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Last week on this blog, I wrote about the revived trend of corporate inversions where, through a merger transaction a US company re-domiciles outside of the US for business reasons, including the desire to avoid paying US corporate taxes.  Walgreens was rumored to be negotiating with Alliance Boots, a UK company in which the US drugstore chain already held 45%.  The merger announcement today, in a deal valued at $5.27 billion for the other 55% of Alliance Boots will keep the merged company’s headquarters in Chicago.   Citing, in part to public reaction and the drug store’s brand here in the US, “The company concluded it was not in the best long-term interest of our shareholders to attempt to re-domicile outside the U.S.”

The full article in the DealBook is available here.

-Anne Tucker

There is a new face on an old problem — American companies “moving” overseas in part to avoid U.S. taxes — that has increased in popularity in the last several years and recently gained political attention. Last week President Obama and Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew called for tax reform to encourage economic patriotism and to deter corporate defectors, calling the overseas moves legal, but immoral.

Two structural features of the U.S. tax code incentivize corporations to move abroad. The U.S. corporate tax rate, at 35 percent, is high compared to the average Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) rate of 25 percent, and the average European Union rate of 21 percent. Many corporations effectively pay much less than 35 percent, after factoring in loopholes and deductions, policies that cost approximately $150 billion in untaxed revenue last year. But the reported tax rate is high compared to other jurisdictions and the complexity required to reduce that rate in practice also is a deterrent.

Second, other countries like the United Kingdom become attractive foreign tax locations because they operate under a territorial system that does not tax profits earned outside of the home country. Under the U.S. system, however, returning…

Steven Davidoff Solomon, a professor of law at the University of California, Berkeley, has an interesting article on antitrust in the DealBook today:  Changing Old Antitrust Thinking for a New Gilded Age. Professor Solomon argues that a new wave of mergers in the tech and telecommunications industries mirror the consolidation wave of the Gilded Age a century ago which lead to our current antitrust laws.  These mergers leave competition in tact, albeit among a few huge companies, and therefore facially meet the competition requirements under antitrust law.  He argues that “[t]his calculus, however, excludes the political and other power that a concentrated industry can wield with government and regulators.”  Citing to industry-based nonprofits and the ability to participate in political spending in a post-Citizens United world, professor Solomon concludes that antitrust may become a question of power, not just competition. 

“[R]ight now there is simply no real government ability to review the industry consolidation that is occurring today in which industries become dominated by a handful of major players. Yet it is becoming increasingly apparent that size and industry concentration affect American society even if competition still exists.”

I think that this is an interesting lens through which…

Amazon BBB Book Cover
You may think of Warren Buffett as a savvy stock picker but his greater accomplishment is in configuring an exceptionally strong corporation that defies widespread conceptions of effective corproate governance.  

Since early in his career, Buffett adopted what he calls the double-barreled approach to capital allocation, meaning both stock picking and business buying. He gained prominence primarily as an investor in stocks, championing a contrarian investment philosophy.

Attracting three generations of devoted followers to a school of thought called “value investing,” he doubted the market’s efficiency and deftly exploited it. Buffett bought stocks of good companies at a fair price, assembling a concentrated portfolio of large stakes in a small number of firms. Today, nearly three-fourths of Berkshire’s stock portfolio consists of just seven stocks.     

But late in his career, beginning around 2000, Buffett shot more often through the other half of his double-barreled approach: buying 100 percent of companies run by trusted managers given great autonomy. True, Berkshire early on bought all the stock of companies such as Buffalo News and See’s Candies. But, through the 1990s, the first barrel dominated, with Berkshire consisting 80 percent of stocks and 20 percent owned companies. That mix gradually reversed and recently flipped, making subsidiary ownership the defining characteristic of today’s Berkshire.

Owning primarily subsidiaries rather than merely stocks gives Berkshire a different shape compared to its previous character as the holding company of a famed investor. After all, even for a buy-and-hold investor, stocks come and go. Berkshire has sold the stocks of many once-fine companies, including Freddie Mac, McDonald’s, and The Walt Disney Company.

In contrast, aside from a few Berkshire subsidiaries that it acquired from the Buffett Partnership in the 1970s, Berkshire has never sold a subsidiary and vows to retain them through thick and thin.  Despite their variety, moreover, Berkshire companies are remarkably similar when it comes to corporate culture, which is the central discovery I document and elaborate in my upcoming book, Berkshire Beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value of Values.

When Berkshire consisted mostly of the stock portfolio of a famed stock picker, you could expect that, once that investor departed, the portfolio would naturally be unwound and the company dissolved. Now, however, with Berkshire made of companies not stocks, its life expectancy stretches out in multiple decades, not mere years. It certainly goes beyond the stock picker who founded it.  That’s not an accident either, as the dominant cultural motif at Berkshire and its subsidiaries is a sense of permanence–the longest possible time horizon imaginable.   

Tomorrow kicks off the 2014 Law & Society Annual meeting in Minneapolis, MN.  Law & Society is a big tent conference that includes legal scholars of all areas, anthropologists, sociologists, economists, and the list goes on and on.  A group of female corporate law scholars, of which I am a part, organizes several corporate-law panels. The result is that we have a mini- business law conference of our own each year.  Below is a preview of the schedule…please join us for any and all panels listed below.

