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“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”

Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, Alabama, 16 April 1963, in Atlantic Monthly August 1963

I had wanted to post a tribute to Dr. King here early on Monday.  However, after posting the Emory conference announcement, I moved on to other work, and that work filled up the available time in the day.  So, this late post including the quote above will have to suffice.

As I read meaningful quotes from Dr. King on social media and elsewhere all day on Monday, I found myself thinking of examples of inequality and injustice.  Many are compelling; many are meaningful.  Some are current events; and some of those involve business law questions.

For a number of days now (since before MLK Day) we have been showered with news stories relating to the compensation disparity between Mark Wahlberg and Michelle Williams for reshooting scenes from All the Money in the World in the wake of Kevin Spacey's replacement in the film resulting from allegations of sexual misconduct.  (See here, among other places.)  Most folks who follow Hollywood business issues know that gender discrimination is common.  My sister, a visual effects…

Loyalty has been in the news lately.  The POTUS, according to some reports, asked former Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") Director James Comey to pledge his loyalty.  Assuming the basic veracity of those reports, was the POTUS referring to loyalty to the country or to him personally?  Perhaps both and perhaps, as Peter Beinart avers in The Atlantic, the POTUS and others fail to recognize a distinction between the two.  Yet, identifying the object of a duty can be important.

I have observed that the duty of government officials is not well understood in the public realm. Donna Nagy's fine work on this issue in connection with the proposal of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge ("STOCK") Act, later adopted by Congress, outlines a number of ways in which Congressmen and Senators, among others, may owe fiduciary duties to others.  If you have not yet been introduced to this scholarship, I highly recommend it.  If we believe that government officials are entrusted with information, among other things, in their capacity as public servants, they owe duties to the government and its citizens to use that information in authorized ways for the benefit of that government and those citizens.  In fact, Professor Nagy's congressional testimony as part of the hearings on the STOCK Act includes the following in this regard:

Given the Constitution's repeated reference to public offices being “of trust,” and Members’ oath of office to “faithfully discharge” their duties, I would predict that a court would be highly likely to find that Representatives and Senators owe fiduciary-like duties of trust and confidence to a host of parties who may be regarded as the source of material nonpublic congressional knowledge. Such duties of trust and confidence may be owed to, among others:

  • the citizen-investors they serve;
  • the United States;
  • the general public;
  • Congress, as well as the Senate or the House;
  • other Members of Congress; and
  • federal officials outside of Congress who rely on a Member’s loyalty and integrity.

There is precious little in federal statutes, regulations, and case law on the nature–no less the object–of any fiduciary the Director of the FBI may have.  The authorizing statute and regulations provide little illumination.  Federal court opinions give us little more.  See, e.g., Banks v. Francis, No. 2:15-CV-1400, 2015 WL 9694627, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 15-1400, 2016 WL 110020 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 2016) ("Plaintiff does not identify any specific, mandatory duty that the federal officials — Defendants Hornak, Brennan, and the FBI Director— violated; he merely refers to an overly broad duty to uphold the U.S. Constitution and to see justice done.").  Accordingly, any applicable fiduciary duty likely would arise out of agency or other common law.  Section 8.01 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency provides "An agent has a fiduciary duty to act loyally for the principal's benefit in all matters connect with the agency relationship."  

But who is the principal in any divined agency relationship involving the FBI Director?  

Imagine this: Professor walks into Business Associations class Monday morning at 8:00 am having prepared to cover 14 pages of reading when she assigned only three (intending, when creating the syllabus, as she later recalled, to use the time to summarize, contrast, and compare agency law rules that will again come into play in partnership and other entity law–and to catch up, if need be).  OK.  The professor is me.  First lesson (which I thought I had learned many moons ago): always double-check the syllabus on what you've assigned.
 
