Earlier this year, the SEC released a rule treating significant market participants as “dealers” or “government security dealers.” The fact sheet explains the rationale was to update existing rules to capture modern electronic trading activity. The rule would apply to businesses that are:

  • Regularly expressing trading interest that is at or near the best available prices on both sides of the market for the same security and that is communicated and represented in a way that makes it accessible to other market participants; or
  • Earning revenue primarily from capturing bid-ask spreads, by buying at the bid and selling at the offer, or from capturing any incentives offered by trading venues to liquidity supplying trading interest.

At the time, I didn’t see the rule as particularly controversial. Market-makers have long been regulated. As trading technology changed, market participants began acting like market-makers without operating under the same regulatory standards. Firms subject to the rule would be required to register and possibly join an SRO if appropriate. The proposal generated a significant comment file and predictable litigation followed.

Two cases challenging the rule were filed in Texas. District Court Judge Reed O’Connor vacated the rule in both cases, one filed by the

In August 2021, the SEC announced that it had charged Matthew Panuwat with insider trading in violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Panuwat was the head of business development at Medivation, a mid-sized biopharmaceutical company when he learned that his company was set to be acquired by Pfizer at a significant premium.

If Panuwat had purchased Medivation stock in advance of the announcement of the acquisition, it is likely he would have been liable for insider trading under the classical theory. Liability for insider trading under the classical theory arises when a firm issuing stock, its employees, or its other agents strive to benefit from trading (or tipping others who then trade) that firm’s stock based on material nonpublic information. Here the insider (or constructive insider) violates a fiduciary duty to the counterparty to the transaction (the firm’s current or prospective shareholders) by not disclosing the information advantage drawn from the firm’s material nonpublic information in advance of the trade.

If Panuwat had purchased shares of Pfizer in advance of the announcement, then it is likely he would have been liable under the misappropriation theory. Liability for insider trading under the misappropriation theory arises when

There have been number of recent BLPB posts representing a diversity of viewpoints concerning the SEC’s proposed rule to “Enhance and Standardize Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors”. For example, co-blogger Joan MacLeod Heminway recently posted on a comment letter drafted by  Jill E. FIsch, George S. Georgiev, Donna Nagy, and Cynthia A. WIlliams (and signed by Joan and 24 others) that affirms the proposed rule is within the SEC’s rulemaking authority. I have offered a couple posts raising concerns about the proposed rule from the standpoint of utility and legal authority (see here and here). One of the concerns I have raised is that the SEC’s proposed disclosure regime may compel corporate speech in a manner that runs afoul of the First Amendment. SEC Commissioner Hester Pierce raised this same concern, and now Professor Sean J. Griffith has posted a new article, “What’s ‘Controversial’ About ESG? A Theory of Compelled Commercial Speech under the First Amendment”, which offers a more comprehensive treatment of this problem. Professor Griffith has also submitted a comment letter to the SEC raising this issue. Here’s the abstract for Professor Griffith’s article:

This Article uses the SEC’s recent foray into ESG

In the fall, I posted on Professor Kevin R. Douglas’s article, “How Creepy Concepts Undermine Effective Insider Trading Reform” (linked below), which is now forthcoming in the Journal of Corporation Law. The following post comes from Professor Douglas. In it, he develops one theme from that article:

Would U.S. officials imprison real people for failing to adhere to the most unrealistic assumptions in prominent economic models? Yes, if the assumption is that no one can generate risk-free profits when trading in efficient capital markets. What are risk-free profits, and why should you go to jail for trying to generate them? Relying on the ordinary dictionary definition of “risk” makes the justification for criminal penalties described above seem absurd. One dictionary defines risk as “the possibility of loss, injury, or other adverse or unwelcome circumstance,” and another simply defines risk as “the possibility of something bad happening.” Why should someone face criminal liability for attempting to generate trading profits without something bad happening—without losing money? The absurdity is especially jarring when thinking about securities markets, where hedge fund managers rely heavily on risk reduction strategies.

However, if we turn to the definition of “risk” used in prominent models

With a recent poll showing that 76 percent of voters think members of Congress have an “unfair advantage” in stock trades, I argued in my last post that Congress should adopt a broad rule against trading in individual stocks by sitting cogresspersons (and perhaps their spouses, children, and staff). I argued that such a move would go a long way toward restoring the perception that members of Congress are public servants, as opposed to the current perception shared by many voters that they are public parasites. In addition to restoring public confidence in the legislative branch, I argued adopting such a prophylactic against insider trading would also help improve public confidence in the integrity of our securities markets—a goal Congress has touted repeatedly for almost a century.

