April 2022

The following comes to us from the Law & Economics Center at the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University.

The Law & Economics Center is pleased to announce that we are now accepting applications to the Workshop for Law Professors on Teaching Capitalism. This program will be held at the Park Hyatt Beaver Creek Resort and Spa in Beaver Creek, Colorado with attendees arriving on Sunday, July 10 and departing on Thursday, July 14.

The Workshop for Law Professors on Teaching Capitalism is a five-day program that will deepen law professors’ understanding of the fundamentals of capitalism, educate the participants in methods and techniques for teaching about capitalism as a stand-alone course in their own law schools, and help guide these professors in ways to integrate lessons learned from capitalism and discussions around the topic into their subject-specific doctrinal courses like corporations, constitutional law, or on common law subjects. The workshop is designed to enrich the curricula of law schools across the country by encouraging a more robust discussion of capitalism and its relationship with the law in courses, by giving its attendees the tools necessary to take this instructional guidance back to their home institutions.  Across

On Friday, I have the honor and pleasure of presenting a continuing legal education session for the Tennessee Bar Association with Dean Matt Lyon from the LMU Duncan School of Law.  Our topic?  Partner freeze-outs–situations in which a co-venturer in a business recognized as a partnership is excluded from the business by their fellow co-venturers.  This exclusion often occurs through or involves the formation of a limited liability entity, typically a corporation or limited liability company, to conduct the operations of the business going forward.  That new business entity does not include one of the initial co-venturers.  We have titled our session “No Partner Left Behind:Organizing a Limited Liability Entity for a Pre-existing Business Venture.”

I truly enjoy the judicial opinions in this area.  You probably know some of them.  Holmes v. Lerner may be one of the better known cases in this space.  But there are others.  Some of the claims in these cases, like the claims in Holmes v. Lerner, stem from co-venturers involved in a de facto partnership–a venture recognized under statutory law as a partnership for which there is no express written acknowledgment of partnership.  Entrepreneurs beware!

The partnership freeze-out genre of judicial opinions is

I really enjoyed Matthew Wansley’s new paper, Moonshots, forthcoming in the Columbia Business Review.  He focuses on the complicated incentives involved in performing “moonshot” research, that is, highly risky projects that could dramatically advance a field, but that will take years to develop.  He argues that the venture carveout structure – whereby a startup has public company parents alongside other private investors, and employee incentive ownership, is designed to mitigate the various conflicts and agency costs that would exist among the players, and uses autonomous driving as the major case study.

I haven’t seen much about corporate investment in outside entities – though I gather there has been more written in the business literature, the only other legal paper I’m familiar with is Jennifer Fan’s Catching Disruptions: Regulating Corporate Venture Capital, 2018 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 341, which offers a detailed descriptive account of how corporate venture capital functions and how it differs from traditional venture capital.  But the two papers together convince me that this is a phenomenon that needs more attention in the legal scholarship.

Shortly after President Barack Obama’s first press conference in 2009, the Huffington Post published an article, “When Did You Stop Beating Your Wife?”, that challenged the false premises of many of the questions being asked of the new president. The article opens by noting:

Sooner or later every human being on the face of this planet is confronted with tough questions. One of the toughest and most common is the infamous loaded question, “when did you stop beating your wife?” which implies that you have indeed been beating your wife. How do you answer without agreeing with the implication? How do you not answer without appearing evasive?

The author’s solution is that you should refuse to answer the question by simply responding, “no,” or by challenging the false assumption imbedded in the question. But what if the question is not asked at a press conference, by opposing counsel in the courtroom, or at a cocktail party, but as part of a federally mandated disclosure regime? This is a dilemma issuers may face if the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) proposed rule to “Enhance and Standardize Climate-Related Disclosures for Investors” is adopted.

Existing SEC disclosure rules and guidance already require

Professor Julie Hill recently posted Bank Access to Federal Reserve Accounts and Payment Systems.  It’s an excellent and important article.  As I’ve blogged about (here) and written about (here), access to a master account at the Fed is an arcane, but highly important issue.      

Here’s the abstract for Professor Hill’s article:

Should the Federal Reserve process payments for a Colorado credit union established to serve the cannabis industry? Should the Federal Reserve provide an account for a Connecticut uninsured bank that plans to keep all its depositors’ money in that Federal Reserve account? Should the Federal Reserve provide payment services for an uninsured, government-owned bank in American Samoa? What about Wyoming cryptocurrency custody banks? Should they have access to Federal Reserve accounts and payment systems? Although the Federal Reserve has recently considered account and payment services applications from these novel banks, its process for evaluating the applications is not transparent.

