Corporate Governance

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Last week I had the pleasure of speaking on a panel on global human rights compliance and enterprise risk management with Mark Nordstrom of General Electric and John Sherman of Shift. The panel was part of a conference entitled New Challenges in Risk Management and Compliance at the UConn School of Law Insurance Law Center. 

I spoke about the lack of direct human rights obligations under international law for multinationals, the various voluntary initiatives such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO Tripartite Declaration, the UN Global Compact, ISO 26000, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the Global Reporting Initiative, and accusations of bluewashing. I also discussed Dodd-Frank 1502 (conflict minerals), sustainable stock exchange indices, ESG reporting, SEC proxy disclosure on risk management oversight, socially responsible investors, and the roles of the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board and the International Integrated Reporting Council in spurring transparency and integrated reporting. 

Sherman focused on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which were unanimously endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011 and which contain three pillars, namely the state duty to protect people from human rights abuses by third parties, including business; business’ responsibility to respect…

The NBA’s handling of what the NBA concluded was Donald Sterling’s now-infamous, racist-language-laden phone call with V. Stiviano has generated a lot of commentary (including my own).  As one might expect, the incident has led to some oft-repeated assertions that are not quite right.  So, in taking a break from my grading, I thought I’d deal with a couple of those issues right now. 

To start, if Sterling is forced to sell the Clippers, the NBA and the other team owners are not “taking” anything away from him that he has a right to keep.  He is an owner subject to an agreement that, according to NBA Commissioner Adam Silver, allows the league to force Sterling to sell upon a three-fourths vote of other league owners.  As such, the league has, and has always had, the power to decide if Sterling would be allowed to own a team.  (Why the league owners didn’t act twenty years ago is a legitimate question, but one for another day.)

 That Sterling can be forced to sell should not be news to lawyers, at any rate.  This case reminds me of Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, 562 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. App. 4th Dist. 1990). The case is taught in many Business Organizations courses. In that case, Lawlis was a partner the Kightlinger & Gray law firm. At some point, his alcoholism became a problem, and eventually he told the partners of his issues. Lawlis and his partners reached an agreement about how to move forward (one with a “no-second chances” provision).  Lawlis got things together for a bit, then returned to drinking, and he was given a second chance.  Lawlis apparently got sober and eventually insisted the firm should increase his partnership participation.  Instead, the firm decided to expel him by a 7-to-1 vote (Lawlis was the sole vote against expulsion).  Lawlis sued. 

The court was not convinced, and I would hope any court would look the same way at a vote to remove Sterling as an NBA owner. Even if they needed cause, I would opine that the league has it, but the likely don’t need it.  The Lawlis court explained: 

All the parties involved in this litigation were legally competent and consenting adults well educated in the law who initially dealt at arm’s length while negotiating the . . .  agreements here involved. At the time the partners negotiated their contract, it is apparent they believed . . . the “guillotine method” of involuntary severance, that is, no notice or hearing, only a severance vote to terminate a partner involuntarily need be taken, would be in the best interests of the partnership. Their intent was to provide a simple, practical, and above all, a speedy method of separating a partner from the firm, if that ever became necessary for any reason. We find no fault with that approach to severance.

 Where the remaining partners in a firm deem it necessary to expel a partner under a no cause expulsion clause in a partnership agreement freely negotiated and entered into, the expelling partners act in “good faith” regardless of motivation if that act does not cause a wrongful withholding of money or property legally due the expelled partner at the time he is expelled.

Lawlis,562 N.E.2d at 442-43.

Some have lamented that Sterling will still be a rich man from this, no matter what.  That is true, and the NBA has no way to change that.  Sterling must be properly compensated if he were forced to sell the team. But that’s the point.  In America, Sterling (like anyone else) is permitted (within the bounds of the law) to say racist and misogynist things and be a generally awful person without anyone taking away property.  On the other hand, it appears Sterling agreed to buy a team in a league with an agreement that has a guillotine clause that allows the league to force him to sell.  So be it.

Here are five other related points worth noting (at least, I think so), even if they are not as business-law focused. Click below for more.

Unless you have been under a rock, you’ve probably heard about the racially offensive (and morally repugnent) comments apparently made by Donald Sterling, owner of the NBA’s Los Angeles Clippers, made about African-Americans, including Magic Johnson.  Just moments ago, the league announced how it would respond.

NBA Commissioner Adam Silver announced that an NBA investigation has concluded that Sterling was the voice reflecting hateful speech, views that are “deeply offensive and harmful.”  (Note that the investigation was done by the Wachtell Lipton firm.)   

Commissioner Silver apologized for Sterling’s comments and vowed action. The result: Effective immediately, Sterling is banned for life from games, practices, facilities, and player personnel decisions, and he is barred from executive meetings.  In addition, the maximum fine of $2.5 million is levied, which will for to charities selected jointly by the NBA and the player’s association.  Silver said he will do everything in his power to help force a sale of the team. 

