It has been kind of a unique end of the semester, and I am working feverously to get through my Business Organizations exams. I’m getting there.  So far, I have had zero exams reference a “limited liability corporation.”  If this holds, it will be at least three years in a row.  

I have had a couple of folks refer to LLC veil piercing as piercing the “corporate” veil (another no-no), and I did have some other “corporate” references to LLCs (e.g., “an LLC’s corporate formalities”), so we’re not all the way there. But so far, I am seeing improvement, and I appreciate the effort.  

Here’s hoping for 48 of 48 describing the LLC (as an entity) correctly.  I hope the rest of my colleagues are holding up well here in the home stretch. Good luck to all. 

A recent report and recommendation from a U.S. magistrate recommends that the referring court find that a plaintiff did not provide the facts needed to support taking diversity jurisdiction.  The magistrate is correct, but the recommendation is a little ironic in that it seems to be chiding the plaintiff for a lack of precision, and well, this: 

Here, Peeples’ amended complaint contains the bare assertions that the address for Xlibris Publishing is in Bloomington, Indiana, while his address is in Mobile, Alabama. The bare allegation respecting the Defendant is insufficient as it does not identify whether Xlibris is a corporation or, instead, an unincorporated entity such as a limited liability corporation. Moreover, if Xlibris is a corporation, the complaint does not delineate its state(s) of incorporation and the state where it has its principal place of business. See Flintlock Constr. Servs., LLC v. Well-Come Holdings, LLC, 710 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2013) (“A corporation is considered a citizen of every state in which it has been incorporated and where it has its principal place of business.”). And, if an unincorporated entity such as a limited liability corporation,3 the amended complaint does not allege every

Okay, not really. But my daily Westlaw search for “limited liability corporation” recently started delivering contract award announcements from the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) related to contract awards. DHHS reconds many “business types” for their records, such as “Minority Owned Business” and “For Profit Organization. And now, apparently, “limited liability coroporation” is one of them.  ARRRRRGHH! LLCs are “limited liability companies” and are not corporations.  An internet search shows that there are at least 78 of these DHHS designations out there (and I’ll wager there are more).  

Following is an excerpt of one such announcement.  You’ll note that, according to the announcement, Seba Professional Services LLC is both a “Partnership or Limited Liability Partnership” and a “Limited Liability Corporation.”  Sigh.  Really, they’re making my stomach hurt: 

Department of Health and Human Services awarded contract of IGF::CT::IGF PATIENT MESSENGER AND TRANSPORT SERVICES to SEBA PROFESSIONAL SERVICES LLC

Washington: This contract was awarded to seba professional services llc with a potential award amount of $6,117,056. Of this amount, 100% ($6,117,056) has been obligated.
 
Awarding Agency:
Department of Health and Human Services
 
. . . .
 
Recipient:
SEBA PROFESSIONAL SERVICES LLC
. . . .

A 2017 opinion related to successor liability just posted to Westlaw.  The case is an EEOC claim “against the Hospital of St. Raphael School of Nurse Anesthesia (“HSR School”) and Anesthesia Associates of New Haven (“AANH”), alleging gender discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . .” The plaintiff was seeking to join Yale New Haven Hospital (“YNHH”). MARGARITE CONSOLMAGNO v. HOSPITAL OF ST. RAPHAEL SCHOOL OF NURSE ANESTHESIA and ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES OF NEW HAVEN, P.C., 3:11CV109 (DJS), 2017 WL 10966446, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2017). 

 
 
Apparently, the HSR School trained nurse anesthetists was owned and run by AANH a Connecticut “professional corporation.”  The plaintiff was in the HSR School for about six months before she was dismissed, she claimed, because of ” gender discrimination and retaliation for reporting a staff member’s inappropriate sexual conduct.” Id. The plaintiff sought to join YNHH because that entity took over running an anesthesia school that had been, in some form, the HSR school.  
 
The successor liability part is rather interesting, though largely devoid of facts from the transaction.  The court ultimately concludes that even though YNHH resumed a similar school,

A new case from the Southern District of Texas recently appeared, and it is yet another case in which the entity type descriptions are, well, flawed. The case opens: 

Before the Court is the defendant’s, Arnold Development Group, LLC (the “defendant”) motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) and (3) (Dkt. No. 5), the plaintiff’s, Conesco Industries, LTD.; d/b/a DOKA USA, LTD. (the “plaintiff”) response to the defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 18) and the defendant’s reply in support of its motion (Dkt. No. 20).
 . . . .
The plaintiff is a New Jersey limited partnership doing business in Texas and throughout the United States. The defendant is a Missouri limited liability corporation.
CONESCO INDUSTRIES, LTD. d/b/a DOKA USA, LTD., Pl., v. ARNOLD DEVELOPMENT GROUP, LLC, Def.., 4:18-CV-02851, 2019 WL 1430112, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 2019) (emphasis added). 
 
Everybody who reads this blog knew that was coming because I am writing about the case. Arnold Development Group, LLC, is not a limited liability corporation. It is a limited liability company.
 
So, fine, this kind of error is not remarkable, given my numerous posts on the subject.

