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Earlier tonight, the Nevada Senate voted unanimously to pass AB239, introduced by Nevada Assemblymember Joe Dalia. The legislation was put forward by the Nevada State Bar’s Business Law Section. The State Bar’s explanatory memorandum summarizes the changes. Although it has not yet been signed by Governor Lombardo, I expect that it’s legislation he’ll be happy to sign.

I’ll cover three changes here: (1) jury-trial waivers; (2) controlling stockholder duties; and (3) merger approvals.

Bench Trial Elections

This is how the Nevada Business Law Section explained the change:

The proposed amendments to NRS 78.046 are designed to address the ability of a corporation to waive jury trials with respect to “internal actions” (as defined by NRS 78.046(4)(c)). In other words, the corporation can essentially require that such actions be heard only before a judge rather than before a jury. This amendment is aimed at providing additional predictability with respect to the resolution of internal actions, and will also give some comfort to companies considering a move to Nevada, since jury trials are unavailable for cases heard in the Delaware Court of Chancery.

One of Delaware’s advantages has been that Chancery only has bench trials. The possibility…

It’s frequently been observed that (perhaps until recently) Delaware’s real competition was not horizontal, but vertical – if Delaware did not at least appear to be meting out appropriate corporate discipline, the federal government would step in to preempt its law.  Right now, however, we’re seeing a full on horizontal race to the bottom, as Texas, Delaware, and Nevada compete to absolve corporate managers of any fiduciary liability.  All three states could, of course, just say that – explicitly provide that shareholders have no cause of action for fiduciary breach – but all three (especially Texas and Delaware) feel the need to create a maze of procedural limitations on shareholder action that collectively add up to eliminating litigation rights without saying as much in so many words.  All of which provides support for the argument I made in my paper, The Legitimation of Shareholder Primacy, that the rules are intended as a display to the general public in order to create the illusion that limits are being placed on managerial power. 

One possibility I raise in the paper (which was actually drafted before SB 21, though I’ll update it eventually) is that we are in a moment when…

Just checking in on NCPPR v. SEC, which I previously blogged about here.

In that case, the SEC issued Kroger a no-action letter allowing it to exclude a conservative shareholder proposal from its proxy materials.  The shareholders sued, claiming that the SEC had engaged in unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination against conservatives; meanwhile, intervenors National Association of Manufacturers argued that Rule 14a-8 itself was unconstitutional.  The SEC argued that its no-action decisions are not final orders subject to review.

A Dem-majority panel held that the issue was moot – not because the meeting date had passed, but because Kroger had voluntarily agreed to include the proposal in its materials, and the shareholders had soundly rejected it, which meant that should NCPPR seek to advance the proposal again in the near future, it would be excludable for failure to meet resubmission thresholds.  But the panel also held that no-action letters are not final orders and cannot be reviewed.

Judge Jones dissented on both points, and further wrote that she would have reversed the no-action decision on the ground that the SEC had engaged in viewpoint discrimination.  Since the Fifth Circuit tends to holistically lean more toward Jones than toward the Democrats…

  1. On December 3, 2024, ahead of its December 4, 2024 investor conference in New York City, UnitedHealth introduced its 2024 outlook. The guidance included net earnings of $28.15 to $28.65 per share and adjusted net earnings of $29.50 to $30.00 per share.
  2. This guidance was materially false and misleading at the time it was issued because it omitted how the Company would have to adjust its strategy (which resulted in heightened denials compared to industry competitors) because of scrutiny from the United States Senate, as well as public scrutiny. Because of the change in strategy, the Company was
    deliberately reckless in issuing the 2025 guidance as it related to net and adjusted earnings per share.
  3. On January 16, 2025, subsequent to Mr. Thompson’s murder, the Company
    announced
…

Texas, Nevada, and Delaware have been competing to relieve corporate managers of liability for breach of fiduciary duty (the interesting question is not the race so much as why none feels sufficiently emboldened to say what they mean – shareholders can’t sue – they all feel it necessary to dress up their legislation in a lot of conditions so as to obscure the practical effect), but what if they could compete to eliminate other shareholder rights?

That’s the innovation currently being advanced by the Texas Legislature, with HB 4115 – just passed the House. 

The legislation tackles the scourge of nonbinding shareholder proposals.  Corporations that meet certain criteria can amend their governing documents – and I can’t tell whether that means bylaws, the certificate, or either, though I suspect the latter – to block shareholder proposals unless the shareholder holds the lesser of $1 million worth of securities or 3% of the securities entitled to vote, and solicits at least 67% of the corporation’s voting power (again, not sure if that means sending proxy materials or if 14a-8 inclusion in the corporation’s proxy materials is sufficient).

The conditions to take advantage of this provision are that the…

There are a number of reasons why Delaware is an attractive state for the incorporation of the Company and why the Redomicile is in the interests of our stockholders. For many years, Delaware has followed a policy of encouraging incorporation in that state. To advance that policy, Delaware has adopted comprehensive, modern and flexible corporate laws that are updated and revised periodically to meet changing business needs. As a result, many major corporations have initially chosen Delaware for their domicile or have subsequently reincorporated in Delaware. Delaware courts have developed considerable expertise in dealing with corporate issues. In doing so, Delaware courts have created a substantial body of case law construing Delaware law and establishing public policies with respect to Delaware corporations. Our Board believes that this environment provides greater predictability with respect to corporate legal affairs and allows a corporation to be managed more efficiently.

The procedures and degree of stockholder approval required for Delaware corporations for the authorization of additional shares of stock, and for approval of certain

…

I recently published a piece with FT Alphaville arguing that, after a brief experiment with democratization, corporate and securities law were taking on a distinct authoritarian turn.  (See also Christine Hurt, Texas, Delaware, and the New Controller Primacy).

Further to that, I doubt anyone was surprised when the Business Roundtable came out with its wish list for SEC/congressional rulemaking, which essentially is designed to minimize shareholder voice by attacking both shareholder proposals and proxy advisors.

They want to ban ESG proposals, for example and, hilariously, they cite a survey – with a pie chart! – showing that 91% of their own members agree that shareholder proposals are more focused on special interests than increasing company value.  Next, you’ll tell me that 91% of Business Roundtable members agree that income taxes are too high, employees are too entitled, and Gstaad lets just anyone in these days.

They also want to codify a policy I earlier blogged about, namely, to bar the use of Rule 14a-6 to distribute solicitation material by anyone holding less than $5 million.

But most aggressively, they want to ban the use of the universal proxy for shareholder proposals.  This use of universal proxy is…

New decision out from a California appellate court enforcing Rivian’s charter provision requiring that federal Securities Act cases be brought in federal, rather than state, court.

I realize the ship has pretty much sailed on this issue, but I wrote a whole paper about why this trend is problematic both from a doctrinal and a policy perspective.

My issue doctrinally, of course, is that I do not think charters are contracts, and I also believe the question of contract formation is not part of the internal affairs doctrine, and therefore is not dependent on the law of the chartering state. On that latter point, at least, Delaware agrees with me; in Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, the Delaware Supreme Court conceded that forum provisions governing federal law claims are not, strictly, governed by the internal affairs doctrine, although the court argued that other states should respect them nonetheless.

These doctrinal points, however, tend to be lost when the issue reaches non-Delaware courts, and Bullock v. Rivian is no exception. There, the California court not only situated the dispute squarely within the internal affairs doctrine, but also assumed that charter-based forum provisions are in fact contractual agreements, without even attempting…