Brett McDonnell (Minnesota) recently posted a new article entitled Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations.  I have not read the article yet, but it is printed and in my stack for the summer.  The abstract is below. 

Can someone running a business do good while doing well? Can they benefit society and the environment while still making money? Supporters of social enterprises believe the answer is yes, as these companies aim at both making money for shareholders while also pursuing other social benefits. Since 2010, states have begun to enact statutes creating the “benefit corporation” as a new legal form designed to fit social enterprises. Benefit corporations proclaim to the world that they will pursue both social good and profits, and those who run them have a fiduciary duty to consider a broad range of social interests as they make their decisions rather than a duty to focus solely on increasing shareholder value. Does this novel fiduciary duty effectively commit these businesses to doing good? How will courts actually apply this duty in practice? Will this new duty accomplish its goals without unduly high costs?

This article is among the first to

Two of my former colleagues at King & Spalding LLP, Jaron Brown and Tyler Giles, sent me their recently published book, Stock Purchase Agreements Line by Line.  Jaron Brown made partner in King & Spalding’s M&A group before moving in-house to Novelis, Inc.  Tyler Giles moved in-house earlier in his career (to Equifax, Inc.) and has since moved back to law firm life as a partner at FisherBroyles LLP.

The book appears aimed at practitioners, but it could also be a valuable resource for those who teach M&A or drafting courses.  The book includes various practical pointers for drafting typical provisions in a stock purchase agreement and, as the title suggests, goes through an SPA line by line.  The authors are true experts in their subject matter, and I look forward to using the book.   

Earlier this week, Stanford University’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance released a study entitled “How Investment Horizon and Expectations of Shareholder Base Impact Corporate Decision-Making.” Not surprisingly, the 138 North American investor relations professionals surveyed prefer long-term investors so that management can focus on strategic decisionmaking without the distraction of “short-term performance pressures that come from active traders,” according to Professor David F. Larcker. Companies believed that attracting the “ideal” shareholder base could lead to an increase in stock price and a decrease in volatility.

The average “long-term investor” held shares for 2.8 years while short-term investors had an investment horizon of 7 months or less.  Pension funds, top management and corporate directors held investments the longest, and companies indicated that they were least enamored of hedge funds and private equity investors.  Those surveyed had an average of 8% of their shares held by hedge funds and believed that 3% would be an ideal percentage due to the short-termism of these investors. Every investor relations professional surveyed who had private equity investment wanted to see the ownership level down to zero.

I wonder what AstraZeneca’s investor relations team would have said if they could have participated in the survey given

As of earlier this week, B Lab has now certified 1,000 entities as “certified B corporations.”

Given over 1 million entities in Delaware alone, coupled with the fact that B Lab seems willing to certify any type of entity, anywhere in the world, (if the company scores above an 80 on B Lab’s 200 point survey and pays a fee) 1,000 is a relatively small number. Every movement has to start somewhere, however.

As a side note, I have told a number of folks at B Lab that “certified B corporation” is an inappropriate name, given that they certify limited liability companies, among other entity types, but they do not seem bothered by that technicality.  I am guessing my fellow blogger Professor Josh Fershee would share my concern.   

The number of benefit corporations is more difficult to pin down, but is somewhere in the neighborhood of 400 (including public benefit corporations in Delaware and Colorado).

For the major differences between certified B corporations and benefit corporations, see here. Confusingly, both are sometimes called “B Corps.”

While the numbers are currently small, and I have critiques for some of the ways both the certified B corporation and

1) I was not the only person who went to law school because I was terrified of math and accounting. Many of my students did too, which made teaching this required course much harder even after I explained to them how much accounting I actually had to understand as a litigator and in-house counsel.

2) I will always make class participation count toward the grade. Apparently paying tens of thousands of dollars a year for an education is not enough to make some students read their extremely expensive textbooks. A 20% class participation grade is a great incentive. Similarly, I will never allow laptops in the classroom. The subject matter is tough enough without the distraction of Instagram, Facebook and buying shoes on Zappos.

3) Students come to a required course with a wide range of backgrounds- some have never written a check and others have traded in stocks since they were teenagers and use Bitcoin. Teaching to the middle is essential.

4) As I suspected, when students are allowed to use an outline for an exam, they won’t study as hard or as thoroughly, and I will grade harder.

