Research/Scholarhip

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I try to read everything Lyman Johnson writes, so my Thanksgiving break reading is his recent book chapter The Reconfiguring of Revlon. The abstract is below:

Three decades later, an irksome uncertainty still impedes a settled understanding of the Delaware Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. For such a towering doctrine, Revlon’s underlying rationales remain controversial, its exact contours and demands continue to be surprisingly unclear, and it holds out scant hope for remedial relief. In spite of these troubling features of today’s Revlon jurisprudence, however, Revlon is slowly being worked back into the larger fabric of Delaware’s fiduciary duty law and away from being a gangling, standalone doctrine. The organizing themes of this judicial project are strong deference in the deal context to decisions made by independent directors without regard to deal structure, the substantially reduced likelihood of equitable or monetary remedies in all types of deal-related lawsuits, and a nascent effort at harmonizing Revlon with Delaware’s more general, and ill-defined, doctrine on corporate purpose.

This chapter discusses the original Revlon decision and its rapid expansion before turning to lingering uncertainties surrounding the reach of Revlon, the decline of Revlon’s remedial

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Jill Fisch (Penn) recently posted an essay entitled The Mess at Morgan: Risk, Incentives and Shareholder Empowerment.

The entire essay is worth reading, but I think her argument can be summed up with this quote: 

This essay argues that the effort to employ shareholders as agents of public values and, thereby, to inculcate corporate decisions with an increased public responsibility is misguided. The incorporation of publicness into corporate governance mistakenly assumes that shareholders’ interests are aligned with those of non-shareholder stakeholders. Because this alignment is imperfect, corporate governance is a poor tool for addressing the role of the corporation as a public actor. (pg. 651)

Jill Fisch argues that economic regulation may be a better solution to the problem of protecting the public than shareholder empowerment. (pg. 684).

While I acknowledge the essay’s mentioned limitations on shareholder empowerment, I don’t think economic regulation is the only alternative solution to the problem of protecting public values. As Jill Fisch notes “shareholder empowerment might be defended on the basis that it is less intrusive than direct regulation.” Corporate governance mechanisms other than shareholder empowerment may be both less intrusive and more effective than direct regulation. For example, (non-shareholder) stakeholder empowerment may…

I had the honor of being invited to speak at the annual symposium for the Wayne Law Review two weeks ago.  The event, which focused on Corporate Counsel as Gatekeepers, was well organized and attended–and also very stimulating.  Speakers included Tony West as a keynote, a few of us academics, and a bunch of current and former practitioners–prosecutors, in-house counsel, and outside counsel.

My presentation focused on a story that bugs me–a story built on an experience I had in practice.  In the story (which modifies the true facts), an executive flagrantly violates a securities trading compliance plan that I drafted in connection with a subsequent transaction that I worked on for the executive’s firm.  Specifically, the executive informs a friend about the transaction the day before it is announced, believing that the friend will never trade on the information.  The friend trades.  The incident results in a stock exchange and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) inquiries.  No enforcement is undertaken against the firm.  However, the executive signs a consent decree with–and pays a cash penalty to–the SEC and, together with the firm, suffers public humiliation via a front-page article in the local newspaper (since the SEC would not agree to forego a press release).  This fact pattern gnaws at me because I wonder whether there is anything more legal counsel can do to prevent an executive from violating a compliance policy to the detriment of himself and the firm . . . .

This week I thanked the law review editors at the West Virginia Law Review for their hard work on my forthcoming article. They seemed truly grateful for the thanks, which was well deserved, and it made me think that I should thank law review editors more often.

Law review editors put in a tremendous amount of time working on our articles, often well after-hours given all of their other commitments. Even when the process is frustrating, I think we need to be thankful and professional. Also, given that I have had a few rough editing experiences, I now state my preferences up front, which (at least this time) led to better results. 

Somewhat related, over at PrawfsBlawg, Andrew Chongseh Kim has a couple posts on the law review process: one on exploding offers and one on peer review of law review articles.

Personally, I don’t have a problem with exploding offers, and I actually think more law reviews should use them. The submission game incentivizes submission to many journals and trading up multiple times. This process wastes an incredible amount of student editor time and they have every right to effectively shut down the expedite process.

As I have…

BLPB guest-blogger Todd Haugh (Indiana University – Kelley School of Business) has a new article in the Vanderbilt Law Review entitled Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm. The abstract is reproduced below:

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The harms of overcriminalization are usually thought of in a particular way—that the proliferation of criminal laws leads to increasing and inconsistent criminal enforcement and adjudication. For example, an offender commits an unethical or illegal act and, because of the overwhelming depth and breadth of the criminal law, becomes subject to too much prosecutorial discretion and faces disparate enforcement or punishment. But there is an additional, possibly more pernicious, harm of overcriminalization. Drawing from the fields of criminology and behavioral ethics, this Article makes the case that overcriminalization actually increases the commission of criminal behavior itself, particularly by white collar offenders. This occurs because overcriminalization, by lessening the legitimacy of the criminal law, fuels offender rationalizations. Rationalizations are part of the psychological process necessary for the commission of crime—they allow offenders to square their selfperception as “good people” with the illegal behavior they are contemplating, thereby allowing the behavior to go forward. Overcriminalization, then, is more than a post-act concern. It is inherently criminogenic because it facilitates some…

Christine Hurt has written an interesting article on limited liability partnerships in bankruptcy. It’s available here.

