In my Corporate Finance class this morning, as a capstone experience, I asked my students to read and be prepared to comment on an article I wrote a bit over a decade ago. The article, Federal Interventions in Private Enterprise in the United States: Their Genesis in and Effects on Corporate Finance Instruments and Transactions, 40 Seton Hall L. Rev 1487 (2010), offers information and observations about the U.S. government’s engagements as an investor, bankruptcy transformer, and M&A gadfly/matchmaker in responding to the global financial crisis. A discussion of the article typically leads to a nice review of several things we have covered over the course of the semester. I have a number of topics I want to ensure we engage with, but I allow some free rein.
Today, one of our interesting bits of discussion centered around the possibility that the U.S. government became a controlling shareholder for a time due to the nature of its high percentage ownership interest in, for example, AIG. This was not directly addressed in my article. Nevertheless, we set into a discussion of the substance, citing to Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, one of Josh Fershee’s favorite cases. We also