So, what happened in class?  Well, the students didn't let on that the outline for the class plan that I scripted out on the whiteboard seemed to go beyond the reading.  But they might not have recognized that, since it was only an outline.  However, once I started covering the unassigned material, someone did alert me to my error.  Shocked (!), I told them that I had been too nice (weak response) and that–obviously–I had not checked the syllabus to confirm the day's reading assignment before scripting out the class plan and preparing for class.
 
I didn't then let the students go after learning of the mistake (having covered

…

This past week, I completed the second leg of my June Scholarship and Teaching Tour.  My time at "Method in the Madness: The Art and Science of Teaching Transactional Law and Skills" at Emory University School of Law last week was two days well spent.  I had a great time talking to attendees about my bylaw drafting module for our transaction simulation course, Representing Enterprises, and listening to others talk about their transactional law and skills teaching.  Great stuff.

This week's portion of my academic tour begins with a teaching whistle-stop at the Nashville School of Law on Friday, continues with attendance (with my husband) at a former student's wedding in Nashville on Saturday evening, and ends (my husband and I hope) with Sunday brunch out with our son (and his girlfriend if she is available).  Specifically, on Friday, I teach BARBRI for four hours in a live lecture.  The topics?  Well, I drew a short straw on that.  I teach agency, unincorporated business associations (including a bit about both extant limited liability statutes in Tennessee), and personal property–all in four hours.  Ugh.  Although I am paid for the lecture and my expenses are covered, I would not have taken (and would not continue to take) this gig if I…

OK.  I count 17 Form C filings (not including a few amended filings, two of which are noted below) on "Day 1" of U.S securities crowdfunding.  Not a bad showing for the first day out, in my view.

First in line? Bloomery Investment Holdings, LLC with an offering of LLC interests on StartEngine Capital LLC.  The firm filed its Form C a bit after 6:30 AM.   Early risers!  Eager beavers!  (Maybe too eager, since an amendment was filed less than two hours later–apparently because the attendant Form C .pdf was rejected in the initial filing.)  The firm's subsidiary is a moonshine-based liqueur producer.  At this writing, $11,700 of the target threshold funding of $300,000 (1000 units at $300 per unit) has been committed–$288,300 to go!  ($600 came in while I was typing this post.)  And it looks like the base of operations is in West Virginia, Josh!  Do you know these folks?  (Slogan: "Take a Shot on Us.")

StarEngine also is hosting another crowdfunded offering filed today.  The issuer on this offering, GameTree PBC (yes, Haskell, a public benefit corporation!), a social network for gamers based in Solana Beach, California.  GameTree is selling common stock at $2 per share and…

Guest post by Daniel Kleinberger:

Part I – Introduction

My postings this week will seek to delineate Delaware’s implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing and the covenant’s role in Delaware entity law

An obligation of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every common law contract and is codified in the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C”). The terminology differs:  Some jurisdictions refer to an “implied covenant;” others to an “implied contractual obligation;” still others to an “implied duty.”  But whatever the label, the concept is understood by the vast majority of U.S. lawyers as a matter of commercial rather than entity law.  And, to the vast majority of corporate lawyers, “good faith” does not mean contract law but rather conjures up an important aspect of a corporate director’s duty of loyalty.

Nonetheless, Delaware’s “implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing” has an increasingly clear and important role in Delaware “entity law” – i.e., the law of unincorporated business organizations (primarily limited liability companies and limited partnerships) as well as the law of corporations.

Because to the uninitiated “good faith” can be frustratingly polysemous, this first blog “clears away the underbrush” by explaining what Delaware’s…

Last week, the Deal Professor, Steven Davidoff Solomon, wrote an article titled, The Boardroom Strikes Back. In it, he recalls that shareholder activists won a number of surprising victories last year, and more were predicted for this year. That prediction made sense, as activists were able to elect directors 73% of the time in 2014.  This year, though, despite some activist victories, boards are standing their grounds with more success.  

