areas, and we are excited to advance our trajectory with this new hire. In addition to this subject area focus, we look for an individual who will embrace and meaningfully contribute to our close-knit, collegial, and intellectually vibrant community.

We warmly invite applications for a tenure-track or tenured position beginning July 1, 2017, and we are particularly focused on lateral candidates. In all cases, candidates for the position must clearly demonstrate a record of excellence in teaching and scholarship. Appointment rank would be commensurate with the candidate’s qualifications and experience.

Washington and Lee University School of Law is an Equal Opportunity employer that adheres to a robust nondiscrimination policy. Our school has a firm commitment to enhancing the diversity of our faculty and, in that regard, we welcome candidates who are members of communities traditionally under-represented in the legal profession and academia.

Kindly direct applications and questions to the Chair of the Faculty Appointments Committee. Applicants should submit…

The summer before I entered law school, I worked in the legal department of a major international business firm.  I learned a lot.  But I realized by the end of the summer that most of the interesting legal questions and matters that the business firm generated (requiring transactional and litigation work) were farmed out to a veritable stable of law firms that represented the business firm on a regular basis.  I then determined (based on my very unscientific single-firm study) that in-house work was not for me.  That was 1982.

Fast-forward 15-or-so years.  By then, I had been working at a major international law firm for twelve years doing transactional work I enjoyed.  A client asked me to interview for an open in-house position.  I did.  I was ready to focus my attention on one business and had a good relationship with the in-house lawyers at the client firm.  Many friends had successfully moved to in-house jobs and were happy and well-adjusted in them (some after trying several to get the right fit).  I was in line to get the job.  But the client then determined to downsize and eliminated the open position.  

Several years later, I resolved to pursue a different path.   I decided to spend my second career teaching and writing about business law–a road well suited to me in many ways but less traveled by business law colleagues.  This was a harder decision to reach in many ways.  But I knew it was right, and in the end, I jumped in with two feet.  In 2000, The University of Tennessee College of Law gave me that opportunity.  The rest is a history that readers likely already know well.

What of the in-house road not taken?  

*The guest post is contributed by Itai Fiegenbaum who teaches corporate law at Tel Aviv University and Ramat Gan College of Law and Business.  

Today’s post continues the discussion started by Anne’s informative post regarding the law of controlling stockholders. Anne astutely notes that the MFW “enhanced ratification” framework was rendered in connection with a going private merger. Although I recognize the intuitive appeal, I wish to call into question the impact of MFW’s holding on other manners of controlling shareholder transactions.

Going private transactions differ from going concern transactions in that their successful completion wipes out the minority float. This distinction accelerates stockholders’ divergent incentives and raises the possibility for minority stockholder abuse. An unscrupulous controller might structure the transaction in a manner that captures all unlocked value for later private consumption. Going private transactions allow controlling stockholders to shed the restrictions of the public market, thereby evading future retribution by minority stockholders. Policy considerations accordingly call for superior protection of minority stockholders participating in a going private transaction.

Since MFW establishes a procedure for achieving less intrusive judicial review for going private transactions, it stands to reason that this procedure should apply to all…

Assume a state trial court issues an opinion in a particular case and the case is not appealed.  Should a legal scholar using the opinion to support or refute a key point (in the text of a written work) characterize the weight or status of the opinion (e.g., noting that it is a trial court opinion and that is has not been appealed)?  Justify your answer.

If the trial court at issue is the Delaware Chancery Court and the opinion addresses matters under the Delaware General Corporation Law, does that alter your answer?  Why?  Why not?

I am having fun considering these issues today in connection with my work on a symposium paper.  I have not yet decided how to handle the specific matter that raises the questions.  Accordingly, it seemed like a good idea at this juncture to share my questions and seek collaboration in answering them . . . .

I am preparing to teach the doctrine on controlling shareholders in my corporations class tomorrow, and found the recent Delaware opinions on non-controlling shareholder cleansing votes and the BJR to be helpful illustrations of the law in this area.

In summer 2016, the Delaware Court of Chancery dismissed two post-closing actions alleging a breach of fiduciary duty where there was no controlling shareholder in the public companies, where the stockholder cleaning vote was fully informed, and applied the 2015 Corwin business judgment rule standard.  The cases are City of Miami General Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust v. Comstock, C.A. No. 9980-CB,  (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2016) (Bouchard, C.) and Larkin v. Shah, C.A. No. 10918-VCS, (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016) (Slights, V.C.), both of which relied upon  Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).  (Fellow BLPB blogger Ann Lipton has written about Corwin here).