Silver said, “We stand together in condemning Mr. Sterling’s views. They have no place in the NBA.” Sterling said that a three-fourths vote of owners could force Donald Sterling to sell. He did not know how it would proceed, but Silver said he…

Last week the DC Circuit Court of Appeals generally upheld the Dodd-Frank conflict minerals rule but found that the law violated the First Amendment to the extent that it requires companies to report to the SEC and state on their websites that their products are not “DRC Conflict Free.” The case was remanded back to the district court on this issue.

As regular readers of the blog know I signed on to an amicus brief opposing the law as written  because of the potential for a boycott on the ground and the impact on the people of Congo, and not necessarily because it’s expensive for business (although I appreciate that argument as a former supply chain professional). I also don’t think it is having a measurable impact on the violence. In fact, because I work with an NGO that works with rape survivors and trains midwives and medical personnel in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, I get travel advisories from the State Department. Coinicidentally, I received one today as I was typing this post warning that “armed groups, bandits, and elements of the Congolese military [emphasis mine] remain security concerns in the eastern DRC….[they] are known to pillage, steal…

In an opinion released earlier today, the D.C. Circuit Court struck down the SEC’s Dodd-Frank Conflict Mineral Rule under the compelled speech doctrine for failing the least restrictive alternative prong.  

We therefore hold that 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii) & (E), and the Commission’s final rule, 56 Fed. Reg. at 56,362-65, violate the First Amendment to the extent the statute and rule require regulated entities to report to the Commission and to state on their website that any of their products have “not been found to be ‘DRC conflict free.’”

Not striking down the need for information about conflict minerals, but rather the required approach, the Court suggested that: 

[A] centralized list compiled by the Commission in one place may even be more convenient or trustworthy to investors and consumers. The Commission has failed to explain why (much less provide evidence that) the Association’s intuitive alternatives to regulating speech would be any less effective.

In August, 2012, the SEC released final Dodd-Frank rules for conflict minerals “requir[ing] companies to publicly disclose their use of conflict minerals that originated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or an adjoining country.”

-AT

[I]t is counterproductive for investors to turn the corporate governance process into a constant Model U.N. where managers are repeatedly distracted by referenda on a variety of topics proposed by investors with trifling stakes. Giving managers some breathing space to do their primary job of developing and implementing profitable business plans would seem to be of great value to most ordinary investors. –Hon. Leo E. Strine Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUMBIA L. REV. 449, 475 (2014).

When was the last time you remember the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of Corporate Directors, the National Black Chamber of Commerce, American Petroleum Institute, the Latino Coalition, Financial Services Roundtable, Center On Executive Compensation, and the Financial Services Forum joining forces on an issue? Well yesterday they signed on to a petition for rulemaking that was submitted to the SEC regarding the resubmission of shareholder proposals that “fail to elicit meaningful shareholder support.” 

Shareholders who own at least $2,000 worth of a company’s stock for at least one year may require a company to include one shareholder proposal in the company’s proxy statement…

On March 27th, SEC commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher’s delivered the keynote address at the 26th Annual Corporate Law Institute  at Tulane University Law School.  Addressing the intersection of governance and securities disclosure, Commissioner’s Gallagher’s remarks (available here) are summarized below:

Dodd Frank increased the federalization of corporate law.

“This mandated intrusion into corporate governance will impose substantial compliance costs on companies, along with a one-size-fits-all approach that will likely result in a one-size-fits-none model instead.”

Shareholder proposals are costly, problematic and used by only a small group of shareholders with particular interests and agendas that may not be alligned with other shareholders. Citing first to the 41% increase in shareholder proposals post Dodd-Frank, and the meager 7% passage rate, Commission Gallagher outlined which shareholders use the proposal process and the punch line is that only 1% are brought by ordinary institutional investors.

  • 34% are from organized labor;
  • 25% are from social, policy or religious institutions; and
  • 24% of the proposals were brought by just two individuals whom the Commissioner described as “corporate gadflies.”

The shareholder proposal process should be reformed by narrowing the scope of those eligible to bring proposals and the subject matter of the proposals.…

Over at the Harvard LSFOCGAFR, Stephen Cooke, partner and head of the Mergers and Acquisitions practice at Slaughter and May, has posted a fascinating review of “10 Surprises for a US Bidder on a UK Takeover.”  It’s a bit long for a blog post (16 printed pages on my end), but well worth the time if you have any interest at all in the subject matter.  What follows is a very brief excerpt, which is really just a teaser in light of the excellent depth of treatment the post provides.  Given my latest project, “Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory,” I find # 7 to be of particular interest.

Takeovers in the UK are in broad terms decided by the Target’s shareholders, with the Target Board rarely having decisive influence …. Unlike in the US, the Target Board is not the gatekeeper for offers. A Bidder may take its offer direct to shareholders and the Board has no power to block or delay an offer …. The Takeover Code (the “Code”) reflects this environment and, although changes were made post-Cadbury to reflect the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders, it remains a body of rules embodying the pre-eminence…