I have no problem with shareholders seeking to impose their will on the board of the companies in which they hold stock.  I don't see activist shareholder as an inherently bad thing.  I do, however, think  it's bad when boards succumb to the whims of activist shareholders just to make the problem go away.  Boards are well served to review serious requests of all shareholders, but the board should be deciding how best to direct the company. It's why we call them directors.  

As the Deal Professor notes, some heavy hitters are questioning the uptick in shareholder activism: 

Some of the big institutional investors are starting to question the shareholder activism boom. Laurence D. Fink, chief executive of BlackRock, the world’s biggest asset manager, with $4 trillion, recently issued a well-publicized letter that criticized some of the strategies pushed by hedge funds, like share buybacks and dividends, as a “short-termist phenomenon.” T. Rowe Price, which has $750 billion under management, has also criticized shareholder activists’ strategies. They carry a big voice.

I am on record being critical of boards letting short-term planning be their primary filter, because I think it can hurt long-term value in many instances.  I don't, however, think buybacks or dividends are inherently incorrect, either.  Whether the idea comes from an activist shareholder or the board doesn't really matter to me.  The board just needs to assess the idea and decide how to proceed.  

[Please click below to read more.]

 The Supreme Court of Wyoming recently decided to pierce the limited liability veil of a single-member LLC.   Green Hunter Wind Energy, LLC (LLC), had a single member: Green Hunter Energy, Inc. (Corp). LLC entered into a services contract with Western Ecosystems Technology, Inc. (Western).  The court determined that veil piercing – thus allowing Western to recover LLC’s debts from Corp – was appropriate for several reasons. I think the court got this wrong.  The case can be accessed here (pdf).  

The court provides the following rule for piercing the veil of a limited liability company, providing three basic factors 1) fraud; 2) undercapitalization; and 3) “intermingling the business and finances of the company and the member to such an extent that there is no distinction between them.”  The court noted that the failure to following company formalities was recently dropped as a factor by changes to the state LLC statute.

Here’s where the court goes wrong: 

(1) As to undercapitalization, the court completely ignores the fact that Western freely contracted with the LLC with little to no cash.  If Western wanted the parent Corp to be a guarantor, it could have required that. If Western thought LLC was acting…

At West Virginia University College of Law, we started classes yesterday, and I taught my first classes of the year: Energy Law in the morning and Business Organizations in the afternoon.  As I  do with a new year coming, I updated and revised my Business Organizations course for the fall.  Last year, I moved over to using Unicorporated Business Entities, of which I am a co-author.  I have my own corporations materials that I use to supplement the book so that I cover the full scope of agency, partnerships, LLCs, and corporations.  So far, it's worked  pretty well.  I spent several  years with  Klein, Ramseyer and Bainbridge's Business Associations, Cases and Materials on Agency, Partnerships, and Corporations (KRB), which is a great casebook, in its own right.

I did not make the change merely (or even mostly) because I am a co-author. I made the change because I like the structure we use in our book. I had been trying to work with KRB in my structure, but this book is designed to teach in with the organization I prefer, which is more topical than entity by entity.  I'll note that a little while ago, my co-blogger Steve…

With oral arguments today in the Hobby Lobby case, I thought I’d pile on a few last thoughts:

(1) As I explained here, entities should be able to take on a racial, religious, or gender identity in discrimination claims.  I would add that I feel similarly about sexual orientation, but (though I think it should be) that is still not generally federally protected. To the extent the law otherwise provides a remedy, I’d extend it to the entity. 

(2) It is reasonable to inquire, why is discrimination different than religious practice?  For me, I just don’t think religious exercise by an entity is the same as extending discrimination protection to an entity.  There is something about the affirmative exercise of religion that I don’t think extends well to an entity.   That is, discrimination happens to a person or an entity. Religious practice is an affirmative act that is different.  Basically, reification of the entity to the point of religious practice crosses a line that I think is unnecessary and improper because discrimination protection should be sufficient.

As a follow up to that, I also think it's a reasonable question to ask: Why is religion different than speech?