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Anne Tucker

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Anne Tucker teaches and researches contracts, corporations, securities regulations, and investment funds.

Tucker’s research focuses on three areas of business law. The first is on the regulation and administration of funds (both public and private funds) and how pooled investments can achieve significant personal and social ends, such as retirement security and private funding for social entrepreneurship. Second, she focuses on impact investing and contract terms that reinforce impact objectives alongside financial returns. Third, she studies corporate governance, including the role of institutional investors as shareholders. Read More

Last week on this blog, I wrote about the revived trend of corporate inversions where, through a merger transaction a US company re-domiciles outside of the US for business reasons, including the desire to avoid paying US corporate taxes.  Walgreens was rumored to be negotiating with Alliance Boots, a UK company in which the US drugstore chain already held 45%.  The merger announcement today, in a deal valued at $5.27 billion for the other 55% of Alliance Boots will keep the merged company’s headquarters in Chicago.   Citing, in part to public reaction and the drug store’s brand here in the US, “The company concluded it was not in the best long-term interest of our shareholders to attempt to re-domicile outside the U.S.”

The full article in the DealBook is available here.

-Anne Tucker

The New York Times spotlighted Michigan State’s Reinvent Law Laboratory and Entrepreneurial Startup Competition in this article.

“[P]ushing its students to understand business and technology so that they can advise entrepreneurs in coming fields. The school wants them to think of themselves as potential founders of start-ups as well, and to operate fluidly in a legal environment that is being transformed by technology.”

The article also highlights University of Colorado’s Tech Lawyer Accelerator.

Fascinating stuff.  What is your school doing, if anything, on this front?

-Anne Tucker

There is a new face on an old problem — American companies “moving” overseas in part to avoid U.S. taxes — that has increased in popularity in the last several years and recently gained political attention. Last week President Obama and Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew called for tax reform to encourage economic patriotism and to deter corporate defectors, calling the overseas moves legal, but immoral.

Two structural features of the U.S. tax code incentivize corporations to move abroad. The U.S. corporate tax rate, at 35 percent, is high compared to the average Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) rate of 25 percent, and the average European Union rate of 21 percent. Many corporations effectively pay much less than 35 percent, after factoring in loopholes and deductions, policies that cost approximately $150 billion in untaxed revenue last year. But the reported tax rate is high compared to other jurisdictions and the complexity required to reduce that rate in practice also is a deterrent.

Second, other countries like the United Kingdom become attractive foreign tax locations because they operate under a territorial system that does not tax profits earned outside of the home country. Under the U.S. system, however, returning…

Steven Davidoff Solomon, a professor of law at the University of California, Berkeley, has an interesting article on antitrust in the DealBook today:  Changing Old Antitrust Thinking for a New Gilded Age. Professor Solomon argues that a new wave of mergers in the tech and telecommunications industries mirror the consolidation wave of the Gilded Age a century ago which lead to our current antitrust laws.  These mergers leave competition in tact, albeit among a few huge companies, and therefore facially meet the competition requirements under antitrust law.  He argues that “[t]his calculus, however, excludes the political and other power that a concentrated industry can wield with government and regulators.”  Citing to industry-based nonprofits and the ability to participate in political spending in a post-Citizens United world, professor Solomon concludes that antitrust may become a question of power, not just competition. 

“[R]ight now there is simply no real government ability to review the industry consolidation that is occurring today in which industries become dominated by a handful of major players. Yet it is becoming increasingly apparent that size and industry concentration affect American society even if competition still exists.”

I think that this is an interesting lens through which…

Like my co-editor, Haskell Murray, I am participating in an on line symposium on Hobby Lobby over at the Conglomerate.  My piece focuses on the boundaries set (or left open) by the opinion and raises this new issue:

The Court framed the case as an “important question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is immoral for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but hat has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an import act by another.”  The corporate plaintiff didn’t have to violate its beliefs (that feels like an absurd statement), but taking an action that permitted a third party employee to possibly violate the beliefs of the corporation was a sufficient burden.  This is also ignores that the contraceptives at issue could be used for medical reasons unrelated to lifestyle choices.  Here is where I struggle the most with the reasoning of the Majority.  Employers pay employees subject to minimum wage laws. Employers have no guarantee that the employees will use the compensation in a manner consistent with the employer’s religious views.  Why is it different when the compensation comes in the form of employer-provided

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Today I am highlighting a very interesting economics article exploring the relationship between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance.  