Thursday 5/29

Friday 5/30

Saturday 5/31

8:15-10:00

0575 Corp Governance & Locus of Power

U. St. Thomas MSL 458

Participants: Tamara Belinfanti, Jayne Barnard, Megan Shaner, Elizabeth Noweiki, and Christina Sautter

10:15-12:00

1412 Empirical Examinations of Corporate Law

U. St. Thomas MSL 458

Participants: Elisabeth De Fontenay, Connie Wagner, Lynne Dallas, Diane Dick & Cathy Hwang

12:45-2:30

1468 Theorizing Corp. Law

U. St. Thomas MSL 458

Participants: Elizabeth Pollman, Sarah Haan, Marcia Narine, Charlotte Garden, and Christyne Vachon

1:00 Business Meeting Board Rm 3

2:45-4:30

Roundtable on SEC Authority

View Abstract 2967

Participants: Christyne Vachon, Elizabeth Pollman, Joan Heminway, Donna Nagy, Hilary Allen

1473 Emerging International Questions in

…

Two of my former colleagues at King & Spalding LLP, Jaron Brown and Tyler Giles, sent me their recently published book, Stock Purchase Agreements Line by Line.  Jaron Brown made partner in King & Spalding’s M&A group before moving in-house to Novelis, Inc.  Tyler Giles moved in-house earlier in his career (to Equifax, Inc.) and has since moved back to law firm life as a partner at FisherBroyles LLP.

The book appears aimed at practitioners, but it could also be a valuable resource for those who teach M&A or drafting courses.  The book includes various practical pointers for drafting typical provisions in a stock purchase agreement and, as the title suggests, goes through an SPA line by line.  The authors are true experts in their subject matter, and I look forward to using the book.   

Earlier this week, Stanford University’s Rock Center for Corporate Governance released a study entitled “How Investment Horizon and Expectations of Shareholder Base Impact Corporate Decision-Making.” Not surprisingly, the 138 North American investor relations professionals surveyed prefer long-term investors so that management can focus on strategic decisionmaking without the distraction of “short-term performance pressures that come from active traders,” according to Professor David F. Larcker. Companies believed that attracting the “ideal” shareholder base could lead to an increase in stock price and a decrease in volatility.

The average “long-term investor” held shares for 2.8 years while short-term investors had an investment horizon of 7 months or less.  Pension funds, top management and corporate directors held investments the longest, and companies indicated that they were least enamored of hedge funds and private equity investors.  Those surveyed had an average of 8% of their shares held by hedge funds and believed that 3% would be an ideal percentage due to the short-termism of these investors. Every investor relations professional surveyed who had private equity investment wanted to see the ownership level down to zero.

I wonder what AstraZeneca’s investor relations team would have said if they could have participated in the survey given…

The New York Times Dealbook Blog reports that France is opposing GE’s attempt to acquire a large portion of Alstom:

“While it is natural that G.E. would be interested in Alstom’s energy business,” France’s economy minister, Arnaud Montebourg, said in a letter to Jeffrey R. Immelt, the G.E. chairman and chief executive, “the government would like to examine with you the means of achieving a balanced partnership, rejecting a pure and simple acquisition, which would lead to Alstom’s disappearing and being broken up.”

The government’s legal means for stopping a deal would appear to be limited, though it could refuse to approve such an investment on national security grounds. The government does not hold Alstom shares, but the company is considered important enough to have received a 2.2 billion euro bailout in 2005. And Mr. Montebourg noted in the letter on Monday that the government was Alstom’s most important customer.

Alstom’s energy units, which make turbines for nuclear, coal and gas power plants, as well as the grid infrastructure to deliver electricity, contribute about three-quarters of the company’s 20 billion euros, or about $30 billion, in annual sales.

Alstom is France’s largest industrial entity, and the government says the deal…

Earlier this spring, I posted about transactional resources  (the current source list is available here: Download Transactional Law Resources).

Continuing with the theme, I want to highlight a new hybrid resource, JURIFY, which is a mostly-free, online transactional law resource. 

“Jurify provides instant access to high-credibility, high-relevance legal content, including forms and precedent in Microsoft Word® format written by the world’s best lawyers, white papers and webinars from top-tier law firms, articles in prestigious law journals, reliable blog posts and current versions of statutory, regulatory and case law, all organized by legal issue.”

Here are the stats:  Jurify, launched in 2012, covers 5 broad transactional areas:  General Corporate, Governance, Mergers & Acquisitions, Securities and Startup Companies.  The 11,000+ sources that the website currently contains have been verified by transactional attorneys and generated from free on-line platforms or submitted by private attorneys who are voluntarily sharing their work.  Documents are organized according to 586 tags.  Three transactional attorneys started this website (husband/wife duo and their former law-firm colleague); none take compensation from editors, publishers or law firms. 

Jurify is a unique transactional law resource for the following reasons: 

  • FREE (mostly). Website contents including primary law, secondary sources

…

Over at the Harvard LSFOCGAFR, Stephen Cooke, partner and head of the Mergers and Acquisitions practice at Slaughter and May, has posted a fascinating review of “10 Surprises for a US Bidder on a UK Takeover.”  It’s a bit long for a blog post (16 printed pages on my end), but well worth the time if you have any interest at all in the subject matter.  What follows is a very brief excerpt, which is really just a teaser in light of the excellent depth of treatment the post provides.  Given my latest project, “Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory,” I find # 7 to be of particular interest.

Takeovers in the UK are in broad terms decided by the Target’s shareholders, with the Target Board rarely having decisive influence …. Unlike in the US, the Target Board is not the gatekeeper for offers. A Bidder may take its offer direct to shareholders and the Board has no power to block or delay an offer …. The Takeover Code (the “Code”) reflects this environment and, although changes were made post-Cadbury to reflect the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders, it remains a body of rules embodying the pre-eminence…