Corporate Governance

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In my article, “The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance Cases,” 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 831, I criticized the Supreme Court justices for failing to acknowledge the role of competing conceptualizations of the corporation in their corporate political speech cases.  I noted, however, that former Chief Justice Rehnquist was arguably the lone modern justice to deserve at least some praise in this area.

Justice Rehnquist’s stand-alone dissent in Bellotti provides arguably the sole example in these opinions of a Justice affirmatively adopting a theory of the corporation for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of corporations–though not via the express adoption of one of the traditionally recognized theories. Specifically, Justice Rehnquist relied on Justice Marshall’s Dartmouth College opinion to conclude that: “Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation does not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons . . . our inquiry must seek to determine which constitutional protections are ‘incidental to its very existence.”’ Thus, while it may be true that “a corporation’s right of commercial speech . . . might be considered necessarily incidental to the business of a commercial corporation[…

I wonder how many people are boycotting Hobby Lobby because of the company’s stance on the Affordable Health Care Act and contraception. Perhaps more people than ever are shopping there in support. Co-blogger Anne Tucker recounted the Supreme Court’s oral argument here in the latest of her detailed posts on the case. The newspapers and blogosphere have followed the issue for months, often engaging in heated debate. But what does the person walking into a Hobby Lobby know and how much do they care?

I spoke to reporter Noam Cohen from the New York Times earlier today about an app called Buycott, which allows consumers to research certain products by scanning a barcode. If they oppose the Koch Brothers or companies that lobbied against labels for genetically modified food or if they support companies with certain environmental or human rights practices, the app will provide the information to them in seconds based on their predetermined settings and the kinds of “campaigns” they have joined. Neither Hobby Lobby nor Conestoga Woods is listed in the app yet. 

Cohen wanted to know whether apps like Buycott and GoodGuide (which rates products and companies on a scale of 1-10 for their health, environmental…

I’m trying out a new weekly blog post theme, “The Weekly BLT,” wherein I highlight a few interesting business law tweets that I’ve come across in the past week that have not yet made it to the BLPB.

It’s proxy season and the Conference Board has released a series of reports on investor engagement and corporate governance. In “The Conference Board Governance Center White Paper: What is the Optimal Balance in the Relative Roles of Management, Directors, and Investors in the Governance of Public Corporations?” the authors provide a 76-page overview of the evolution of US corporate governance, describing key trends and issues.

The report begins by discussing the history of the allocation of roles and responsibilities for governance of public companies. If I thought my law students would read it, I would assign this section to them.  The second part of the paper addresses the legal, social and market trends that have influenced the historical allocation of rights. Specifically, it reviews:

a) the increasing influence of institutional investors resulting from the concentration of ownership in institutional investment, changes in voting rules and practices and more assertive shareholder activism;

b) shifting conceptions about the purpose of the corporation and the duty to maximize corporate value, with a strong emphasis on shareholder wealth maximization;

c) decreased public trust of business leaders following the corporate scandals of 2001-2002 and 2007-2008;

d) federal regulation intended to enhance the influence of shareholders…

A hearing in the Delaware Court of Chancery highlights the question raised in my earlier post of institutional shareholder activism and provides a timely example of one brand of shareholder activism:  issue activism.

Yesterday, Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster denied Hershey’s motion to dismiss a books-and-records suit brought by shareholder Louisiana Municipal Police Employees’ Retirement System. The suit seeks inspection of corporate books to investigate claims that the chocolate company knowingly used suppliers violating international child labor laws.  A full description of the hearing is available here.

UPDATE, Kent Greenfield who has been involved in the case, provided me with a copy of the Hershey hearing & ruling ( Download Hershey Ruling) as well as some context for the case.  Yesterday’s hearing did two things. First, it clarified the standard of review for motions to dismiss section 220 books and records demands. Citing to Seinfeld v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 909 A.2d 117, 118 (Del. Supr. 2006), the proper standard is whether a shareholder has provided “some evidence to suggest a ‘credible basis’ from which a court can infer that mismanagement, waste or wrongdoing may have occurred.”    Second, the books and record request was brought on …

I am interested in the behavior of institutional investors, including defined benefit plans and large mutual funds, primarily because they trade in people’s retirement savings.   Institutional investors and hedge funds are some of the only remaining investors under the big umbrella heading of “shareholders” that have the resources and incentive to act the way that corporate law theorizes shareholders should act.  They become the lab rats and the test case of governance experiments and debates.