Scholars have been searching for a link between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP) for thirty-five years. If only doing good could be connected to doing well, then companies might be persuaded to act more conscientiously, whether in cleaning up their own questionable conduct (Campbell, 2006) or in redressing societal ills (Porter & Kramer, 2006). A positive link between social and financial performance would legitimize corporate social performance on economic grounds, grounds that matter so much these days (Useem, 1996). It would license companies to pursue the good—even incurring additional costs—in order to enhance their bottom line and at the same time contribute more broadly to the well-being of society.

In DOES IT PAY TO BE GOOD?, three economists (Joshua Margolis,  HIllary Anger Elfenbein, and James P. Walsh) perform a meta analysis of 251 effects in over 200 manuscripts to examine the relationship between CSP and CFP.  They find a small positive effect. Most importantly, the articles engages in a rich conversation (and critique) of empirical studies in this area and suggests parameters for future research.  

This paper is accessible for non-economists…

June 6-7 Emory Law’s Conference on Transactional Law–register here; view program here

June 7-9 AALS Workshop on Blurring Boundaries in Financial and Corporate Law–information here; registration here.  (early bird ends today, May 2nd).

-AT

Felix Chang, at the University Of Cincinnati College Of Law, recently posted a draft of his excellent paper, The Systemic Risk Paradox: Banks and Clearinghouses Under Regulation.  The paper will be published in the Columbia Business Law Review (congrats Felix!) in the fall.  I first read Felix’s paper in conjunction with the George Washington University C-Leaf Junior Scholar workshop earlier this spring. After the workshop, I asked him to let me know when a draft was ready to share with BLPB readers, and here is the Abstract:

Consolidation in the financial industry threatens competition and increases systemic risk. Recently, banks have seen both high-profile mergers and spectacular failures, prompting a flurry of regulatory responses. Yet consolidation has not been as closely scrutinized for clearinghouses, which facilitate trading in securities and derivatives products. These nonbank intermediaries can be thought of as middlemen who collect deposits to ensure that each buyer and seller has the wherewithal to uphold its end of the deal. Clearinghouses mitigate the credit risks that buyers and sellers would face if they dealt directly with each other. 

Yet here lies the dilemma: large clearinghouses reduce credit risk, but they heighten systemic risk since the collapse of one

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FINRA and NASD rules have long provided that customers must arbitrate individual disputes with their brokers, but that class claims can be brought in court (and are not subject to arbitration).

In 2011, after the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the brokerage company Charles Schwab amended all of its customer agreements to require that the customer waive the right to bring class claims and agree to resolve all disputes in individual arbitration.

FINRA brought an enforcement action against Charles Schwab for violation of its rules, and in 2013, a hearing panel concluded that the FINRA rules were unenforceable because they conflicted with the Federal Arbitration Act.

On Thursday, that decision was overruled by the FINRA Board of Governors.  FINRA concluded that its rules, promulgated in conjunction with, and under the oversight of, the SEC, represent valid exercises of regulatory authority that override the FAA.

 Obviously, this conclusion raises a lot of interesting legal questions about the authority of the SEC to abrogate the FAA, and conflicts between the Exchange Act and the FAA (Barbara Black and Jill I. Gross have written extensively on this issue).

But the part that immediately interests me is FINRA’s…

In March, the Fourth Circuit held in Carnell Construction Corp. v. Danville Redevelopment & Housing Authority, that racial identity can be imputed to a corporation for purposes of standing under Title VI, citing to case precedent from the several circuits allowing 1981 claims to be raised by corporations. 

“[W]e observe that several other federal appellate courts have considered this question, and have declined to bar on prudential grounds race discrimination claims brought by minority-owned corporations that meet constitutional standing requirements.” 

The Fourth Circuit had to deal with the following language in Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. 252, 263 (1977): “As a corporation, MHDC has no racial identity and cannot be the direct target of the petitioners’ alleged discrimination. In the ordinary case, a party is denied standing to assert the rights of third persons.” In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court however did not need to “decide whether the circumstances of this case would justify departure from that prudential limitation and permit MHDC to assert the constitutional rights of its prospective minority tenants. For we have at least one individual plaintiff who has demonstrated standing to assert these rights as his own.” (citations omitted).  The dicta in Arlington Heights was…