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Colleen Baker

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PhD (Wharton) Professor Baker is an expert in banking and financial institutions law and regulation, with extensive knowledge of over-the-counter derivatives, clearing, the Dodd-Frank Act, and bankruptcy, in addition to being a mediator and arbitrator.

Previously, she spent time at the U. of Illinois Urbana-Champaign College of Business, the U. of Notre Dame Law School, and Villanova University Law School. She has consulted for the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, and for The Volcker Alliance.  Prior to academia, Professor Baker worked as a legal professional and as an information technology associate. She is a member of the State Bars of NY and TX. Read More

The Turtles continue to have salience in the music world.  Now, they also are a “happening thing” in legal circles.  Two recently published law review articles take on an interesting issue in copyright law relating to pre-1972 sound recordings that has been the subject of legal actions brought by members of The Turtles.  The articles (both of which use the song Happy Together, a Turtles favorite, in their titles) are authored by my University of Tennessee College of Law colleague, Gary Pulsinelli, and Georgetown University Law Center Professor Julie L. Ross.  

In his abstract, Gary summarizes the problem as follows:

Federal copyright law provides a digital performance right that allows owners of sound recordings to receive royalties when their works are transmitted over the Internet or via satellite radio. However, this federal protection does not extend to pre-1972 sound recordings, which are excluded from the federal copyright system and instead left to the protections of state law. No state law explicitly provides protection for any type of transmission, a situation the owners of pre-1972 sound recordings find lamentable. These owners are therefore attempting to achieve such protection by various means. . . . 

He concludes:

[S]tate…

In response to one of my posts last week, co-blogger Josh Fershee raised concern about making minor changes to securities regulation–in that case, in the context of the tender offer rules.  Specifically, after raising some good questions about the teaser questions in a marketing flyer regarding a program I am moderating, he adds:

This reflects my ever-growing sense that maybe we should just take a break from tweaking securities laws and focus on enforcing rules and sniffing out fraud. A constantly changing securities regime is increasingly costly, complex, and potentially counterproductive. 

Admittedly, I am not that close to this, so perhaps I am missing something big, but I’m thinking maybe we should just get out of the way (or, probably better stated, keep the obstacles we have in place, because at least everyone knows the course).

Although I pushed back a bit, I generally agree with his premise (and I told him so).  I will leave the niceties regarding the tender offer rule at issue for another day–perhaps blogging on this after the moderated program takes place.  But in the mean time, I want to think a bit more out loud here about Josh’s idea that, e.g., mandatory disclosure and substantive regulation should be minimal and fraud regulation should be paramount.  Not, of course, a new idea, but a consideration that all of us who are honest securities policy-makers and scholars must address.

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Mosaic Dialogue Series
13D Filing Requirements: Time is of the Essence

There has been significant controversy surrounding the required disclosures by investors acquiring a 5% stake in public companies. Under current law, investors must disclose ownership of 5% or more within 10 days. Many issuers are in favor of shortening this disclosure window, with some favoring reporting as soon as one business day after the 5% threshold is crossed. They argue that the 10 day reporting lag deprives the market of material information and can facilitate market manipulation. Shareholders argue that shortening the disclosure window effectively allows issuers to set a ceiling on the number of shares an activist may acquire. Furthermore, at some companies, a poison pill can be triggered if the 5% threshold is crossed, preventing additional accumulation of shares by an activist investor.

Should the current 13D filing requirements be amended? Does the 10 day lag result in activists obscuring their actions? Would shortening the window assist issuers in preventing accumulation of shares by investors seeking change? Join us as we answer these questions and others on this important and timely topic.

Speakers:

Andrew M. Freedman, Partner, Olshan Frome Wolosky, LLP
Kai Haakon E. Liekefett…

Last week, I attended the National Business Law Scholars Conference at Seton Hall University School of Law in Newark, NJ.  It was a great conference, featuring (among others) BLPB co-blogger Josh Fershee (who presented a paper on the business judgment rule and moderated a panel on business entity design) and BLPB guest blogger Todd Haugh (who presented a paper on Sarbanes-Oxley and over criminalization).  I presented a paper on curation in crowdfunding intermediation and moderated a panel on insider trading.  It was a full two days of business law immersion.

The keynote lunch speaker the second day of the conference was Kent Greenfield.  He compellingly argued for the promotion of corporate personhood, following up on comments he has made elsewhere (including here and here) in recent years.  In his remarks, he causally mentioned B corporations and social enterprise more generally.  I want to pick up on that thread to make a limited point here that follows up somewhat on my post on shareholder primacy and wealth maximization from last week.

Courtesy of AALS Section on Securities Regulation Chair Christine Hurt:

Call for Papers

AALS Section on Securities Regulation – 2016 AALS Annual Meeting

January 6-10, 2016 New York, NY

The AALS Section on Securities Regulation invites papers for its program on “The Future of Securities Regulation: Innovation, Regulation and Enforcement.”

TOPIC DESCRIPTION: This panel discussion will explore the current trends and future implications in the securities regulation field including transactional and financial innovation, the regulation of investment funds, the intersection of the First Amendment and securities law, the debate over fee-shifting bylaws, the ever-expanding transactional exemptions including under Regulation D, and judicial interpretations of insider trading laws. The Executive Committee welcomes papers (theoretical, doctrinal, policy-oriented, empirical) on both the transactional and litigation sides of securities law and practice.

