At the 2017 AALS annual meeting, January 3-7 in San Francisco, the AALS Sections on Agency, Partnerships LLCs, and Unincorporated Associations & Nonprofit and Philanthropy Law will hold a joint session on LLCs, New Charitable Forms, and the Rise of Philanthrocapitalism.

In December 2015, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg and his wife, Dr. Priscilla Chan, pledged their personal fortune—then valued at $45 billion—to the Chan-Zuckerberg Initiative (CZI), a philanthropic effort aimed at “advancing human potential and promoting equality.” But instead of organizing CZI using a traditional charitable structure, the couple organized CZI as a for-profit Delaware LLC. CZI is perhaps the most notable example, but not the only example, of Silicon Valley billionaires exploiting the LLC form to advance philanthropic efforts. But are LLCs and other for-profit business structures compatible with philanthropy? What are the tax, governance, and other policy implications of this new tool of philanthrocapitalism? What happens when LLCs, rather than traditional charitable forms, are used for “philanthropic” purposes?

From the heart of Silicon Valley, the AALS Section on Agency, Partnerships LLCs, and Unincorporated Associations and Section on Nonprofit and Philanthropy Law will host a joint program tackling these timely issues. In addition to featuring invited speakers, we seek speakers

March has provided a slate of mistakes as to entity form, focusing (as it almost always does) on limited liability companies (LLCs) and various outlets calling such entities “corporations.”  These are not in any particular order, but lists are neat. Enjoy! 

(1 ) Politifact Checks Trump Facts, Forgets to Check Entity Law Facts

In an article on Politifact.com, Donald Trump incorrectly says Virginia winery is the largest on East Coast, which determines that Trump’s claims about the size of a winery that his son runs to be false and notes some statements are incorrect. Ironically, the article also claims: 

A legal disclaimer on the winery website says the GOP presidential candidate doesn’t own the winery. The venture is a limited liability corporation, and its owners are not a matter of public record.

Wrong. The winery site says, “Trump Winery is a registered trade name of Eric Trump Wine Manufacturing LLC, which is not owned, managed or affiliated with Donald J. Trump, The Trump Organization or any of their affiliates.”  An LLC is still not a corporation. 

(2) Big Bang Theory: Big Brains Don’t Know Entity Law

I don’t watch the Big Bang Theory, but my colleague at Valparaiso University, Professor Rebecca J. Huss, is a reader

In my Energy Business: Law & Strategy course, I use Larry A. DiMatteo’s article, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 47 Am. Bus. L.J. 727 (2010).  I have been using the article in the class since 2012 (this is the third time I have taught it), and I think it does a great job of providing a theoretical backdrop for practical application.  I teach the article in combination with a one-sided proposed Memorandum of Understanding to help students think about the contracting process and and the long-term implications of what might seem like a small-scale negotiation. I highly recommend the piece.  

In reading the article this time around, though, I was struck by how differently the piece treats limited liability companies (LLCs) and corporations and the way concerns about opportunistic behavior are raised in the context of the latter.   In one portion of the article, DiMatteo notes: 

Corporate strategy that fails to take account of the strategic use of law is likely to waste opportunities for competitive advantages. A corporate legal strategy can be used to gain competitive advantages both internally and externally.

I wholeheartedly agree, and this is part of the reason I teach my course.  Although I don’t think

Our Kentucky “brother,” Tom Rutledge, sent me a link to a super blog post yesterday on Mortgage Grader Inc. v. Ward & Olivo, a limited liability partnership case currently before the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Tom’s focus in his post was the limited liability aspect of the case, which is fascinating–and more than a bit unsettling for those practicing in jurisdictions like New Jersey and Kentucky that require law firms organizing limited liability partnerships to maintain malpractice insurance.  The question before the court: whether, in the absence of an express provision in the partnership statute, the failure of a law firm organized as a limited liability partnership to maintain required malpractice insurance results in the loss of the partnership’s limited liability status.  The trial court ruled that the lapse of malpractice insurance caused a loss of limited liability status; the appeals court reversed.

But Tom also mentions another aspect of the case in his post that I want to call out here.  Specifically, he notes references in the appellate court opinion to the conversion of a partnership to a limited liability partnership.  Here’s what he says on that point:

One potentially disturbing aspect of the language used by the Court of Appeals and in the oral argument is the notion that the loss of LLP status and the treatment of the firm as a general partnership is some sort of conversion. But it isn’t. An LLP is a general partnership that has elected into a special status – it is still a general partnership but for the rule of partner limited liability. . . .

This comment reminded me of co-blogger Josh Fershee‘s super-helpful obsession (maybe too strong a word?) with “limited liability corporation” as an incorrect judicial (and other) descriptor of the limited liability company business form.  (See, e.g., his December 2015 post here.)  And far be it from me to disagree with either of these guys in making their respective points about these labeling inaccuracies!  

As a separate point, I want to call out the fact that this area of partnership law can be important both for bar examinations (thinking of all those folks suffering through that test this week . . .) and IRL.  In fact, I was asked a question recently about the Tennessee provision on limited liability elections by a BARBRI student.  (Little-known fact: I teach the Tennessee BARBRI segments on agency, unincorporated entities, and personal property.)  The student’s question did not inappropriately refer to a conversion of a partnership into a limited liability partnership, but it did point out several differences in Tennessee law in this area that I want to mention.

I love your most recent post, Josh, and have been truly enjoying the ensuing commentary/conversation. I took on the “is it a contract?” issue in the LLC context because of questions similar to those raised in your post and in the comments it generated. I admit that the partnership issue on which you posted has fascinated me for quite some time. (I first encountered it when I undertook to teach Business Associations almost 16 years ago . . . .)

