A few of us have blogged about benefit corporations here from time to time; they’re a controversial business form, in part because there are disputes about whether they actually are materially different from the ordinary corporate form, and in part because of flaws in states’ adopting legislation.
The basic issue here is that, as we all know, the business judgment rule is robust enough that corporate directors are perfectly free, as a practical matter, to pursue a stakeholder-oriented mission without the need of any special form. The reason they do not has little to do with their formal legal obligations, and everything to do with the market for corporate control: If directors do not put shareholders first, their companies may become ripe for a takeover and they may be voted out of office.
In theory, benefit corporations could solve a shareholder collective action problem. Let’s assume, as some theorize, that given the choice, many shareholders would actually prefer not to maximize their own welfare but instead to share those gains with other stakeholders. The problem is, they may experience defection in their own ranks. Over time, some shareholders may change their minds and prefer to keep all excess profits; or