Previously, I blogged about Mivtachem Insurance v. Furtarom, 54 F.4th 82 (2d Cir. 2022), where the Second Circuit held that false statements about a target company – most of which were included in the acquiring company’s S-4 – were not made “in connection with” sales of the acquirer’s securities, and therefore, purchasers of the acquirer’s stock did not have standing to bring Section 10(b) claims against target company officers.

Inevitably, the same thing came up in a pair of cases about SPACs, where purchasers in the publicly-traded SPAC entity wanted to bring claims based on pre-merger false statements about the target company.  A New York district court, following Frutarom, denied the claims; a California district court rejected the Second Circuit’s reasoning (and dismissed the claims on other grounds, namely, that at the time of the false statements it wasn’t clear that the target company really was going to be a target company).

Anyway, the California case, which involved the Lucid de-SPAC, was just appealed to the Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit … followed the Second Circuit’s rule.  In Max Royal LLC v. Atieva, it held:

As noted above, Blue Chip limits standing to “purchasers or

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Wendy Gerwick Couture has posted a thoughtful article entitled, Nevadaware Divergence in Corporate Law.  It’s available here.  She presents some new perspectives on Nevada corporate law and emphasizes that Nevada has adopted a different policy balance than Delaware. She does this through three thorough sections analyzing exculpation, appraisal, and freeze-out mergers under both Nevada and Delaware law.  

This detailed focus gives some real insights.  She recognizes that many of the claims about Nevada exculpating for breaches of the duty of loyalty are overstated.  Nevada exculpates for breach of fiduciary duty under a single standard.  To the extent that any breach of the duty of loyalty involves any intentional misconduct, it would not be exculpated under Nevada law. It’s a much narrower category–unintentional breaches of the duty of loyalty–that may be exculpated under Nevada law.

She also recognizes that burden of proof differences in exculpation may shift outcomes.  Delaware places the burden of proof on a party seeking exculpation.  Nevada places the burden of proof on the party aiming to impose monetary liability.  This difference undoubtedly shifts litigation costs for many disputes.

If you’re interested in TripAdvisor case or other comparative corporate law issues, her work helps bring real…

This week I just direct your attention to various items.

First, the NYSE recently proposed a rule change that would exempt closed end funds from the requirement of holding annual shareholder meetings.  Closed-end funds are frequently the subject of activist attacks – here I blogged about a Second Circuit case that struck down a takeover defense measure in a Nuveen fund – so a rule change here would be, you know, significant.  Anyway, here is the link to the comments the SEC has received, and the one I found particularly useful, was by the Working Group on Market Efficiency and Investor Protection in Closed-End Funds, which is a collection of law and business professors.

Second, Project 2025 is all in the news these days as a preview of what a second Trump administration might look like, and it turns out, there are proposals for changes to the federal securities laws.

We have the usual conservative stuff, like, get rid of disclosure requirements pertaining to “social, ideological, political, or ‘human capital’ information that is not material to investors’ financial, economic, or pecuniary risks or returns.”  Obviously, the issue here, unaddressed in the document, is that most commenters would…

And now another Texas District Court has stayed the Department of Labor’s Fiduciary Rule.  You can find the opinion here.  This followed closely on the heels of the first decision.  Both apply the 5th Circuit’s prior precedent from its case striking down its prior attempt at issuing a fiduciary rule in the space.

Special committees in Delaware have an important role for cleansing various kinds of conflicted transactions, everything from negotiating controlling shareholder deals to vetting derivative lawsuits.  There is no rule regarding committee size; the Board can populate a committee with as many or as few people as it wants.

That said, Delaware caselaw suggests that courts will be somewhat suspicious of special committees consisting of only one member.  That member must be “’like Caesar’s wife… above reproach.” Gesoff v. IIC Industries, 902 A.2d 1130 (Del. Ch. 2006).  In Gesoff, VC Lamb stated that a single member special committee would get “a higher level of scrutiny,” and noted that in that case, the special committee member deferred too much to a controlling shareholder – something that might not have happened if a “moderating influence,” via a second member, had been available.

Since then, however, a couple of decisions have blessed the actions of single-member special committees.

And then came the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in In re Match Group Derivative Litigation, which held that – at least when a corporation attempts to cleanse a controlling shareholder transaction – all special committee members, and not just a majority of…

In an opinion released earlier today, Judge Kernodle of the Eastern District of Texas has stayed the rule from going into effect.  

Although I have not had time to sit and digest it at length, Chevron‘s demise plays a significant role.  Consider this passage:

In reviewing agency action under the APA, “[c]ourts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority” and should “set aside any [] action inconsistent with the law as they interpret it.” Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2261, 2273; see also Chamber, 885 F.3d at 369 (“A regulator’s authority is constrained by the authority that Congress delegated it by statute.”). A court should no longer defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute but should decide for itself “whether the law means what the agency says.” Loper Bright, 144 S. Ct. at 2261 (overruling Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).

The Court thus owes no deference to DOL’s interpretation of ERISA, but rather “begins with the text” of the statute—as all courts do. E.g., Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638 (2016); United States v. Lauderdale Cnty., 914 F.3d 960,

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In November 2021, Hertz authorized a buyback of its stock.  The effect of the buyback to was transform CK Amarillo from a 39% stockholder – who also had board seats – into a 56% stockholder.

Public stockholders of Hertz sued, alleging that the Hertz directors violated their fiduciary duties by transferring control of Hertz to CK Amarillo, without requiring that CK Amarillo pay a control premium.

One critical question was: Is this claim direct or derivative?

Normally, claims arising out of stock buybacks are derivative claims.  And normally, when a stockholder continues to hold shares in the entity, and nothing has changed about those share characteristics, and the stockholder was not asked to vote on anything, claims arising out of corporate action are derivative.  And just recently, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Brookfield Asset Management, Inc. v. Rosson, 261 A.3d 1251 (Del. 2021), where it held that if a company sells new shares to a controlling stockholder on the cheap, the claim is derivative, not direct – overruling Gentile v. Rossette, 906 A.2d 91 99 (Del. 2006), which held the claim is both.

But, as I argued in my paper, The Three Faces of Control, …