Litigation

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Prominent corporate governance, corporate finance and economics professors face off in opposing amici briefs filed in DFC Global Corp. v.  Muirfield Value Partners LP, appeal pending before the Delaware Supreme Court.   The Chancery Daily newsletter, described it, in perhaps my favorite phrasing of legal language ever:  “By WWE standards it may be a cage match of flyweight proportions, but by Delaware corporate law standards, a can of cerebral whoopass is now deemed open.”   

Point #1: Master Class in Persuasive Legal Writing: Framing the Issue

Reversal Framing: “This appeal raises the question whether, in appraisal litigation challenging the acquisition price of a company, the Court of Chancery should defer to the transaction price when it was reached as a result of an arm’s-length auction process.”

vs.

Affirmance Framing: “This appeal raises the question whether, in a judicial appraisal determining the fair value of dissenting stock, the Court of Chancery must automatically award the merger price where the transaction appeared to involve an arm’s length buyer in a public sale.”

Point #2:  Summary of Brief Supporting Fair Market Valuation:  Why the Court of Chancery should defer to the deal price in an arm’s length auction

  • It would reduce litigation and

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Spoiler alert:  wrongful refusal of demand and bad faith standards are the same in recent Delaware Court of Chancery case: Andersen v. Mattel, Inc., C.A. No. 11816-VCMR (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 2017, Op by VC Montgomery-Reeves).  

But sometimes a reminder that the law is the same and can be clearly stated is worth a blog post in its own right.  Professors can use this as a hypo or case note and those in the trenches can update case citations to a 2017 (and 2016) case.

In Andersen v. Mattel, Inc., VC Montgomery-Reeves dismissed a derivative suit, holding that plaintiff did not prove wrongful refusal of pre-suit demand.  The derivative action claimed that the Mattel board of directors refused to bring suit to recover up to $11.5 million paid in severance/consulting fees to the former chairman and chief executive officer who left in the wake of a falling stock price. Plaintiff challenged disclosure discrepancies over whether Stockton resigned or was terminated and the resulting entitlement to severance payments.  Mattel’s board of directors unanimously rejected the demand after consultation with outside counsel, 24 witness interviews and a review of approximately 12,400 documents.

The relied upon case law is unchanged, but the clear…

Here we go again. The Oregon Federal District Court has a rule with an incorrect reference to LLCs on the books: 

In diversity actions, any party that is a limited liability corporation (L.L.C.), a limited liability partnership (L.L.P.), or a partnership must, in the disclosure statement required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1, list those states from which the owners/members/partners of the L.L.C., L.L.P., or partnership are citizens. If any owner/member/partner of the L.L.C., L.L.P., or partnership is another L.L.C., L.L.P., or partnership, then the disclosure statement must also list those states from which the owners/members/partners of the L.L.C., L.L.P., or partnership are citizens.
U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules D. Or., Civ LR 7.1-1 (emphasis added). This rules is designed to assist with earlier disclosure to assist in determining diversity jurisdiction and other related issues. As the Practice Tip explains, 
The certification requirements of LR 7.1-1 are broader than those established in Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1. The Ninth Circuit has held that, “[L]ike a partnership, an LLC is a citizen of every state of which its owners/members/partners are citizens.” Johnson v. Columbia Properties Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). Early state citizenship disclosure will help address jurisdictional

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The end of the calendar year brings many things–among others: the holidays (and I hope you have enjoyed and are enjoying them), the release of the last Oscar-contender movies, and the publication of oh-so-many “top ten” lists.

Apropos of the last of those three, I admit to being a bit proud, in a perverse sort of way, about spotting a “top ten” and commenting on it here on the BLPB.  Back in May and June, I blogged about consumer litigation against Starbucks (my daughter’s employer) involving coffee–too much ice, too hot, etc.  Apparently, those types of legal actions are among the “Top Ten Most Ridiculous Lawsuits of 2016.”  Specifically, two of those lawsuits against Starbucks (the one for too much ice and another alleging too much steamed milk) are #1 on the list.  Another consumer suit takes the #2 spot–a legal action asserting that a lip balm manufacturer’s packaging is misleading (specifically, making customers beehive there is more product in the tube than there actually is).  I continue to maintain (while acknowledging that consumer class action litigation can be useful when employed in cases that present a true danger to the consuming public), as I noted…

Last spring, in the wake of Justice Scalia’s passing, I blogged about Justice Scalia’s final business law case: Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Ltd. The oral argument signaled that the Court’s preference for a formalistic, bright line test that asked whether the entity involved was an unincorporated entity, in which case the citizenship of its members controlled the question of diversity, or whether it was formed as an corporation, in which a different test would apply.  The Supreme Court issued its unanimous (8-0) opinion in March, 2016 holding that the citizenship of an unincorporated entity depends on the citizenship of all of its members. Because Americold was organized as a real estate investment trust under Maryland law, its shareholders are its members and determine (in this case, preclude) diversity jurisdiction.   