The Larkin case clarified that Corwin applies to duty of loyalty claims and will be subject to the deferential business judgment rule in post-closing actions challenging non-controller transactions where informed stockholders have approved the transaction.   The Larkin opinion states that:

(1) when disinterested, fully informed, uncoerced stockholders approve a transaction

…

National Business Law Scholars Conference (NBLSC)
Thursday & Friday, June 8-9, 2017

Call for Papers

The National Business Law Scholars Conference (NBLSC) will be held on Thursday and Friday, June 8-9, 2017, at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. 

This is the eighth meeting of the NBLSC, an annual conference that draws legal scholars from across the United States and around the world.  We welcome all scholarly submissions relating to business law. Junior scholars and those considering entering the legal academy are especially encouraged to participate. 

To submit a presentation, email Professor Eric C. Chaffee at eric.chaffee@utoledo.edu with an abstract or paper by February 17, 2017.  Please title the email “NBLSC Submission – {Your Name}.”  If you would like to attend, but not present, email Professor Chaffee with an email entitled “NBLSC Attendance.”  Please specify in your email whether you are willing to serve as a moderator.  We will respond to submissions with notifications of acceptance shortly after the deadline. We anticipate the conference schedule will be circulated in May. 


Keynote Speaker:

Lynn A. Stout, Distinguished Professor of Corporate & Business Law, Cornell Law School


Plenary Author-Meets-Reader Panel:

Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Corporations, Wall Street, and the Dilemmas of Investor Protection by Donald C. Langevoort…

The Wells Fargo headlines–fresh from a congressional testimony, a spiraling stock price, and a CEO with $41M less dollars to his name— raise the question of whether this is a case study of corporate governance effectiveness or inefficiency. That the wrong doing (opening an estimated 2M unauthorized customer accounts to manipulate sales figures) was eventually unearthed, employees fired and bonus pay revoked may give some folks confidence in the oversight and accountability structures set up by corporate governance. Michael Hiltzit at the LA Times writes a scathing review of the CEO and the Board of Directors failed oversight on this issue.  

The implicit defense raised by Stumpf’s defenders is that the consumer ripoff at the center of the scandal was, in context, trivial — look at how much Wells Fargo has grown under this management. But that’s a reductionist argument. One reason that the scandal looks trivial is that no major executive has been disciplined; so how big could it be? This only underscores the downside of letting executives off scot-free — it makes major failings look minor. The answer is to start threatening the bosses with losing their jobs, or going to jail, and they’ll start to

…

The Stanford Law Review Online has just released a series of essays on Salman v. United States, scheduled for oral argument on Wednesday.  I plan to blog more about the Salman case as/if I can find time this week, but I wanted you to have this link right away–first thing this morning.  The essays are a veritable insider trading feast and are written by some of the most thoughtful scholars in the area: Jill Fisch, Don Langevoort, Jonathan Macey, Donna Nagy, and Adam Pritchard.  There’s something in at least one of the essays for almost everyone out there.

In recent weeks, co-bloggers Ann Lipton and Anne Tucker both have posted on issues relating to the upcoming Supreme Court oral argument in Salman v. U.S.  Indeed, this is an important case for the reason they each cite: resolution of the debate about whether the receipt of a personal benefit should be a condition to tippee liability for insider trading (under Section 10(b) of/Rule 10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended), when the tipper and tippee are close family members.  Certainly, many of us who teach and litigate insider trading cases will be watching the oral argument and waiting for the Court’s opinion to see whether, and if so, how, the law evolves.

Having noted that common interest (as among many) in the Salman case, as I earlier indicated, I have a broader interest in the Salman case because of a current project I am working on relating to family relationships and friendships in insider trading–both as a matter of tipper-tippee liability (as in Salman) and as a matter of the duty of trust and confidence necessary to misappropriation liability.  The project was borne in part of a feeling that I had, based on reported investigations…

Fresh from the presidential debate,** I find myself writing about board room diversity.*** Over the 2016 summer, SEC Chairwoman Mary Jo White signaled intent to revisit diversity in U.S. boardrooms.  In 2009 the SEC adopted a diversity disclosure rule requiring companies to disclose how their nominating committees considered diversity and whether the company had a diversity policy. The full rule can be viewed here.  The SEC did not define (nor did it mandate a singular definition of ) diversity, and companies have been left to define diversity individually, often without regard to gender, ethnic, racial or religious identities.  The result, criticized by Chairwoman White,  has been vague disclosures without apparent impact. 

SEC diversity rule making (past and future) was the backdrop for a recent corporate governance seminar class where I asked students:  Why should they care about board room diversity? And if the 2009 disclosure rule changes, how should it change? How do other countries approach the issue of boardroom diversity?  Can it be a mandated or legislated endeavor?  To guide our discussion we read  Aaron A Dhir’s brilliant and thorough: Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, Governance and Diversity and consulted Catalyst.org to understand the panoply of diversity choices…