March has provided a slate of mistakes as to entity form, focusing (as it almost always does) on limited liability companies (LLCs) and various outlets calling such entities “corporations.”  These are not in any particular order, but lists are neat. Enjoy! 

(1 ) Politifact Checks Trump Facts, Forgets to Check Entity Law Facts

In an article on Politifact.com, Donald Trump incorrectly says Virginia winery is the largest on East Coast, which determines that Trump’s claims about the size of a winery that his son runs to be false and notes some statements are incorrect. Ironically, the article also claims: 

A legal disclaimer on the winery website says the GOP presidential candidate doesn’t own the winery. The venture is a limited liability corporation, and its owners are not a matter of public record.

Wrong. The winery site says, “Trump Winery is a registered trade name of Eric Trump Wine Manufacturing LLC, which is not owned, managed or affiliated with Donald J. Trump, The Trump Organization or any of their affiliates.”  An LLC is still not a corporation. 

(2) Big Bang Theory: Big Brains Don’t Know Entity Law

I don’t watch the Big Bang Theory, but my colleague at Valparaiso University, Professor Rebecca J. Huss, is a reader

In my Energy Business: Law & Strategy course, I use Larry A. DiMatteo’s article, Strategic Contracting: Contract Law as a Source of Competitive Advantage, 47 Am. Bus. L.J. 727 (2010).  I have been using the article in the class since 2012 (this is the third time I have taught it), and I think it does a great job of providing a theoretical backdrop for practical application.  I teach the article in combination with a one-sided proposed Memorandum of Understanding to help students think about the contracting process and and the long-term implications of what might seem like a small-scale negotiation. I highly recommend the piece.  

In reading the article this time around, though, I was struck by how differently the piece treats limited liability companies (LLCs) and corporations and the way concerns about opportunistic behavior are raised in the context of the latter.   In one portion of the article, DiMatteo notes: 

Corporate strategy that fails to take account of the strategic use of law is likely to waste opportunities for competitive advantages. A corporate legal strategy can be used to gain competitive advantages both internally and externally.

I wholeheartedly agree, and this is part of the reason I teach my course.  Although I don’t think

Some of our December graduates haven just taken the Florida bar exam. As always, I asked them about the business associations questions. Florida drastically changed its LLC rules in 2014, but still hasn’t asked any questions about LLCs, focusing instead on partnerships and corporations (at least according to the students). From a review of the released questions, the bar didn’t ask about LLCs before the amendments either.

I teach BA again next year and I’m struggling with what to emphasize. Business Associations is not required in many Florida law schools, but it is at St. Thomas, and many students enter the class with trepidation. Most will only take the one required course and won’t go on to advanced classes in securities regulation, corporate taxation, or other drafting courses. I try to focus the required BA class on skills that graduates will need in the workplace in addition to preparing them for the bar by using released test questions. Now I wonder how to balance the tension between the rise of LLCs and the many changes in laws related to securities regulation with the bar’s continued focus on partnerships and traditional corporations.

Yesterday the Obama administration added Miami to the list

Fellow BLPB editor, Stefan Padfield, raised some insightful questions on the continued reach and impact of defacto corporation doctrines and corporation by estoppel in an earlier, offline conversation.  [Stefan uses my Business Organizations casebook offered on the electronic platform ChartaCourse and was graciously providing me some feedback].  The conversation raised two related groups of questions. First what is the continued import and application of defacto corporation doctrine in a world of standardized incorporation processes.  Long gone are the days of lost mail (lost Email maybe) and corrections can be made nearly instanteously and will relatively little cost in the event of typos or other defects.  To what extent does the de facto doctrine, long a staple of the survey law school course on corporations, still play a relevant role in practice. I understand all of the doctrinal reasons law professors may want to continue to teach it because it tests the outer limits of the substance over form debate in corporations and the begs the questions how fragile or strong is the legal fiction of separately incorporated entities.  It is nearly as fun as piercing the corporate veil!  But in [insert finger quotes here] “real life” or “practice” how relevant is

For those of you who talk about the recent problems at Volkswagen in your classes, this recently posted article may be useful. I connected with Charles Elson briefly when I lived in Delaware, and he is certainly an authority on corporate governance. The article is available here and the abstract is posted below. 

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Although the primary cause of the emissions scandal at Volkswagen appears to have been misfeasance and malfeasance on a corporate-wide scale, we argue that such a problematic culture existed at Volkswagen because of the composition of the board itself in combination with the unique governance structure known as “co-determination,” that defines many German companies, including VW. There are three major problems from a corporate governance standpoint with the Volkswagen board. First, is the interest-conflicting nature of the dual-class stock held by the dominant shareholding Porsche and Piech families. Second, is the presence of a government as a major shareholder. And third is the organization of its characteristically German “two-tier” board around the principle of co-determination, which mandated significant labor representation. We argue that each of these elements of the VW ownership and governance structure contributed in varying degrees to the board failure of oversight that led

Christopher Bruner recently posted a book chapter entitled The Corporation’s Intrinsic Attributes. I try to read everything Christopher writes, including his excellent Cambridge University Press book, Corporate Governance in the Common Law World, and I am looking forward to reading this new book chapter over spring break next week. The book chapter’s abstract is reproduced below for interested readers:

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Numerous treatises, casebooks, and other resources commonly present concise lists of attributes said to be intrinsic to the modern corporation and/or essential to its economic utility. Such descriptions of the corporate form often constitute introductory matter, conditioning how students, professionals, and public officials alike approach corporate law by presenting a straightforward framework to distinguish the corporate form from other types of business entities. There are two significant problems with such frameworks, however, from a pedagogic perspective. First, these frameworks describe the corporation by reference to purportedly fixed intrinsic attributes, conflicting sharply with the flux and dynamism that have in fact characterized the history of corporate law. Second, these frameworks differ markedly from each other in how they characterize the corporation’s attributes, each embodying a contestable perspective on the nature of the corporate form.

