M&A

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Prof. Bainbridge yesterday posted about The Modern Corporation Statement on Company Law.  The statement has ten fundamental rules, of which number ten is:

Contrary to widespread belief, corporate directors generally are not under a legal obligation to maximise profits for their shareholders. This is reflected in the acceptance in nearly all jurisdictions of some version of the business judgment rule, under which disinterested and informed directors have the discretion to act in what they believe to be in the best long term interests of the company as a separate entity, even if this does not entail seeking to maximise short-term shareholder value. Where directors pursue the latter goal, it is usually a product not of legal obligation, but of the pressures imposed on them by financial markets, activist shareholders, the threat of a hostile takeover and/or stock-based compensation schemes.

Prof. Bainbridge is with Delaware Chief Justice Strine in that profit maximization is the only role (or at least only filter) for board members.  As he asserts, “The relationship between the shareholder wealth maximization norm and the business judgment rule, . . . explains why the business judgment rule is consistent with the director’s “legal obligation to maximise profits for…

There are many Delaware cases from 2014 that are worth reading, but below are three relatively recent Delaware cases that I found worthwhile.  I provide the case name, my very short takeaway, and links to the case and additional commentary for those who wish to dive deeper.

In re Zhongpin Inc. Stockholders Litigation, controlling stockholders, decided Nov. 26, 2014. In denying a motion to dismiss, the Delaware Court of Chancery found a reasonable inference that a 17.3% stockholder/CEO could be a “controlling stockholder.” I have not done an exhaustive search on this issue, but this is a lower percentage of ownership for a “controlling stockholder” than I have seen in most cases, though (of course) the analysis is case specific. Additional commentary by Toby Myerson (Paul Weiss).

C.J. Energy Services, Inc. et al v. City of Miami General Employees’ and Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust, M&A/Revlon, decided Dec. 19, 2014. The Delaware Court of Chancery held that “there was a ‘plausible’ violation of the board’s Revlon duties because the board did not affirmatively shop the company either before or after signing.” (pg. 3). The Delaware Court of Chancery enjoined the shareholder vote on the transaction at…

I had very limited time at AALS this year (unfortunately) but I still walked away with some great ideas (and a chance to say hello to a few, but not enough, friendly faces).  I am borrowing from many ideas shared in the panel cited below, as well as a few of my own.  As many of you prepare to teach BA/Corporations for the spring (or making notes on how to do it next time), here are a few fun new resources to help illustrate common concepts:

  • HBO’s The Newsroom.  A hostile takeover, negotiations with a white knight– all sorts of corporate drama unfolded on HBO’s Season 3 of The Newsroom.   I couldn’t find clips on youtube, but episode recaps (like this) are available and provide a good reference point/story line/hypo/exam problem for class.
  • This American Life– Wake Up Now Act 2 (Dec. 26, 2014).  This brief radio segment/podcast tells the story of two investors trying to reduce the pay of a company CEO.  The segment discusses board of director elections, board duties, board

    • …

    The Delaware Court of Chancery recently denied a motion to dismiss in In re Comverge, Inc. Shareholders Litigation. In this case, the plaintiff claimed bad faith by the board of directors that approved an allegedly unreasonable termination fee in a merger agreement. Transactional attorneys and professors who teach M&A will want to read this case.  

    I am deep into grading my business associations exams, so I will outsource to a nice client alert on the case by Steven Haas at Hunton & Williams. A bit of the alert is below, and you can access the entire alert here.

    The court then found that the termination fees of 5.55% of equity value (or 5.2% of enterprise value) during the go-shop period and 7% of equity value (or 6.6% enterprise value) after the go-shop period “test the limits of what this Court has found to be within a reasonable range for termination fees.” The court also analyzed the termination fee in connection with the convertible note held by the buyer in connection with the bridge financing. The plaintiff alleged that the conversion feature in the note, which allowed the buyer to purchase common stock at a price below the merger consideration, would

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    In the comments to my post last week on teaching fiduciary duty in Business Associations, Steve Diamond asked whether I had blogged about why we changed our four-credit-hour Business Associations course at The University of Tennessee College of Law to a three-credit-hour offering.  In response, I suggested I might blog about that this week.  So, here we are . . . .

    Professor Dionysia Katelouzou of Kings College, London has written an interesting empirical article on hedge fund activisim. The abstract is below:

    In recent years, activist hedge funds have spread from the United States to other countries in Europe and Asia, but not as a duplicate of the American practice. Rather, there is a considerable diversity in the incidence and the nature of activist hedge fund campaigns around the world. What remains unclear, however, is what dictates how commonplace and multifaceted hedge fund activism will be in a particular country.

