I am writing this while on a break at the AALS Annual Meeting, having just attended the panel discussion organized by the AALS Section on Agency, Partnership, LLCs, and Unincorporated Associations: Effective Methods for Teaching LLCs and Unincorporated Business Arrangements.  The presentations were excellent, including one by BLPB co-blogger Anne Tucker.  Here are a couple of items I took from Robert Rhee’s presentation that I thought might be of interest to our readers:

1.  Robert J. Rhee, Case Study of the Bank of America and Merrill Lynch Merger

This is a case study of the Bank of America and Merrill Lynch merger. It is based on the article, Fiduciary Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and the Hobson’s Choice during a National Crisis, 17 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 661 (2010). The case study analyzes the controversial events occurring between the merger signing and closing. It reviews in depth the circumstances under the federal government threatened to fire the board and management of Bank of America unless it consummated the Merrill Lynch acquisition. Among other issues, this case study raises the questions: (1) what is the role of a private firm during a public

With winter break nearly upon us this means grading, writing projects, and possibly some conference travel with the upcoming AALS annual meeting.  I plan on putting together my AALS talk (on incorporating experiential exercises in teaching LLCs) next week, and have drawn inspiration from the following image:

Conference Image

The Business Law programs are on Saturday, January 4th and are listed below. If you would like to highlight other programs, please respond in the comments, and I will add to the list.

  • The program will explore:  The … topic of effectively teaching LLCs.  
  • 2:00 pm – 3:45 pm Business Associations
    The Value Proposition for Business Associations in Tomorrow’s Legal Education
  • The panel will be exploring: How does business associations teaching and scholarship contribute to the U.S. program of legal education?  How could or should it contribute?  What role does the basic law school course on business associations play in an optimized law school curriculum?  What course content, pedagogy, and teaching tools best support that role?  How does business associations scholarship inform and support that role?    
  • 4:00 pm –

A recent study, Who Owns West Virginia? (full report pdf), gives a glimpse into the land ownership in the state.  The report finds that much of the state’s private land is “owned by large, mainly absentee corporations, [but] the list of top owners – once dominated by energy, land holding and paper companies – now includes major timber management concerns.”  

As reported by Ken Ward Jr. in the Charleston Gazette, the report finds that “[n]one of the state’s top 10 private landowners is headquartered in West Virginia.”  Although it is accurate that the top ten owners are not indivdual owners,  I will note that not all of the top ten owners are “corporations.”  There is at least one master limited partnership and one limited liability company (LLC).  That may not mean much in the sense of absentee ownership, but it is a doctrinal distinction I maintain is still important.  

It’s not shocking that these entity owners would be out of state, especially because that was true back in 1974, too, when the last study was done.  There are relatively few large entities chartered or headquartered in West Virginia, and it appears that many of the

Here in West Virginia, it’s exam time for our law students.  For my Business Organizations students, tomorrow is the day.  For students getting ready to take exams, and for any lawyers out there who might need a refresher, the Kentucky Supreme Court provides a good reminder that LLCs are separate from their owners, even if there is only one owner.  

Here’s a basic rundown of the case, Turner v. Andrew, 2011-SC-000614-DG, 2013 WL 6134372 (Ky. Nov. 21, 2013) (available here):   In 2007, an employee of M&W Milling was driving a feed-truck owned by his employer.  A movable auger mounted on the feed-truck swung into oncoming traffic and struck and seriously damaged a dump truck owned by Billy Andrew, the sole member of  Billy Andrew, Jr. Trucking, LLC, which owned the damaged truck.  Andrew filed suit against the employee and M & W Milling  claiming personal property damage to the truck and the loss of income derived from the use of damaged truck.  Notably, the LLC was not a named plaintiff in the lawsuit.

Hey issue spotters: check out the last line of the prior paragraph. (Also: a bit of an odd twist is the Andrew chose not to respond to discovery requests, though

The Economist has an interesting piece on how “[a] mutation in the way companies are financed and managed will change the distribution of the wealth they create.”  You can read the entire article here.  A brief excerpt follows.

The new popularity of the [Master Limited Partnership] is part of a larger shift in the way businesses structure themselves that is changing how American capitalism works…. Collectively, distorporations such as the MLPs have a valuation on American markets in excess of $1 trillion. They represent 9% of the number of listed companies and in 2012 they paid out 10% of the dividends; but they took in 28% of the equity raised…. [The] beneficiaries, though, are a select class. Quirks in various investment and tax laws block or limit investing in pass-through structures by ordinary mutual funds, including the benchmark broad index funds, and by many institutions. The result is confusion and the exclusion of a large swathe of Americans from owning the companies hungriest for the capital the markets can provide, and thus from getting the best returns on offer….