The diversity of perspectives that such inquiry

Presidential candidate Donald Trump has repeatedly stated that he never plans to eat Oreo cookies again because the Nabisco plant is closing and moving to Mexico. Trump, who has starred in an Oreo commercial in the past, is actually wrong about the nature of Nabisco’s move, and it’s unlikely that he will affect Nabisco’s sales notwithstanding his tremendous popularity among some in the electorate right now. Mr. Trump has also urged a boycott of Apple over how that company has handled the FBI’s request over the San Bernardino terrorist’s cell phone.

Strangely, I haven’t heard a call for a boycott of Apple products following shareholders’ rejection of a proposal to diversify the board last week. I would think that Reverend and former candidate Al Sharpton, who called for the boycott of the Oscars due to lack of diversity would call for a boycott of all things Apple. But alas, for now Trump seems to be the lone voice calling for such a move (and not because of diversity). In fact, I’ve never walked past an Apple Store without thinking that there must be a 50% off sale on the merchandise. There are times when the lines are literally

I have long followed the trials and tribulations of Chesapeake Energy and founder Aubrey McClendon, and I had been planning to write about yesterday’s indictment of McClendon for bid rigging in a couple weeks, after I gathered more information.  About an hour ago, though, reports broke that former Chesapeake CEO Aubrey McClendon died today.  According to CNBC:

Aubrey McClendon, a founder and former chief executive of Chesapeake Energy, died in a single-car crash Wednesday at age 56, a day after he was charged with conspiring to rig bids for oil and natural gas leases.

McClendon crashed into an embankment while traveling at a “high rate of speed” in Oklahoma City just after 9 a.m. Wednesday morning, said Capt. Paco Balderrama of the Oklahoma City Police Department. Flames engulfed McClendon’s vehicle “immediately,” and it was burnt so badly that police could not tell if he was wearing a seatbelt, he said.

Before going any further, my thoughts go out to his friends and family.  Regardless of how anything else comes together, their loss is real, and I feel badly for them.  

In years past, I have questioned how Chesapeake conducted some of their business, including their use of entities and

I am looking forward to presenting at this conference next month. Looks like a great group of academics and practitioners.

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University of Cincinnati College of Law

The 29th Annual Corporate Law Center Symposium – Corporate Social Responsibility and the Modern Enterprise

March 18, 2016

8:45 a.m. – 3:30 p.m.

Hilton Netherland Plaza

Pavilion Ballroom

This event is free. CLE: 5.0 hours, pending approval.

Presented by the University of Cincinnati College of Law’s Corporate Law Center and Law Review.

Symposium materials will be available on March 14 at: law.uc.edu/corporate-law-center/2016-symposium

Please register by contacting Lori Strait: email Lori.Stait@uc.edu; fax 513-556-1236; or phone 513-556-0117

Introduction, 8:45 a.m.

Keynote, 9:00 a.m.

Clare Iery, The Procter & Gamble Company

Social Enterprises and Changing Legal Forms, 9:30 a.m.

Mark Loewenstein, University of Colorado Law School

William H. Clark, Jr., Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Haskell Murray, Belmont University College of Business

Russell Menyhart, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP

Sourcing Dilemmas in a Globalized World, 11:00 a.m.

Steve Slezak, University of Cincinnati College of Business

Marsha A. Dickson, University of Delaware Department of Fashion & Apparel Studies

Tianlong Hu, Renmin University of China Law School

Anita Ramasastry, University of Washington School of Law

CSR

One of my two former firms, King & Spalding, is hosting a free interactive web seminar on cybersecurity and M&A on February 25 at 12:30 p.m. Thought the web seminar might be of interest to some of our readers. The description is reproduced below.

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An Interactive Web Seminar

The Opportunities and Pitfalls of Cybersecurity and Data Privacy in Mergers and Acquisitions

February 25, 2016

12:30 PM – 1:30 PM

Over the last several years, company after company has been rocked by cybersecurity incidents. Moreover, obligations relating to cybersecurity and data privacy are rapidly evolving, imposing on corporations a complex and challenging legal and regulatory environment. Cybersecurity and data privacy deficiencies, therefore, might pose potentially significant business, legal, and regulatory risks to an acquiring company. For this reason, cybersecurity and data privacy are becoming integral pre-transaction due diligence items.

This e-Learn will analyze the (1) special cybersecurity and data privacy dangers that come with corporate transactions; (2) strategies to mitigate those dangers; and (3) benefits of incorporating cybersecurity and data privacy into due diligence. The panel will zero in on these issues from the vantage point of practitioners in the deal trenches, and from the perspective of a former computer crime