Institute for Law & Economics 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School  

FOURTH ANNUAL  
JUNIOR FACULTY BUSINESS & FINANCIAL LAW WORKSHOP 

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Institute for Law & Economics (ILE) at the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School is pleased to announce its Fourth Annual Junior Faculty Business & Financial Law Workshop. The Workshop will be held in person on January 23, 2026 at or near Penn Carey Law.  

The Workshop supports and recognizes the work of pre-tenured scholars in tenure-track positions in the business and financial fields, including corporations, securities, finance, accounting, banking, bankruptcy, tax, and general business law, while promoting interactions with such scholars, selected tenured faculty, and practitioners. By providing a forum for the exchange of creative ideas in these areas, ILE also aims to encourage new and innovative scholarship in the business and financial arena. 

Approximately 6 to 8 papers will be chosen from those submitted for presentation at the Workshop. One or more senior scholars and practitioners will comment on each paper, followed by a general discussion of each paper among all participants. The Workshop audience will include invited pre-tenured scholars, faculty from Penn Carey Law, The Wharton School, and other institutions, practitioners, and invited guests.  

We welcome submissions from scholars within the U.S. and abroad who hold a full-time tenure-track academic appointment but have not yet received tenure as of the submission date.  Scholars who do not yet hold a full-time tenure-track academic appointment such as PhD or doctoral candidates or visiting or academic fellows without a full-time tenure-track academic appointment are not eligible for consideration. Co-authored submissions are welcome so long as each of the authors individually meet the submission criteria. Work that is published or is expected to be published by the date of the Workshop is not eligible for submission. However, submissions may include work that has been accepted for publication so long as such work is still capable of incorporating substantive edits. ILE will cover reasonable travel, hotel, and meal expenses of all presenters. 

Those interested in presenting a paper at the Workshop should submit through this JFW Submission Link on or before September 8, 2025, 11:59 p.m. ET. Submissions may be in the form of an abstract, summary, or draft. Please submit using the following format for your file name: Last Name.First Name.Title. Please direct any inquiries related to the Workshop to: 

Professor Lisa M. Fairfax 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School  
3501 Sansom Street 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204 
ile@law.upenn.edu 

Authors of accepted submissions will be notified by October 6, 2025. Please feel free to share this Call for Papers with any colleagues who may be interested.

Loyola University New Orleans College of Law is now accepting applications for several tenure-track or tenured positions to begin August 1, 2026. Loyola’s curricular needs include Arbitration, Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Contracts, Criminal Law, Employment Law, Environmental Law, Family Law, Health Law, Immigration Law, Intellectual Property, Legal Ethics and related courses. If you are interested in applying, please submit curriculum vitae and cover letter to leonhard@loyno.edu.  All ranks will be considered.


About the College of Law
The College of Law is located in one of the most culturally diverse cities in the United States, with unique cuisine, museums, historical sites, and a flourishing arts and music community. New Orleans is the seat of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, Louisiana Supreme Court, Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal, as well as other lower courts. The College of Law has a student population of approximately 500 students, over forty faculty members, active clinics that have spearheaded numerous social justice reform efforts, and summer abroad programs. Its location in Louisiana, one of the world’s best known “mixed jurisdictions,” provides unique opportunities for comparative and international law scholarship. Loyola University is an educational institution dedicated to fostering intellectual achievement, personal development, and social responsibility, and it is committed to the human dignity and worth of every person.

Yesterday, the Delaware Supreme Court released its opinion in Wong v. Amazon. A copy of the decision is here.

A stockholder sent a letter to Amazon, demanding to inspect books and records under Delaware’s Section 220. The stockholder’s stated purpose was to investigate Amazon’s possible wrongdoing and mismanagement by engaging in anticompetitive activities.

