Last Monday, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) released the consultative document, Guidance on financial resources to support CCP resolution and on the treatment of CCP equity in resolution (here). As readers know, I’ve written several times about clearinghouses, the central feature of the G20’s reforms to the over-the-counter derivative markets following the 2007-08 crises, implemented in the US in Dodd-Frank’s Title VII (for example, here and here).
The Guidance’s title is a succinct encapsulation of its two-part focus. In the first part, it uses a five-step process to evaluate the adequacy of a CPP’s resources and available tools to support its resolution (were that to prove necessary). These steps include:
Step 1: identifying hypothetical default and non-default loss scenarios (and a combination of them) that may lead to resolution;
Step 2: conducting a qualitative and quantitative evaluation of existing resources and tools available in resolution;
Step 3: assessing potential resolution costs;
Step 4: comparing existing resources and tools to resolution costs and identifying any gaps; and
Step 5: evaluating the availability, costs and benefits of potential means of addressing any identified gaps.
In the second part, the Guidance focuses on how to treat CCP