This Article examines how the Federal Reserve decides which banks get access to its accounts and payment systems. It explores the sometimes-ambiguous statutory authority governing the Federal Reserve’s provision of accounts and payments and chronicles the Federal Reserve’s longtime policies limiting access

Last May, I posted on a wonderful two-day event–a symposium hosted over Zoom by Brooklyn Law School celebrating the career of Professor Roberta Karmel.  As I noted then, I was honored to be invited to speak at the event. It was so inspiring.

I have just posted the essay that I presented at the symposium, “Federalized Corporate Governance: The Dream of William O. Douglas as Sarbanes-Oxley Turns 20” (recently published by the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law), on SSRN.  It can be found here

The roadmap paragraph from the essay’s introduction offers a brief description of the essay’s contents.

This essay focuses on the federalization of U.S. corporate governance since Sarbanes-Oxley—and, more specifically, since Roberta’s article was published in 2005 [Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas — The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005)]—pulling forward key aspects of Roberta’s work in Realizing the Dream. To accomplish this purpose, the essay first briefly reviews the contours of Roberta’s article. It then offers observations on corporate governance in the wake of (among other things) the public offering reforms adopted by the U.S.

Further to my post from last Sunday, I received notice that Northwestern continues to accept applications for full-time lecturers for its Master of Science in Law program.  (The soft submission deadline was April 8.)  Preferred qualifications include a JD and 3-5 years of experience teaching or working in a field relevant to the MSL curriculum, such as a legal, business, entrepreneurship, or regulatory setting.  Applicants should submit a CV and a cover letter explaining interest in the position through Northwestern’s online application system at this link: https://facultyrecruiting.northwestern.edu/apply/MTQ2Mg%3D%3D

The blog has previously covered the ongoing litigation over California’s director diversity statutes, with Ann contributing this insightful writeup of an earlier Ninth Circuit decision.  The case has returned to the Ninth Circuit on appeal again after the District Court denied a motion for a preliminary injunction.   The case involves a shareholder claim challenging SB 826 on the theory that the law exerts pressure on shareholders to unconstitutionally discriminate when they cast their votes for directors in shareholder elections out of fear that electing a board without enough women will subject the corporation to a fine.

I joined with seventeen other securities and business law scholars to file an amicus brief arguing that the shareholder claim should be classified as a derivative claim.  Many thanks to all who joined and many apologies to Faith Stevelman who joined before the filing deadline and sent thoughtful comments.  In the rush to finalize the brief, I didn’t get her name on the final list of amici.  

This is the summary of the argument:

This shareholder derivative litigation should be decided under ordinary rules for shareholder litigation.  Plaintiff has asserted claims and sought a preliminary injunction as a shareholder of OSI Systems, Inc. (OSI). 

The NYU Pollack Center invites applications for a Wagner Fellowship for the 2022-2023 academic year.  Thanks to a generous grant of the Leonard Wagner Testamentary Trust, the Center for Law & Business offers a one-year graduate research fellowship to help develop future law academics with an interest in the social control of business institutions and the social responsibility of business.

Requirements:

Applicants must hold a JD or LLM degree and have practiced law for two years. Preference is given to applicants with a research interest in the legal regulation of business and ethics, and to those who have a degree from NYU School of Law. Fellows are expected to make a full-time commitment to their graduate research at the center. Involvement in Pollack Center research ventures is required.

How to Apply:

Applications must be received by May 16th 2022. Applicants must submit the following materials*:

  • Statement describing academic and research interests
  • Proposal for the research project during the fellowship year
  • Curriculum Vitae
  • Law school academic transcripts
  • A letter of recommendation
  • A writing sample, preferably a scholarly paper written in the past two years

*Not all materials are required for every applicant.  Please inquire regarding required materials.

More information is

By now, I’m sure everyone is very much aware that Elon Musk took a giant stake in Twitter, was late filing his Schedule 13G (and failed to include a certification that he intended to hold passively), was added to Twitter’s board, and updated his Schedule 13G to a 13D, leaving a question whether he should have been filing on 13D all along.  Once Musk did reveal his stake, Twitter’s stock price shot up.

The SEC has not historically policed the Schedule 13G/Schedule 13D filing requirements with great vigor, though Gary Gensler has highlighted the potential harm to traders/markets when they trade in ignorance of the presence of a potential activist investor; see also United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Section 13(d)’s purpose is to alert investors to potential changes in corporate control so that they can properly evaluate the company in which they had invested or were investing.” (quotations and alterations omitted)).

Matt Levine asks whether this means Elon Musk engaged in insider trading, since he managed to save maybe $143 million by continuing to amass Twitter stock before finally revealing his holdings.

I’m going to ask something else: do the traders who sold between the time he was supposed to file the 13G, and the time he actually filed it, have a claim?  And it seems pretty much, yes they do.

And boy howdy this got long, so, under the cut it goes: