At the 2018 Annual Conference of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business, I spoke on a panel, New Developments in Corporate Governance, with Vincent S.J. Buccola, Gideon Mark, Josephine Sandler Nelson, and David Zaring, the organizer (thanks again, David!).
Buccola discussed governance aspects of corporate bankruptcy law in the modern economy. I was particularly intrigued by his argument that “Bankruptcy law is potentially valuable…insofar as it can toggle from property to liability rule in domains where legal or practical impediments prevent investors from arranging their own, “tailored” toggles.”
I’ve taught Corporate Bankruptcy, and in my research at the time, I was analogizing bargaining processes in the context of the recovery and resolution of clearinghouses to bargaining processes in private restructurings and formal bankruptcy filings. I wondered about the potential application of Buccola’s work within the clearinghouse context, and have been eagerly awaiting his article. I’m excited to share with readers that the wait is over! Bankruptcy’s Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Distress, an impressive and significant new work, is forthcoming in the Northwestern University Law Review, and also now available on SSRN. Here’s its abstract:
What justifies corporate bankruptcy