Another booming pass-through structure is that of the “business development company” (BDC). These firms raise public equity and

Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie have posted “Larry
from the Left: An Appreciation
” on SSRN. 
Here is the abstract:

This essay approaches the scholarship of the late Professor
Larry Ribstein from a progressive vantage point. It argues that Ribstein’s
revolutionary work upended the “nexus of contracts” theory in
corporate law and provided a potential alternative to the regulatory state for
those who believe in worker empowerment and anti-cronyism. Progressive
corporate law scholars should look to Ribstein’s scholarship not as a hurdle to
overcome, but as a resource to be tapped for insights about constructing a more
egalitarian and dynamic economy.

Sarah C. Haan has posted “Opaque Transparency: Outside
Spending and Disclosure by Privately-Held Business Entities in 2012 and Beyond

on SSRN.  Here is a portion of the
abstract:

In this Article, I analyze data on outside spending from the
treasuries of for-profit business entities in the 2012 federal election – the
very spending unleashed by Citizens United v. FEC. I find that the majority of
reported outside spending came from privately-held, not publicly-held
companies, including a significant proportion of unincorporated business
entities such as LLCs, and that more than forty percent of spending by
privately-held businesses was characterized by opaque transparency: Though
fully disclosed under existing campaign finance disclosure laws, something
about the origin of the money was obscured. This happened when political
expenditures were spread among affiliated business-donors, typically donating
similar amounts to the same recipient(s) on similar dates, and when for-profit
business entities were used as shadow money conduits. I also argue that, due to
differences between access-oriented and replacement-oriented electoral
strategies, for-profit businesses engaged in outside spending in a federal
election are likely to be experiencing insider expropriation. The expropriation
of a business entity’s political voice by a controlling person is another
potential

Early this month, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania decided Gentex Corp. v. Abbott, Civ. A. No. 3:12-CV-02549,  (M.D.Pa. 10-10-2013).  The outcome of the case is not really objectionable (to me), but some of the
language in the opinion is. As with many courts, this court conflates LLCs and
corporations, which is just wrong.  The
court repeatedly applies “corporate” law principles to an LLC, without
distinguishing the application.  This is
a common practice, and one that I think does a disservice to the evolution of
the law applying to both corporations and LLCs.

I noted this in a Harvard Business Law Review Online article a while back:

Many courts thus seem to view LLCs as close cousins to corporations, and many even appear to view LLCs as subset or specialized types of corporations. A May 2011 search of Westlaw’s “ALLCASES” database provides 2,773 documents with the phrase “limited liability corporation,” yet most (if not all) such cases were actually referring to LLCs—limited liability companies. As such, it is not surprising that courts have often failed to treat LLCs as alternative entities unto themselves. It may be that some courts didn’t even appreciate that fact. (footnotes omitted).

To be

Okay, so maybe I am overstating that a bit, but it’s only a
bit.  This is not exactly timely, as the
following case was decided in the December 2012, but I was recently reviewing
it as I taught these cases and helped update Unincorporated Business Entities (Ribstein, Lipshaw, Miller, and Fershee, 5th ed., LexisNexis). (semi-shameless plug).  Despite the passage of time, this case has, apparently, gotten me riled up
again.  So here we go . . .    

Synectic Ventures I, LLC v. EVI Corp., 294 P.3d 478 (Or.
2012):  several investment funds organized as LLCs (the Synectic LLCs or
LLCs).  The LLCs made a loan to the
defendant corporation, EVI Corp. The loan agreement was secured by EVI’s
assets, and provided that EVI would pay back $3 million in loans, plus 8%
interest by December 31, 2004.  The loan
agreement provided that if EVI obtained $1 million in additional financing by
December 31, 2004, the loan amount would be converted into equity (i.e., EVI
shares) and the security interest would be eliminated. If the money were not
raised by the deadline, the LLCs could foreclose on EVI’s assets (mostly IP in
medical devices). 

To make things interesting, the LLCs appointed Berkman the
manager of the LLCs (thus, they were manager-managed LLCs). “At all relevant
times, Berkman—the managing member of plaintiffs—was also the chairman of the
board and treasurer of defendant [EVI].” 
In mid-2003, the Synectic LLCs’ members sought to have Berkman removed, and Berkman signed
an agreement not to enter into new obligations for the LLCs without getting
member approval. 

Lewis Lazarus recently posted Directors Designated By Investors Owe Fiduciary Duties to the Company as a Whole and Not to the Designating Investor at the Delaware Business Litigation Report.  In his article, he explained

[The Delaware] cases teach that directors designated by particular stockholders or investors owe duties generally to the company and all of its stockholders.  Where the interests of the investor and the company and its common stockholders potentially diverge, the directors cannot favor the interests of the investor over those of the company and its common stockholders.

Professor Bainbridge weighs in (here), agreeing that the above is the general rule, but that in some cases that may not be best.  He gives a few examples, such as a struggling company granting a union nominee a board position or a time when preferred shareholders can elect a board majority because no dividends were paid for a sufficient period of time. He then notes that a director’s “sponsor might reasonably expect the directors not just to ‘advocate’ for the shareholder’s position, but to vote for it and take other action.”  Professor Bainbridge concludes that he still doesn’t “think the sponsor should be able to punish