Notably, the passivity of institutional investors has been described, empirically documented by number of initiated shareholder proposals and with voting records on such proposals, and debated at considerable length.  Alan Palmiter, Jill Fisch, Roberta Romano, as well as a recent article by Gilson & Gordon and many others have all grappled with the evidence for and against and provided theories that augment or diminish the view of passivity by institutional investors.

The New York Times DealB%k published an article yesterday, New Alliances in Battle for Corporate Control, describing the coordination between institutional investors (both pension funds and mutual funds) and hedge fund activists.  Drawing from industry sources, the article describes informal coordination of activists courting institutional investors’ votes before…

Stanford Law School is looking for a full-time teaching fellow in the corporate governance area.
 
The teaching fellow will teach two courses, and a two-year commitment is required, with the possibility of a third year.  The position is intended for people who plan to go on the academic job market following the fellowship.  The application deadline is April 15, 2014. 
 
More details are available after the break for those who are interested.
 

I have posted the first rough draft of my latest project, “Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory,” on SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

This Essay examines three related propositions: (1) Voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) fails to effectively advance the agenda of a meaningful segment of CSR proponents; (2) None of the three dominant corporate governance theories – director primacy, shareholder primacy, or team production theory – support mandatory CSR as a normative matter; and, (3) Corporate personality theory, specifically concession theory, can be a meaningful source of leverage in advancing mandatory CSR in the face of opposition from the three primary corporate governance theories. In examining these propositions, this Essay makes the additional claims that Citizens United: (A) supports the proposition that corporate personality theory matters; (B) undermines one of the key supports of the shareholder wealth maximization norm; and (C) highlights the political nature of this debate.

Are the directors of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood breaching their fiduciary duties by challenging the contraceptive mandate, seemingly without serious regard to the financial consequences?

Mark Underberg says “perhaps”.

Stephen Bainbridge says “no”.

Professor Bainbridge focuses on the facts that both Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Woods are family-owned, closely-held corporations, and that Conestoga Woods is incorporated under Pennsylvania law, which has a nonshareholder constituency statute.  I am not going to jump into their disagreement directly, but, instead, will use a story I saw about Apple to extend the conversation.

Unlike Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Woods, Apple is a publicly-traded, California corporation.  California does not have a constituency statute.  Recently, Apple CEO and director, Tim Cook, discussed the company’s commitment to the environment, the blind, and making the world a better place.  Cook supposedly told investors:

If you want me to do things only for ROI reasons, you should get out of this stock.

More forcefully, Cook said:

When we work on making our devices accessible by the blind, I don’t consider the bloody ROI.

In Cook’s first statement, he seems to be saying that ROI is one of the reasons (just not the only reason) Apple makes…

This week in Lawson v. FMR, LLC the Supreme Court extended the reach of Sarbanes-Oxley to potentially millions more employers when it ruled that SOX’s whistleblower protection applies to employees of private employers that contract with publicly-traded companies. In 2002, Congress enacted SOX with whistleblower protection provisions containing civil and criminal penalties. The law clearly protects whistleblowers who work for publicly-held companies, and courts have generally ruled against employees who work for privately-held firms. But the Department of Labor’s Administrative Review Board has ruled that contractors at public companies enjoy whistleblower protection as well. The Supreme Court agreed with that assessment, with Justice Ginsburg writing for the majority. The dissent, written by Justice Sotomayor, noted the “stunning reach” based on the majority’s interpretation and opined that the extension was not what Congress intended.  The plaintiffs in Lawson did not work for Fidelity, but were contracted to provide advice to Fidelity Mutual Fund customers. Plaintiffs voiced concerns to management regarding problems with cost-accounting methodologies and the alleged improper retention of millions of dollars in fees. Because Fidelity has no employees of its own, it was not a party to the suit.

This development will likely be among the many that the Whistleblower Protection…