Last week I attended a panel discussion with angel investors and venture capitalists hosted by Refresh Miami. Almost two hundred entrepreneurs and tech professionals attended the summer startup series to learn the inside scoop on fundraising from panelists Ed Boland, Principal Scout Ventures; Stony Baptiste, Co-Founder & Principal, Urban.Us, Venture Fund; Brad Liff, Founder & CEO, Fitting Room Social, Private Equity Expert; and (the smartest person under 30 I have ever met) Herwig Konings, Co-Founder & CEO of Accredify, Crowd Funding Expert. Because I was typing so fast on my iPhone, I didn’t have time to attribute my notes to the speakers. Therefore, in no particular order, here are the nuggets I managed to glean from the panel.

1) In the seed stage, it’s more than an idea but less than a business. If it’s before true market validation you are in the seed round. At the early stage, there has been some form of validation, but the business is not yet sustainable. Everything else beyond that is the growth stage.

2) The friend and family round is typically the first $50-75,000. Angels come in the early stage and typically invest up to $500,000.

3)

A lawyer representing Fordham Law School Professor (and Riverbed Technology shareholder) Sean Griffith argued in Delaware court that a class action settlement related to Riverbed Technology’s  $3.6 billion sale to private equity firm Thoma Bravo was bad for shareholders and good for the lawyers involved, Reuters reports.  

Prof. Griffith told Reuters that “he has been buying stock of companies that have announced merger deals and intends to object to settlements if he feels the litigation is not serving stockholders.” He asserts that the shareholders’ attorneys “are in cahoots” to reach a settlement, without regard to value.  

This raises some interesting questions of law and policy with regard to the Professor’s role here.  As a shareholder, Griffith has the right to object (assuming his time of ownership satisfies the applicable statute).  But how should a court assess the objection of a shareholder who has admitted that he bought stock for the purpose of objecting to settlements not in the interests of shareholders, when that shareholder has expressed ideological concern about the value of all disclosure-only settlements? 

Is Prof. Griffith’s desire to protect shareholders a desire to enhance short- or long-term wealth of the entity from greedy lawyers and bad managers?

Love him or hate him, you can’t deny that President Obama has had an impact on this country. Tomorrow, I will be a panelist on the local public affairs show for the PBS affiliate to talk about the President’s accomplishments and/or failings. The producer asked the panelists to consider this article as a jumping off point. One of the panelists worked for the Obama campaign and another worked for Jeb Bush. Both are practicing lawyers. The other panelist is an educator and sustainability expert. And then there’s me.

I’ve been struggling all week with how to articulate my views because there’s a lot to discuss about this “lame duck” president. Full disclosure—I went to law school with Barack Obama. I was class of ’92 and he was class of ’91 but we weren’t close friends. I was too busy doing sit-ins outside of the dean’s house as a radical protester railing against the lack of women and minority faculty members. Barack Obama did his part for the movement to support departing Professor Derrick Bell by speaking (at minute 6:31) at one of the protests. I remember thinking then and during other times when Barack spoke publicly that he would run

I read with interest the recently released opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Trinity Wall Street v. Walmart Stores, Inc.  The Wall Street Journal covered the publication of the opinion earlier in the month, and co-blogger Ann Lipton wrote a comprehensive post sharing her analysis on the substance of the decision over the weekend.  (I commented, and Ann responded.)  Of course, like Ann, as a securities lawyer, I was interested in the court’s long-form statement of its holding and reasoning in the case.  But I admit that what pleased me most about the opinion was its use of legal scholarship written by my securities regulation scholar colleagues.

Tom Hazen‘s Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation is cited frequently for general principles.  This is, as many of you likely already know, an amazing securities regulation resource.  I also will note that many of my students find Tom’s hornbook helpful when they are having trouble grappling with securities regulation concepts covered in the assigned readings in my class.

Donna Nagy‘s excellent article on no-action letters (Judicial Reliance on Regulatory Interpretation in S.E.C. No-Action Letters: Current Problems and a Proposed Framework, 83

I noted with favor the other day (to myself, privately) the helpful and interesting commentary on The Glom of our trusted colleague and co-blogger, Usha Rodrigues, regarding the recent press reports on Mylan N.V.’s related-party disclosures.  As the story goes, a firm managed and owned in part by the Vice Chair of Mylan’s board of directors sold some land to an entity owned by one of the Vice Chair’s business associates for $1, and that entity turned around the same day and sold the property to Mylan for its new headquarters for $2.9 million.  Usha’s post focuses on both the mandatory disclosure rules for related-party transactions and the mandatory disclosure rules on codes of ethics.  Two great areas for exploration.

A reporter from the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review called me Thursday to talk about the Mylan matter and some related disclosure issues.  He and I spoke at some length yesterday.  That press contact resulted in this story, published online late last night.  The reporter was, as the story indicates, interested in prior related-party disclosures made by Mylan involving transactions with family members of directors.  This led to a more wide-ranging discussion about the status of family members for various different securities regulation purposes.  It is from this discussion that my quote in the article is drawn.  But our conversation covered many other interesting, related issues.