    The Article addresses this issue by pioneering a new approach to understanding the underpinnings and the role of hedge fund activism, in which an activist hedge fund first selects a target company that presents high-value opportunities for engagement (entry stage), accumulates a nontrivial stake (trading stage), then determines and employs its activist strategy (disciplining stage), and finally exits (exit stage). The Article then identifies legal parameters for each activist stage and empirically examines why the incidence, objectives and strategies of activist hedge fund campaigns differ across countries. The analysis is based on 432 activist hedge fund campaigns during the period of 2000-2010 across 25 countries.

    The findings suggest that the extent to which…

    Last week, news of the proposed Burger King & Tim Horton’s merger fueled the already raging fire on corporate inversions as the Miami-based burger chain announced plans, through the merger, to possibly relocate to Canada.  As I have written about on this blog, here and here and in the Huffington Post, inversions may offer US companies tax savings.

    Stephen E. Shay, a professor of practice at Harvard Law School, provides a short article (12 pages) describing the tax issues in corporate inversions and possible regulatory fixes.  This article is very helpful in taking the debate from the headlines into a more complex legal analysis illuminating the tax consequences and offering a better understanding of the legal remedies available.  Worth the read.

    -Anne Tucker

    At the New York Times Dealbook, Andrew Ross Sorkin notes that public pension funds have been lately silent on the issue of corporate inversions. (See co-blogger Anne Tucker on inversions here and here.) Sorkin writes, “Public pension funds may be so meek on the issue of inversions because they are conflicted.”

    Maybe I am reading too much into his choice of words, but “meek” implies more to me than “moderate” or “mild” and instead conveys a value judgment that fund managers have an obligation to speak out. I am not pretty sure that’s not true.

    I definitely don’t like companies heading offshore for mild gains, and I don’t think I would support such a choice, but as a director, I’d sure analyze the option before deciding. Fund managers, too, have obligations to look out for their stakeholders, and unless I had a clear charge on this front or thought the inverting company was clearly wrong, I’d probably stay quiet, too.

    Although the meek may inherit the earth, at least at this point, I might substitute “meek” with “cautious” or even “prudent.”  But that’s just me.

    BPLB’s own Joshua Fershee, Professor of Law with the Center for Energy and Sustainable Development at West Virginia University College of Law, was quoted in a Greenwire story on the Kinder Morgan deal.  You can read an excerpt below

    Kinder Morgan deal leaves questions for investors

          Mike Lee, E&E reporter  Published: Thursday, August 28, 2014

    Kinder Morgan Inc. may have to do more to convince its investors that its proposed $44 billion merger with its subsidiaries is in their best interest.

    The company — the nation’s biggest operator of oil and gas pipelines — took a series of steps to ensure there were no conflicts of interest during the negotiations, and the subsidiaries negotiated for a higher bid from the parent, Kinder Morgan said in a filing<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1506307/000104746914007230/a2221196zs-4.htm>intended to persuade investors to vote for the merger.

    The question will be: Did the company go far enough? Kinder Morgan faced similar questions when it went private in 2007 and when it bought El Paso Corp. in 2011.

    …..

    The market’s reaction — prices for all three companies have risen since the deal was announced — shows that investors are willing to overlook a temporary downside if a

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    Posted in M&A

    Kinder Morgan, a leading U.S. energy company, has proposed consolidating its Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) under its parent company. If it happens, it would be the second largest energy merger in history (the Exxon and Mobil merger in 1998, estimated to be $110.1 billion in 2014 dollars, is still the top dog). 

    Motley Fool details the deal this way:

    Terms of the deal
    The $71 billion deal is composed of $40 billion in Kinder Morgan Inc shares, $4 billion in cash, $27 billion in assumed debt. 

    Existing shareholders of Kinder Morgan’s MLPs will receive the following premiums for their units (based on friday’s closing price):

    • Kinder Morgan Energy Partners: 12%
    • Kinder Morgan Management: 16.5%
    • El Paso Pipeline Partners: 15.4%
    Existing unit holders of Kinder Morgan Energy Partners and El Paso Pipeline Partners are allowed to choose to receive payment in both cash and Kinder Morgan Inc shares or all cash. 
    As I understand it, the exiting holders of the partnerships would have to pay taxes on the merger (this is partnership to a C-corp), but please, consult your tax professional.  
     
    The goal here is said to be to increase dividend potential and use the C-corp structure to

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