Many in the business law world have been following the saga involving the adoption of S.B. 313 by Delaware's General Assembly last week. S.B. 313 adds a new § 122(18) to the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (DGCL) that broadly authorizes corporations to enter into free-standing stockholder agreements (not embodied in the corporation's charter) that restrict or eliminate the management authority of the corporation's board of directors. See my blog posts here and here and others cited in them, as well as Ann's post here.
In the floor debate on S.B. 313 last Thursday in the Delaware State House of Representatives, a proponent of the legislation stated that fiduciary duties always trump contracts. That statement deserves some inspection in a number of respects. I offer a few simple reflections here from one, limited perspective.
The historical centrality of corporate director fiduciary duties (which were the fiduciary duties referenced on the House floor) is undeniable. Those who have taken business associations or an advanced business course with me over the years know well that I emphasize in board decision making that the directors’ actions must be both lawful and consistent with their fiduciary duties in order to