Has an airline ever told you it wasn’t responsible for costs you would incur because of a flight initially delayed for “mechanical reasons” that was now delayed due to weather? In thinking about how potential losses resulting from both a clearing member default and non-default issues (such as operational, investment, or custody problems) are likely to be allocated among a clearinghouse and clearing members, I think of such past travel experiences. From my perspective, the issue of ownership is key to both.
Hence, I’d like there to be an increased amount of discussion about clearinghouse ownership. The word “ownership” was barely mentioned (maybe once) during the December 4th meeting of the Market Risk Advisory Committee, sponsored by CFTC Commissioner Rostin Behnam, which largely focused on issues related to clearinghouses. In contrast, participants frequently mentioned clearinghouse capital (“skin in the game”), and extensively discussed (Panel 2) the allocation of default versus non-default losses (which could occur nearly simultaneously). Surprisingly, there is scant legal guidance on the allocation of non-default losses in the U.S.
Clearinghouses, financial market infrastructure utilities, tend to be owned by their members or by investors (I’ve written extensively about clearinghouses for readers interested in learning more