I have since posted a short paper on SSRN, Time for a Broad Prophylactic against Congressional Insider Trading, that develops these arguments. Part I offers a brief summary of the current state of insider trading laws, with a special focus on their application to Congress. Part II surveys some of the proposed insider trading reform bills under consideration. Part III argues that, given congresspersons’ unique role vis-à-vis securities markets, a broad prophylactic

In January of 2020, The Bharara Task Force on Insider Trading released its report recommending that Congress adopt sweeping reforms of our insider trading enforcement regime. And it appears there is at least some momentum building to act on this recommendation. In April of 2021, the House of Representatives passed the Promoting Transparent Standards for Corporate Insiders Act, and in May of 2021, the House passed the Insider Trading Prohibition Act.  I have expressed some concerns about these bills (see, e.g., here and here). But, as I argue in my book, Insider Trading: Law, Ethics, and Reform, I am in complete agreement with the claim that our current insider trading regime is broken and needs to be reformed.

We should not, however, rush to adopt a new insider trading regime without first thoughtfully considering what constitutes insider trading; why it is wrong; who is harmed by it; and the nature and extent of the harm. The answers to these questions have been subject to endless academic debate, but are crucial for determining whether insider trading should be regulated civilly and/or criminally (or not at all), as well as for determining the nature and magnitude of any

Professor Martin Edwards (Belmont University College of Law) and I are excited to moderate a discussion group titled, “A Very Online Economy: Meme Trading, Bitcoin, and the Crisis of Trust and Value(s)—How Should the Law Respond,” at the 2022 American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting. The discussion group is scheduled to take place (virtually) on Friday, January 7, 2022. We welcome responses to the call for participation (here). Here’s the description:

Emergent forces emanating from social and financial technologies are challenging many underlying assumptions about the workings of markets, the nature of firms, and our social relationship with our economic institutions. The 21st century economy and financial architecture are built on faith and trust in centralized institutions. Perhaps it is not surprising that in 2008, a time where that faith and trust waned, a different architecture called “blockchain” emerged. It promised “trustless” exchange, verifiable intermediation, and “decentralization” of value transfer.

In 2021, the financial architecture and its institutions suffered a broadside from socialmedia-fueled “meme” and “expressive” traders. It may not be a coincidence that many of these traders reached adulthood around 2008, when the crisis called into question whether that real money, those real securities, or that

I’ve addressed the recent social-media-driven retail trading in stocks like GameStop in prior posts (here and here). In both posts, I focused on evidence that at least some of this trading seems to pursue goals other than (or in addition to) profit. For example, some of these retail traders claim that they are buying and holding stocks as a form of social, political, or aesthetic expression. My coauthors Jeremy Kidd, George Mocsary, and I recently posted a forthcoming article on this subject, Social Media, Securities Markets, and the Phenomenon of Expressive Trading, to SSRN. The article introduces the emerging phenomenon of expressive trading. It considers some of the challenges and risks expressive trading may pose to issuers, markets, and regulators–as well as to our traditional understanding of market functioning. Ultimately, the article concludes that while innovations like expressive trading “can be disruptive and demand a reimagining of the established order,” market participants, issuers, and regulators would be wise to pause and observe before rushing to adopt defensive strategies or implement reforms. Here’s the abstract:

Commentators have likened the recent surge in social-media-driven (SMD) retail trading in securities such as GameStop to a roller coaster: “You

    Commenters have likened the recent retail “meme” trading in stocks such as GameStop Corp. to buying a ticket on a roller coaster—“You don’t go on a roller coaster because you end up in a different place, you go on it for the ride and it’s exciting because you’re part of it.” See, Bailey Lipschultz and Divya Balji, Historic Week for Gamestop Ends with 400% Rally as Shorts Yield, Bloomberg (January 29, 2021).

    The comparison is apt in a number of respects. These retail traders, led by some members of the “WallStreetBets” group on the Reddit social media platform, “got on” GameStop a couple weeks ago at just under $20 a share, and, despite its rapid rise to a high of just under $500 a share, I think most people expect (including the meme traders) that the price at which this turbulent ride will end is somewhere around where it began. After all, GameStop’s fundamentals have not changed. It remains a brick-and-mortar business that was devastated by the pandemic, and it is expected to steadily lose market share to online vendors.

    For anyone interested in the mechanics of the “short squeeze” and how these traders managed to move price

The courts have interpreted Section 10b of the Securities and Exchange Act as prohibiting insiders from trading in their own company’s shares only if they do so “on the basis of” material nonpublic information. This element of scienter for insider trading liability is sometimes tricky for regulators and prosecutors to satisfy because insiders who possess material nonpublic information at the time of their trade will often claim they did not use that information. The insider may claim that her true motives for trading were entirely innocent (e.g., to diversify her portfolio, to pay a large tax bill, or to buy a new house or boat). Such lawful bases for trading can be easy for insiders to manufacture and are often difficult for regulators and prosecutors to disprove.

Historically, the SEC and prosecutors sought to overcome this challenge by taking the position that knowing possession of material nonpublic information while trading is sufficient to satisfy the “on the basis of” test. This strategy met mixed results before the courts, with some circuits holding that proof of scienter under Section 10b requires proof that the trader actually used the inside information in making the trade.

Facing a circuit split, the SEC attempted