S.I. Strong, the Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law at the University of Missouri, has a forthcoming article, Congress and Commercial Trusts: Dealing with Diversity Jurisdiction Post-Americold, forthcoming in Florida Law Review.  The article addresses the corporate constitutional jurisprudential questions of how can and should the Supreme Court treat business entities.  What is the appropriate role of substance and form in business law?  Her article offers a decisive reply:

Commercial

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Just in case you haven’t gotten the message yet:  Delaware law means fiduciary duty freedom of contract for alternative entities.  In May 2016, the Delaware Chancery Court upheld a waiver of fiduciary duties in a master limited partnership.  In Employees Retirement System of the City of St. Louis v. TC Pipelines GP, Inc., Vice Chancellor Glasscock upheld challenges to an interested transaction (sale of a pipeline asset to an affiliated entity) that was reviewed, according to the partnership agreement, by a special committee and found to be fair and reasonable.  The waiver has been described as “ironclad” to give you a sense of how straight forward this decision was. No close call here.  

Vice Chancellor Glasscock’s letter opinion starts:

Delaware alternative entity law is explicitly contractual;1 it allows parties to eschew a corporate-style suite of fiduciary duties and rights, and instead to provide for modified versions of such duties and rights—or none at all—by contract. This custom approach can be value enhancing, but only if the parties are held to their bargain. Where equity holders in such entities have provided for such a custom menu of rights and duties by unambiguous contract language, that language must control judicial review of

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Today a number of athletes will compete in various track & field events in the Olympic Trials.

One of those events is the qualifying round of the 800m, and one of the 800m runners, Boris Berian, was recently caught in a legal dispute with his old shoe sponsor (Nike) because of his attempt to sign with a new shoe sponsor (New Balance). The story of the dispute even made The Wall Street Journal. 

You can read the details of the case here, here, and here, but I will attempt to summarize briefly.

As I understand the timeline from the reporting and legal filings:

  • After the 2012 season, Boris dropped out of his division II college (Adams State) to pursue pro-running.
  • For a couple of years, Boris struggled to find world class success, and he worked at McDonald’s.
  • Boris didn’t have a real breakthrough until mid-2015, when he ran the fastest time for an American that year.
  • On June 17, 2015, shortly after his breakthrough race, Boris signed a short-term exclusive sponsorship deal with Nike (chosen from among many suitors).
  • On December 31, 2015, the Nike-Boris contract expired, though the contract gave Nike the right to match any competitor’s bona fide offer within

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Back in May, I posted about a legal action against Starbucks for too much ice in its drinks.  I referenced in that post the earlier legal action taken against Starbucks for under-filling its latte drinks and against McDonald’s for damage done by hot coffee.  I can’t resist adding another hot coffee case to the mix . . . .

Another suit has been brought against Starbucks–my daughter’s employer (as I disclosed at the outset in my previous post).  This time, the case involves damage caused by hot coffee resulting from a bad drive-through pass-off.  The plaintiff requests up to $1 million “for medical expenses, loss of work, and for the mental and physical pain she claims the burning coffee caused her,” according to the news report.  The case involves second-degree burns–a serious matter in anyone’s eyes.  Depending on the facts elucidated at trial, this case may (like the McDonald’s case from 20+ years ago) have some traction in court.  (Apparently, there have been other Starbucks cases involving hot drinks.)

I do feel sorry for plaintiffs who are damaged by hot coffee or beverages.  These cases undoubtedly have more gravitas than cases alleging damages based on the amount of ice or beverage…

If you’ve been slamming away on a writing deadline then perhaps you’ve missed the opportunity (like me) to dive into the recent Chancery Court of Delaware Dell appraisal rights opinion (downloadable here).  Have no fear, your summary is here.

Vice Chancellor Laster valued Dell’s common stock at $17.62 per share, reflecting a 28% premium above the $13.75 merger price that was paid to Dell shareholders in October 2014 in a going private transaction lead by company-founder Michael Dell. Dell’s going private transaction was opposed by Carl Icahn and this juicy, contentious transaction has its own required reading list.  When conceding defeat, Carl Icahn sent the following letter to Dell Shareholders:

New York, New York, September 9, 2013 

Dear Fellow Dell Inc. Stockholders:

I continue to believe that the price being paid by Michael Dell/Silver Lake to purchase our company greatly undervalues it, among other things, because:

1. Dell is paying a price approximately 70% below its ten-year high of $42.38; and

2. The bid freezes stockholders out of any possibility of realizing Dell’s great potential.

Fast forward nearly 3 years later and it seems Vice Chancellor Laster agrees.  VC Laster reached his undervaluation decision despite no finding of significant…

A former law student of mine who practices in Delaware just alerted me to this Delaware Online article. 

The article describes the proposed bill as follows:

House Bill 371 would restrict the number of corporate shareholders who can petition the court for a stock appraisal to only those who own $1 million or more of a company’s stock or 1 percent of the outstanding shares, depending on which is less. Currently, any shareholder can ask the court to appraise their shares. Those motions are typically filed when a company is the target of an all-cash acquisition and the shareholder wants to ensure the buyer is paying a fair price for the stock. (emphasis added)

Corporate governance expert Charles Elson is quoted as saying:

. . . he understands the argument on both sides. “Anytime you attempt to restrict the rights of a smaller shareholder, it is going to be controversial whether or not the approach is warranted”

The article cites co-authored work by my Nashville neighbor, Randall Thomas (Vanderbilt Law):

A study published earlier this month by four noted corporate law professors, including Wei Jang of Columbia Business School and Randall S. Thomas of Vanderbilt Law School, found that hedge funds have

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