I have to push back on your analysis a bit, however.  In particular, here’s the part of your post with which I have some trouble:

There must be an agreement to associate for a purpose. To me, that requires consideration and assent.  If one has associated sufficiently under the law to make one both a partner and an agent of another (and thus liable for the partner), I don’t see how there is a lack of sufficient consideration or assent to form a contract.

Why does an association for a purpose require an agreement? To “associate” is to combine, connect, or link. The concept of an association builds from that: “connection or combination” or “an organization of people with a common

My co-blogger Joan Heminway a short while back wrote a great article, The Ties That Bind: LLC Operating Agreements as Binding Commitments, 68 SMU L. Rev. 811 (2015). (symposium issue)

I often (and perhaps even usually) agree with Joan on issues of law and life, but there’s a spot in Joan’s article with which I disagree.  Joan says:

Although partnership law varies from state to state, as a general matter, partners are not expressly required to contract to form a partnership,88 and a partnership agreement is not defined in a manner that mandates adherence to the common law elements of a contract.89

  1. Under the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, a partnership exists when two or more persons associate as co-owners to carry on a business for profit. REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 101(6), 202(a) (1997).
  2. See, e.g., Sewing v. Bowman, 371 S.W.3d 321, 332 (Tex. App.– Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.). The Revised Uniform Partnership Act provides the following definition for a partnership agreement: “the agreement, whether written, oral, or implied, among the partners concerning the partnership, including amendments to the partnership agreement.” REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 101(7).

Joan has case law support, so at least in

Still grading, and (in the process) reflecting on the line in Marcia Narine’s post from last week on the references to “creepy tender offers” and “limited liability corporations” in her students’  final exam submissions . . . .  I thought I might share today a few of my own favorite outtakes from my students’ Business Associations exams.  I know that the time crunch and the nature of the exam software contribute mightily to the typing errors in student submissions, but on the reading end, some of the answers submitted are just . . . well . . . funny.  As you’ll no doubt note, today’s post focuses mostly on closely held corporations (with one typo relating to limited partnerships).

First , there are, of course, the transposed letters.  Most of these don’t warrant more than a brief mention.  The limited partnership act references to UPLA and RUPLA, instead of ULPA and RULPA fit into this category.  Similar are the inevitable variants of case names (Donahue becoming Danahue, Donahur, and Donaue, etc.). 

Then, there are the many misspelling of fiduciary(ies)–which I have come to believe may just be a hard word to type.  (Or maybe no one actually knows how to spell it.)  Un

As I continue my mission to solidify the limited liability company (LLC) as its own entity, and not a corporation or corporate derivative, I have come to realize that U.S.-based distinctions are usually easier than international ones. One challenge we have is that we often try to find direct entity analogies from country to country, when none may exist.  

Case in point: Over at Lexology.com lat week, an article titled Is litigation funding in peril? appeared.  The article states, “In its ruling (KKO 2015:17), the Finnish Supreme Court found that under certain criteria it is possible to hold the shareholders of a limited liability company liable for the company’s liabilities.” So, if this were a U.S. LLC, we’d know there are no “shareholders” of an LLC.  We have members (or should).  But, I am no expert in Finnish law, but it is different than U.S. law.  According to Wikipedia (that all-knowing source), Osakeyhtiö, abbreviated Oy, means “stock company,” thought others sources says it means “limited company” or limited stock company.” Nonetheless, the shareholder characterization appears acceptable for a Finnish (but not a U.S.) entity.    

Finnish entities do not break down the same way as U.S. entities (this is not surprising).  Thus

This post concludes the Contract Is King, But Can It Govern Its Realm? Micro-symposium.  The symposium was hosted as part of the AALS section on Agency, Partnership, LLCs and Unincorporated Associations in advance of the section meeting on January 7th at 1:30 where the conversation will be continued.

I summarized the conversation and provided links to all of the individual posts.  Bookmark this page– there is great commentary at your finger tips on a range of topics.  Please keep reading (and commenting) on these great contributions by our insightful participants to whom we are very grateful.

Jeffrey Lipshaw kicked off the symposium conversation with his post (available here) questioning, in practice, how different LLCs are from traditional corporations.  He used a great map analogy to talk about the role of formation documents and default rules as gap fillers. 

“The contractual, corporate, and uncorporate models are always reductions in the bits and bytes of information from the complex reality, and that’s what makes them useful, just as a map of Cambridge, Massachusetts that was as complex as the real Cambridge would be useless.” 

After asserting that LLCs differ from corporations only in matters of degrees, Jeff went on to

Guest Post by Daniel Kleinberger

Part IV– Delaware’s Implied Contractual Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Delaware case law applying the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing to a limited partnership dates back to at least 1993,[i] and Delaware’s limited partnership and limited liability company acts have expressly recognized the covenant since 2004.[ii] However, the contents of the implied covenant have not always been crystal clear.[iii]

     A passage from a 2000 Chancery Court decision is illustrative:

The implied covenant of good faith requires a party in a contractual relationship to refrain from arbitrary or unreasonable conduct which has the effect of preventing the other party to the contract from receiving the fruits of the contract.  This doctrine emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified expectations of the other party.  The parties’ reasonable expectations at the time of contract formation determine the reasonableness of the challenged conduct.  [C]ases invoking the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be rare and fact-intensive.  Only where issues of compelling fairness arise will this Court embrace good faith and fair dealing and imply terms in an agreement.[iv]

     This