I often think about this Wall Street Journal article from 2015 about Mylan and its reincorporation to the Netherlands:
At a heated meeting with Mylan NV’s executive team in a Manhattan conference room in May, several investors complained about the drug maker’s resistance to a $40 billion takeover proposal from Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd.
Executive Chairman Robert Coury leaned across the table and retorted, in language laced with expletives, “This is a stakeholder company, not a shareholder company,” according to multiple attendees, meaning his constituents went beyond investors and he wasn’t obligated to agree to a tie-up. Mr. Coury got his way….
Mylan’s resistance to Teva’s proposal was aided by an acquisition that moved the company’s legal home in February from Pennsylvania to the Netherlands—part of the wave of tax-trimming “inversion” transactions that swept American business last year. Mylan, whose senior management remain based in Pennsylvania, gained not just tax savings, but a Dutch corporate rule book that gives companies more levers to resist takeovers….
Dutch policy makers have spent the past decade touting the benefits of Dutch law to global corporations as part of an effort to turn the Netherlands into a management-friendly bastion.
The article’s a bit circumspect