ELIGIBILITY: Full-time faculty members of AALS member law schools are eligible to submit papers. Pursuant to AALS rules, faculty at fee-paid law schools, foreign faculty, adjunct and visiting faculty (without a full-time position at an AALS member law school), graduate students, fellows, and non-law school faculty are not eligible to submit. Please note that all faculty members presenting at the program are responsible for paying their own annual meeting registration fee and…

I just returned early Monday from this year’s Law and Society Association conference.  I presented my paper on LLC operating agreements as contracts–about which I later will blog here–on a panel as part of a CRN (Collaborative Research Network) on corporate and securities law.  I enjoyed the conference and being in Seattle (a city I rarely get a chance to visit).

I noticed something in a number of the sessions I attended, however, that I want to share here.  A number of scholars referenced, in their presentations or in comments to the presentations of others, “shareholder primacy.”  As I listened, it was clear these folks were referring to the prioritizing of shareholder interests–especially financial interests–ahead of the interests of other stakeholders in corporate decision-making, rather than the elements of corporate control (few as there are) enjoyed by shareholders.  As I began to recognize this, several things happened in rapid succession.

First, I remembered David Millon’s recent paper on this subject, which (among other things) tells a history of the use of the “shareholder primacy” term.  It’s well worth a read.  Or a re-read!

Second, I remembered Steve Bainbridge’s earlier work on this same topic. Ditto on that paper; read…

As a semi-closeted (now “out,” I guess) foodie* and as a lover of “things Brazilian” (including Havaianas flip-flops and Veja sneakers, as well as churrascarias and caipirinhas), I read with interest a recent electronic newsletter headline about a thriving Brazilian chef.  I clicked through to the article.  I loved it even more than I had thought I would.

The article tells the story of an emergent Brazilian chef and restauranteur, Rodrigo Oliveira, and his flagship establishment (Mocotó), as promised.  That was great.  But that was not all.  The piece also told the story of a business run using a “holistic business model.”

Today, Oliveira focuses on his employees as much as his customers. . . .  Oliveira pays for his employees’ part-time education. And their kids’ health care. And daily jiujitsu and yoga classes in the room he built upstairs. It’s a rarely encountered, holistic business model that contributes to his restaurant’s roaring success. . . .

 . . . 

Beneath the street level they’re boring out new dormitories for employees, for a quick nap and shower between jiujitsu, work and class. . . .

He also seems to be attentive to the greater local community beyond his customers…

Some of you may recall that I blogged last summer about a SEALS (Southeastern Association of Law Schools) discussion group on “publicness.”  That post can be found here.  My contribution to the discussion group was part of a paper that then was a work-in-process for the University of Cincinnati Law Review that I earlier had blogged about here.

That paper now has been released in electronic and hard-copy format.  I just uploaded the final version to SSRN.  The abstract for the paper reads as follows:

Conceptions of publicness and privateness have been central to U.S. federal securities regulation since its inception. The regulatory boundary between public offerings and private placement transactions is a basic building block among the varied legal aspects of corporate finance. Along the same lines, the distinction between public companies and private companies is fundamental to U.S. federal securities regulation.

The CROWDFUND Act, Title III of the JOBS Act, adds a new exemption from registration to the the Securities Act of 1933. In the process, the CROWDFUND Act also creates a new type of financial intermediary regulated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and amends the 1934 Act in other ways. Important among…

My post from last week posed the question of why corporate executives do what they do.  Why do they commit unethical and illegal acts?  If you ask almost anyone this, the answer comes back the same: corporate executives are greedy.  That’s why they lie, cheat, and steal.  Follow that up with the question of what should be done about it, and most people say that more law and more prison time is the solution. 

I’ve never bought into that thinking (as to the cause or the fix).  Sure, some of us are greedy.  And some small percentage of us are looking to break the law to advance our own interests at every opportunity.  But I’ve seen too many good people do bad things, and vice versa, to think that the cause of illegal corporate behavior (or almost any behavior) is somehow an inherently binary condition—good or bad, right or wrong, greedy or selfless.  The reality is that many of us are both good and bad at the same time.  But how does that actually work?  How can someone like Rajat Gupta, the former managing director of Goldman Sachs, spend his time chairing three international humanitarian organizations and …

As I begin my guest spot here at Business Law Profs Blog, I’ve really enjoyed reading the recent posts by Ann Lipton (here) and Marcia Narine (here) on corporate whistleblowers.  What has always fascinated me about whistleblowers is the “why” question: why do they do it knowing all the negatives—to their career, their family, their psyche—in store for them? 

While I don’t have any great insights as to the answer (although others do), trying to figure out why corporate executives do what they do—particularly in the realm of business ethics and white collar crime—is something I’ve been focused on for a while, first as a white collar criminal defense attorney and now as an academic.  One way I’ve tried to look at the issue is by pulling together disciplines that provide some understanding of why business people commit bad acts and what our collective response to that should be.  This has led me primarily into the areas of criminology, behavioral ethics, and federal sentencing.  And what emerges from that soup, at least for me, is the concept of rationalization—that very powerful, and very human, way of viewing oneself positively (say, as an upstanding citizen, family …