Here’s the abstract:

Brobeck. Dewey. Howrey. Heller. Thelen. Coudert Brothers. These brand-name law firms had many things in common at one time, but today have one: bankruptcy. Individually, these firms expanded through hiring and mergers, took on expensive lease commitments, borrowed large sums of money, and then could not meet financial obligations once markets took a downturn and practice groups scattered to other firms. The firms also had an organizational structure in common: the limited liability partnership.

In business organizations classes, professors teach that if an LLP becomes insolvent, and has no assets to pay its obligations, the creditors of the LLP will not be able to enforce those obligations against the individual partners. In other words, partners in LLPs will not have to write a check from personal funds to make up a shortfall. Creditors doing business with an LLP, just as with a corporation, take this risk and have no expectation of satisfaction of claims by individual partners, absent an express guaranty. In bankruptcy terms, creditors look solely to the capital of the entity to satisfy claims. While bankruptcy proceedings involving…

As some of you may know, I have been focused on crowdfunding intermediation in my research of late.  My articles in the U.C. Davis Business Law Journal and the Kentucky Law Journal both touch on that topic, and a forthcoming chapter in an international crowdfunding book and several articles in process follow along that trail.  (I also have the opportunity to look into gatekeeper intermediary issues outside the crowdfunding context at an upcoming symposium at Wayne State University Law School, about which I will say more in a subsequent post.)  The underlying literature on financial intermediation is super-interesting, and it continues to grow in breadth and depth as I research and write.

Given my interest in this area, I was delighted to see that Larry Cunningham is contributing to the debate, following on his already-rich work relating to Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway.  As you may recall, Larry was our guest here at the Business Law Prof Blog back in 2014.  You can read my Q&A with him here and his posts here and here.

Larry recently posted an essay responding to Kathryn Judge‘s Intermediary Influence, 82 U Chi L Rev 573 (2015).  In her article, Professor…

Alicia Plerhoples (Georgetown) has the details about the first benefit corporation IPO: Laureate Education.*

She promises more analysis on SocEntLaw (where I am also a co-editor) in the near future.

The link to Laureate Education’s S-1 is here. Laureate Education has chosen the Delaware public benefit corporation statute to organize under, rather than one of the states that more closely follows the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation. I wrote about the differences between Delaware and the Model here.

Plum Organics (also a Delaware public benefit corporation) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the publicly-traded Campbell’s Soup, but it appears that Laureate Education will be the first stand-alone publicly traded benefit corporation.

*Remember that there are differences between certified B corporations and benefit corporations. Etsy, which IPO’d recently, is currently only a certified B corporation. Even Etsy’s own PR folks confused the two terms in their initial announcement of their certification.

Stephen Choi (NYU), Jill Fisch (Penn), Marcel Kahan (NYU), and Ed Rock (Penn) have posted an interesting new paper entitled Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?

The authors report the dramatic increase in majority voting provisions. In 2006, only 16% of the S&P 500 companies used majority voting, but by January of 2014, over 90% of the S&P 500 companies had adopted some form of majority voting. (pg. 6). As of 2012, 52% of mid-cap companies and 19% of small-cap companies had adopted majority voting provisions. (pg. 7)

For the most part, the spread of majority voting has not led to significant reduction in election of nominated directors. In over 24,000 director nominations from 2007 to 2013, at companies with majority voting provisions, “only eight (0.033%) [nominees] failed to receive a majority of ‘for’ votes.” (pg.4)

The authors claim that their “most dramatic finding is”:

a substantial difference between early and later adopters of majority voting. The early adopters of majority voting appear to be more shareholder-responsive than other firms. These firms seem to have adopted majority voting voluntarily, and the adoption of majority voting has made little difference in shareholder-responsiveness going forward. By contrast, later adopters, as a group, seem

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Last week I ventured a few blocks from Belmont’s campus to our neighbor Vanderbilt University Law School for their conference on The Future of International Corporate Governance. 

One of the many interesting papers presented was Independent Directors in Singapore: Puzzling Compliance Requiring Explanation by Dan Puchniak and Luh Luh Lan, both of the National University of Singapore.

The entire paper is worth reading, but I want to share three take-aways with our readers.

  1. “[O]nly a handful of jurisdictions [roughly 7%] have ever adopted the American concept of the independent director (i.e., where directors who are independent from management only— but not substantial shareholders—are deemed to be independent).” (pg. 6)

  2. Singapore adopted an American-style definition of “independent director” in 2001, which did not include independence from substantial shareholders. Despite this weaker definition of independence in a jurisdiction with much more concentrated shareholding than the U.S., Singapore enjoyed relative success through “functional substitutes” that limited the private benefits of control. According to the authors, these “functional substitutes” include social relationships in Family Controlled Firms (“FCFs”)” and legally imposed limits on the controlling government shareholder in Government Linked Companies (“GLCs”). 

  3. Despite relative success with the American-style definition of “independent director,” Singapore

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