I have been reading Paul Mahoney’s brilliant new book, Wasting a Crisis: Why Securities Regulation Fails (University of Chicago Press 2015). You should too.

Mahoney attacks the traditional market failure rationale for our federal securities laws. He argues that contrary to the traditional narrative, market manipulation was not rampant prior to 1933 and the securities markets were operating reasonably well. Mahoney concludes that “‘lax’ regulation was not a substantial cause of the financial problems accompanying the Great Depression and . . . most (although not all) of the subsequent regulatory changes were largely ineffective and in some cases counterproductive.”

Mahoney looks at state blue sky laws, the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, the Public Utility Holding Company Act, and, regrettably only briefly, the Investment Company Act. He concludes by discussing the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts. He discusses the rationales for each regulation and whether those rationales are supported by the facts. Mahoney backs up his argument with a great deal of empirical research, some of which has appeared in earlier articles. Warning: Some of that discussion may be a little difficult for those without a background in regression analysis or financial economics, but you can follow Mahoney’s conclusions without understanding

As I earlier noted, on June 23rd, I moderated a teleconference on proposals to shorten the Section 13(d) reporting period, currently fixed by statute and regulation at 10 days.  If you don’t mind registering with Proxy Mosaic, you can listen to the program.  The link is here.

The discussion was lively–as you might well imagine, given that one of the participants represents activist shareholders and the other represents public companies.  A number of interesting things emerged in the discussion, many (most) of which also have been raised in other public forums on Schedule 13D, including those referenced and summarized here, here, and here, among other places.

  • Exactly how does the Section 1d(d) reporting requirement protect investors or maintain market integrity or encourage capital formation?  Or is it just a hat-tipping system to warn issuers about potential hostile changes of control, chilling the potential for the market for corporate control to run its natural course?  Of course, the answer to many questions about Section 13(d) depends on our understanding of the policy interests being served.  It’s hard to tinker with the reporting  system if we cannot agree on the objectives it seeks to achieve . .

Last week, S.E.C Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, gave a speech, Activism, Short-Termism, and the SEC: Remarks at the 21st Annual Stanford Directors’ College. I agree with many of Commissioner Gallagher’s views on short-termism, and (I will semi-shamelessly note) he cited one of my earlier posts about the role of activists on board decision making. In his remarks, he said, with regard to short-termsim (i.e., companies operating for short term rather than long-term gains):

The current picture is bleak . . . 

Clearly, there’s a way for all the parties . . . to co-exist peacefully. The SEC sets a level playing field; companies manage themselves for the long-term with the vigorous oversight of the board; and activists put pressure on those companies that fall short of that ideal.[47] Unfortunately, we are not in that happy place. Rather, there seems to be a predominance of short-term thinking at the expense of long-term investing. Some activists are swooping in, making a lot of noise, and demanding one of a number of ways to drive a short-term pop in value: spinning off a profitable division, beginning a share buy-back program, or slashing capital expenditures or research and development expenses. Having inflated

Last week I posted the first of three posts regarding doing business in Cuba. In my initial post I discussed some concerns that observers have regarding Cuba’s readiness for investors, the lack of infrastructure, and the rule of law issues, particularly as it relates to Cuba’s respect for contracts and debts. Indeed today, Congress heard testimony on the future of property rights in Cuba and the claims for US parties who have had billions in property confiscated by the Castro government- a sticking point for lifting the embargo. (In 1959, Americans and US businesses owned or controlled an estimated 75-80% of Cuban land and resources). Clearly there is quite a bit to be done before US businesses can rush back in, even if the embargo were lifted tomorrow. This evening, PBS speculated about what life would be like post-embargo for both countries. Today I will briefly discuss the Cuban legal system and then focus the potential compliance and ethical challenges for companies considering doing business on the island.

Cuba, like many countries, does not have a jury system. Cuba’s court system has a number of levels but they have both professional judges with legal training, and non-professional judges who are

In response to one of my posts last week, co-blogger Josh Fershee raised concern about making minor changes to securities regulation–in that case, in the context of the tender offer rules.  Specifically, after raising some good questions about the teaser questions in a marketing flyer regarding a program I am moderating, he adds:

This reflects my ever-growing sense that maybe we should just take a break from tweaking securities laws and focus on enforcing rules and sniffing out fraud. A constantly changing securities regime is increasingly costly, complex, and potentially counterproductive. 

Admittedly, I am not that close to this, so perhaps I am missing something big, but I’m thinking maybe we should just get out of the way (or, probably better stated, keep the obstacles we have in place, because at least everyone knows the course).

Although I pushed back a bit, I generally agree with his premise (and I told him so).  I will leave the niceties regarding the tender offer rule at issue for another day–perhaps blogging on this after the moderated program takes place.  But in the mean time, I want to think a bit more out loud here about Josh’s idea that, e.g., mandatory disclosure and substantive regulation should be minimal and fraud regulation should be paramount.  Not, of course, a new idea, but a consideration that all of us who are honest securities policy-makers and scholars must address.