Get this, from a March 15 ruling and order on a motion for summary judgment: 

Greenwich Hotel Limited Partnership [GHLP] is a limited partnership organized under the laws of Connecticut, and is the owner of the Hyatt Regency Greenwich hotel. Answer to First Amended Complaint, dated Dec. 16, 2016 (“Am. Ans.”), ECF NO. 62, at 8. Hyatt Equities, L.L.C. (“Hyatt Equities”) is a limited liability corporation incorporated in Delaware, and is the general partner of Greenwich Hotel Limited Partnership. Id. at 9. The Hyatt Corporation (“Hyatt Corp.”) is a limited liability corporation incorporated in Delaware, and is the agent of Greenwich Hotel Limited Partnership. Id. at 9.

Benavidez v. Greenwich Hotel LP, 3:16-CV-191 (VAB), 2019 WL 1230357, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2019). 
 
Once more, for the people in back: LLCs are “limited liability companies,” not “limited liability corporations.”As such, LLCs are not “incorporated.” LLCs are formed or organized. In addition, corporations are entities that provide shareholders limited liability, but they are generally not referred to as “limited liability corporations” because they might be confused with a separate and distinct entity type, the LLC.  
 
Whenever I read a case with this kind of language,

It is Spring Break at WVU, so I am using this time to finish some paper edits and catch up on my email. Last week, I got an email about a recent case from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. It is a headache-inducing opinion that continues the trend of careless language related to limited liability companies (LLCs). 

The opinion is a civil procedure case (at this point) regarding whether service of process was effective for two defendants, one a corporation and the other an LLC.  The parties at issue, (collectively, “Defendants”) are: (1) Ditech Financial, LLC f/k/a Green Tree Servicing, LLC (“Ditech Financial”) and (2) Ditech Holding Corporation f/k/a Walter Investment Management Corp.’s (“Ditech Holding”). The court notes that it is unclear whether there is diversity jurisdiction, because

“the documents submitted by Defendants with their motion to dismiss suggest that there may be diversity of citizenship in this case. See [12-1, at 2 (stating Ditech Holding is a Maryland corporation with a principal office in Pennsylvania) ]; [12-1, at 2 (stating Ditech Financial is a Delaware limited liability corporation with a principal office in Pennsylvania) ].”

Clayborn v. Walter Investment Management Corp., No.

Gregg D. Polsky, University of  Georgia Law, recently posted his paper, Explaining Choice-of-Entity Decisions by Silicon Valley Start-Ups. It is an interesting read and worth a look. H/T Tax Prof Blog.  Following the abstract, I have a few initial thoughts:

Perhaps the most fundamental role of a business lawyer is to recommend the optimal entity choice for nascent business enterprises. Nevertheless, even in 2018, the choice-of-entity analysis remains highly muddled. Most business lawyers across the United States consistently recommend flow-through entities, such as limited liability companies and S corporations, to their clients. In contrast, a discrete group of highly sophisticated business lawyers, those who advise start-ups in Silicon Valley and other hotbeds of start-up activity, prefer C corporations.

Prior commentary has described and tried to explain this paradox without finding an adequate explanation. These commentators have noted a host of superficially plausible explanations, all of which they ultimately conclude are not wholly persuasive. The puzzle therefore remains.

This Article attempts to finally solve the puzzle by examining two factors that have been either vastly underappreciated or completely ignored in the existing literature. First, while previous commentators have briefly noted that flow-through structures are more complex and administratively burdensome, they

Westlaw recently posted an interesting Massachusetts case at the intersection of criminal law and business law.  Massachusetts (the Commonwealth) sought to commit a defendant as a sexually dangerous person. Commonwealth v. Baxter, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 116 N.E.3d 54, 56 (2018). The defendant was (at the time) an inmate because of a probation violation related to offenses of rape of a child and other crimes.  The Commonwealth retained Mark Schaefer, Ph.D., for an expert opinion, and Dr. Schaefer concluded that the defendant was, under state law, a sexually dangerous person. The hearing judge found probable cause to think the defendant was a sexually dangerous person and had him temporarily committed for examination by two qualified examiners, as required by law. Dr. Joss determined that the defendant was sexually dangerous, and Dr. Rouse Weir determined he was not.

Here’s where the business law part comes in: 

After the reports of the qualified examiners were submitted to the court, the defendant moved to exclude Dr. Joss from providing evidence at trial, or in the alternative, to appoint a new qualified examiner to evaluate the defendant. As grounds therefor, the defendant alleged that Dr. Joss and Dr. Schaefer were both among

Christopher G. Bradley at University of Kentucky College of Law has posted his paper, Business Entities as Skeleton Keys.  The paper was also selected for the 2019 AALS Section on Agency, Partnership, LLCs and Unincorporated Associations program, Respecting the Entity: The LLC Grows Up.  

Chris notes the use of business entities to accomplish goals not attainable previously and the use of entities “to accomplish customized transactions and evade legal restrictions that would otherwise prevent them.”  His observations and insights are good ones, and his paper is definitely worth the read.  I can’t help but think that some of this is occurring more because of an increasing comfort with entities and a willingness to engage in creative transactions. We’re seeing in beyond the use of entities, too, with the rise of derivatives over the last 20 or so years, not to mention cryptocurrencies.  Anyway,  it’s a good paper and I recommend it. 

Here’s the abstract:

This Article identifies the increasingly important phenomenon of what I term “skeleton key business entities” and discusses the ramifications of their rise. Modern business entities, such as LLCs, are increasingly created and deployed to accomplish customized transactions and evade legal restrictions that would otherwise prevent them. Rather