The request kicked of an extended legal battle. A Magistrate conducted a one-day trial that led to a report siding with Amazon that the the stockholder had not alleged a “credible basis” to infer possible wrongdoing by Amazon. The stockholder took exception. A Vice Chancellor also sided with Amazon, but on a different basis–finding that the stockholder’s purposes was overbroad, “facially improper,” and not lucid. The stockholder appealed and the Delaware Supreme Court reversed.

Under Delaware law, investigating corporate wrongdoing is a legitimate purpose, but stockholders must present “some evidence to suggest a credible basis from which a court can infer that mismanagement, waste or wrongdoing may have occurred.” The Supreme Court found that the Vice Chancellor had erred in its interpretation of the scope of the stockholder’s purpose and should have engaged “with the evidence presented by the [stockholder].”

On the evidentiary front, the stockholder pointed to a history of investigations, lawsuits, fines, and one Federal Trade Commission action against Amazon that survived a motion to dismiss. The Delaware Supreme Court stressed that the credible basis standard is the “lowest possible burden of proof under Delaware law.” It requires more than a “mere untested allegation of wrongdoing but does not require that the underlying litigation result in a full victory on the merits against the company.” Collectively, these predicates sufficed to “establish a credible basis from which a court can infer that Amazon has engaged in possible wrongdoing through its purported anticompetitive activities.” Now the matter heads back to Chancery to “determine the scope and conditions of production.”

Stockholder inspection rights meaningfully differ between states. And it’s an open issue as to whether the internal affairs doctrine will always cover inspection rights.

This would have turned out differently if Amazon were a Nevada corporation. Nevada’s statute does not authorize books and records actions for public companies. In Nevada, inspection rights “do not apply to any corporation that furnishes to its stockholders a detailed, annual financial statement or any corporation that has filed during the preceding 12 months all reports required to be filed pursuant to section 13 or section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m or 78o(d).” Instead of having courts gatekeep inspection demands for public companies, Nevada tells stockholders to read the securities filings.

Delaware takes a more judicial approach and carefully considers requests. To resolve this issue, Delaware courts and magistrates issued three opinions/reports over a span of time, likely generating millions in legal fees. Whatever one thinks of how Nevada answers this question, it’s cheap, clear, and straightforward. In Delaware, Amazon was represented by Ross Aronstam & Moritz and Wachtell Lipton. They are not cheap.

Amazon’s expenses seem likely to grow. These firms will likely continue to defend Amazon through the production and in some future stockholder action using the materials procured as the basis for a complaint. That action may be righteous. It may generate net benefits for stockholders. Or it may drive costs and distract management.

Business lawyers understand that corporate directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the firm. These duties include responsibilities to provide oversight, which are colloquially known under Delaware law (and beyond) as Caremark duties, based on a flagship Delaware Supreme Court opinion, In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). Although historically understood by many (yours truly included) as either a separate fiduciary duty of good faith or a component of the fiduciary duty of care, oversight obligations under Delaware law currently are classified as a component of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. According to the Delaware Supreme Court, “because a showing of bad faith conduct … is essential to establish director oversight liability, the fiduciary duty violated by that conduct is the duty of loyalty.” Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006).  

Successful Caremark claims are difficult to plead and prove, given the relatively high burden of showing bad faith conduct. Historically, almost all claims alleging a breach of Caremark duties in Delaware courts have been dismissed before trial for failure to state a claim. Recently, a case involving Meta Platforms, Inc. directors and officers, including Mark Zuckerberg, came close to making it to trial but settled at the eleventh hour. Nevertheless, with Caremark claims in the news, it seems like a good time to ask whether Tennessee law incorporates Caremark duties in the way Delaware law construes those duties.

A review of decisional law on Westlaw reveals only one published opinion, a federal trial court opinion, citing to the Caremark doctrine in relation to claims involving a Tennessee corporation. That opinion, Lukas v. McPeak, No. 3:11-CV-422, 2012 WL 4359437 (E.D. Tenn. Sept. 21, 2012), aff’d, 730 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2013), relates to whether demand may be excused in a shareholder derivative action. In his opinion in Lukas, Judge Thomas Varlan uses Caremark to describe the relevant duties as a basis for articulating the applicable burden of proof involved in assessing demand futility.  