5) Never underestimate how little many students know about the

Joe Leahy (South Texas) recently posted an early draft of an interesting article entitled Corporate Political Contributions as Bad Faith.  He would appreciate any comments readers care to share with him.  The abstract is included below:

A shareholder who files a derivative lawsuit to challenge a corporate political contribution faces long odds, particularly when the shareholder sues under traditional theories for breach of the duty of loyalty, such as waste or self-dealing. However, there is a better theory for a shareholder to employ when filing such a lawsuit: bad faith. Bad faith is a better basis for challenging a corporate political contribution than either waste or self-dealing because bad faith is a more flexible concept than self-dealing and a less difficult standard to satisfy than waste. Even if she intends no harm, a director acts in bad faith when she (1) takes official action that is motivated primarily by any reason other than advancing the corporation’s best interests or (2) consciously disregards her fiduciary duties.

This Article identifies several examples of political contributions – both real and hypothetical – that are ripe for challenge as bad faith because they are made for reasons other than advancing the corporation’s

In the comments to one of Anne Tucker’s earlier posts, I mentioned that Chris Bruner’s book Corporate Governance in the Common-Law World (2013 Cambridge University Press) was on my summer reading list.

Looks like I am a little late to the party.  Over at PrawfsBlawg, there is already a book club on Bruner’s book with a number of excellent posts, including a few by the author.  Maybe the book club inspired demand is one of the reasons I got a letter from Cambridge University Press yesterday letting me know that my copy of Bruner’s book was going to take longer to deliver than expected.

Looking forward to reading the actual book, but for now, the posts make interesting reading.   

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia recently had the opportunity to address the role (if any) of veil piercing in West Virginia LLCs.  The state statute is silent on the subject, but the court determined veil piercing was there, anyway.  It was close, though, as the West Virginia Circuit Court took on the following question with the corresponding answer: 

Does West Virginia’s version of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, codified at W. Va. Code § 31B el seq., afford complete protection to members of a limited liability company against a plaintiff seeking to pierce the corporate veil?

ANSWER: YES

 Kubican v. The Tavern, LLC, 2012 WL 8523515 (W.Va.Cir.Ct.)

Under West Virginia LLC law:

[T]he debts, obligations and liabilities of a limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort or otherwise, are solely the debts, obligations and liabilities of the company. A member or manager is not personally liable for a debt, obligation or liability of the company solely by reason of being or acting as a member or manager. . . . The failure of a limited liability company to observe the usual company formalities or requirements relating to the exercise of its company

Last week I blogged about enterprise risk management,  lawyers, and their “obligations” to counsel clients about human rights risks based in part on statements by the American Bar Association and Marty Lipton of Wachtell, who have cited the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. I posted the blog on a few LinkedIn groups and received some interesting responses from academics, in house counsel, consultants, and outside counsel, which leads me to believe that this is fertile ground for discussion. I have excerpted some of the comments below:

 “Corporations do have risk with respect to human rights violations, and this risk needs to be managed in a thoughtful manner that respects human dignity. I did wonder, though, whether you see any possible unintended consequences of asking attorneys to start advising on moral as well as legal rights?”

“I agree. Great post. Lawyers should always be ready to advise on both legal risks and what I call “propriety”. If a lawyer cannot scan for both risks, then he or she is either incompetent or has integrity issues. Companies that choose to take advice from a lawyer who is incompetent or has integrity issues probably have integrity issues too. I’m

The New York Times Dealbook Blog reports that France is opposing GE’s attempt to acquire a large portion of Alstom:

“While it is natural that G.E. would be interested in Alstom’s energy business,” France’s economy minister, Arnaud Montebourg, said in a letter to Jeffrey R. Immelt, the G.E. chairman and chief executive, “the government would like to examine with you the means of achieving a balanced partnership, rejecting a pure and simple acquisition, which would lead to Alstom’s disappearing and being broken up.”

The government’s legal means for stopping a deal would appear to be limited, though it could refuse to approve such an investment on national security grounds. The government does not hold Alstom shares, but the company is considered important enough to have received a 2.2 billion euro bailout in 2005. And Mr. Montebourg noted in the letter on Monday that the government was Alstom’s most important customer.

Alstom’s energy units, which make turbines for nuclear, coal and gas power plants, as well as the grid infrastructure to deliver electricity, contribute about three-quarters of the company’s 20 billion euros, or about $30 billion, in annual sales.

Alstom is France’s largest industrial entity, and the government says the deal