As the followers of this blog well know, I’ve written a lot about controlling shareholders. There have been blog posts here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here, and an essay, After Corwin: Down the Controlling Shareholder Rabbit Hole. So, I finally posted a whole new essay to SSRN on the subject, called The Three Faces of Control. It’s very short; it’s kind of a follow-up/sequel/coda/friendly amendment to After Corwin. Here is the abstract:
Controlling shareholders are subject to distinct legal obligations under Delaware law, and thus Delaware courts are routinely called upon to distinguish “controlling shareholders” from other corporate actors. That is an easy enough task when a person or entity has more than 50% of the corporate vote, but when a putative controller has less than 50% of the vote – and is nonetheless alleged to exercise control over corporate operations via other means – the law is shot through with inconsistency.
What is needed is a contextual approach that recognizes that the meaning of control may vary depending on the purpose of the inquiry. Under Delaware doctrine, the