In a previous post, I plugged a short piece that was published in the Georgetown Online Journal, and at that time, I explained it was a preview of a longer, in-progress article about the need for a corporate disclosure system intended for non-investor audiences.  I have now posted a draft of that longer paper to SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Not Everything is About Investors: The Case for Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure

Corporations are constantly required to disclose information, but only the federal securities laws impose generalized public disclosure obligations that offer a holistic overview of corporate operations.  Though these disclosures are intended to benefit investors, they are accessible by anyone, and thus have long been relied upon by regulators, competitors, employees, and local communities to provide a working portrait of the country’s economic life.

Today, that system is breaking down.  Congress and the SEC have made it easier for companies to raise capital without becoming subject to the securities disclosure system, allowing modern businesses to grow to enormous proportions while leaving the public in the dark about their operations.  Meanwhile, the governmentally-conferred informational advantage of large investors allows them to tilt managers’ behavior in their favor, at the expense of consumers, employees, and other corporate stakeholders.  As a result, securities disclosures do not provide the comprehensive picture necessary to maintain social control over corporate behavior.

This Article recommends that we explicitly acknowledge the importance of disclosure for noninvestor audiences, and discuss the feasibility of designing a disclosure system geared to their interests.  In so doing, this Article excavates the historical pedigree of proposals for stakeholder-oriented disclosure.  Both in the Progressive Era, and again during the 1970s, efforts to create generalized corporate disclosure obligations were commonplace.  In each era, however, they were redirected towards investor audiences, in the expectation that investors would serve as a proxy for the broader society.  As this Article establishes, that compromise is no longer tenable.

As you can see, this one is a work in progress, so I’m very much interested in hearing everyone’s thoughts.

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Photo of Ann Lipton Ann Lipton

Ann M. Lipton is a Professor of Law and Laurence W. DeMuth Chair of Business Law at the University of Colorado Law School.  An experienced securities and corporate litigator who has handled class actions involving some of the world’s largest companies, she joined…

Ann M. Lipton is a Professor of Law and Laurence W. DeMuth Chair of Business Law at the University of Colorado Law School.  An experienced securities and corporate litigator who has handled class actions involving some of the world’s largest companies, she joined the Tulane Law faculty in 2015 after two years as a visiting assistant professor at Duke University School of Law.

As a scholar, Lipton explores corporate governance, the relationships between corporations and investors, and the role of corporations in society.  Read more.