Should a court applying Tennessee corporate law be citing to Delaware corporate jurisprudence in relation to a Tennessee corporation, even though Tennessee’s corporate law is based on the Model Business Corporation Act, not the Delaware General Corporation Law? Although the policy underpinnings of the statutes can be different, citations to Delaware law are certainly not unusual. “[I]n matters of corporate law, Tennessee courts often look to Delaware law.” Athlon Sports Commc’ns, Inc. v. Duggan, 549 S.W.3d 107, 125 (Tenn. 2018). In his opinion in Lukas, Varlan maintained that “a plaintiff can only overcome the demand requirement with ‘well-pleaded facts to suggest a reasonable inference that a majority of the directors consciously disregarded their duties over an extended period of time,’” citing to Kenney v. Koenig, 426 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1182 (D.Colo.2006) (quoting David B. Shaev Profit Sharing Account v. Armstrong, 2006 WL 391931 at * 1 (Del.Ch., Feb.13, 2006)). He found that the plaintiff failed to meet this burden of proof and dismissed the case.

One might simply conclude from Varlan’s opinion in Lukas that Tennessee recognizes and applies Delaware’s Caremark doctrine. Yet, the Lukas opinion — a federal district court ruling made in a specific procedural context — assumes the existence of the Caremark doctrine as a descriptive matter without reasoning through its general applicability under Tennessee law. It would be interesting to see how a Tennessee state court judge might reason through whether Tennessee corporate law expressly recognizes director and officer oversight duties in the same way Delaware does, including whether the same standard of conduct would apply and whether oversight duties are classified as separate fiduciary duties or as components of the duty of care or the duty of loyalty. The Tennessee Business Corporation Act (TBCA), in § 48-18-301(a), specifically articulates three duties applicable to directors of a Tennessee corporation, separating good faith out from care and loyalty: “A director shall discharge all duties as a director, including duties as a member of a committee: (1) In good faith; (2) With the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) In a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.” An officer having “discretionary authority” over a matter is charged with the same duties in discharging that authority under TBCA § 48-18-403.

Of note in this regard, the Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected Delaware’s categorization of oversight duties as subsidiary elements of the fiduciary duty of loyalty in Rawcliffe v. Anciaux, 2017 UT 72, ¶ 18, 416 P.3d 362, 370 (2017). Utah’s corporate law (the URBCA), as applied in the case, was based on an earlier version of the Model Business Corporation Act. The court in Rawcliffe found that the duties of good faith and loyalty are separate (but sometimes overlapping) fiduciary duties that require different standards of conduct, rejecting the Delaware Supreme Court’s characterization in Stone v. Ritter.  

While it may seem like a pedantic exercise (and therefore unimportant) to ask whether Tennessee courts would follow Delaware courts in defining and categorizing director and officer oversight duties, the relevant standards of conduct and the availability of, for example, the business judgment rule, exculpation, indemnification, or director and officer liability insurance may hang in the balance based on the classification of a claim against a director or officer for a breach of their fiduciary duties. Along those lines, the Rawcliffe court in Utah expressly noted that “the URBCA allows corporations to indemnify their directors for a breach of the statutory duty of care identified in Utah Code section 16-10a-840(1)(b), but does not allow them to indemnify their directors for a breach of the duty of good faith identified in section 16-10a-840(1)(a), or a breach of the duty of loyalty identified in section 16-10a-840(1)(c),” recognizing that the classification of a specific breach claim may have substantive effect.  Rawcliffe, 416 P.3d at 370.

And so we must wait to know for sure whether Tennessee fully embraces Delaware’s law on director and officer oversight. However, the Utah Supreme Court’s opinion in Rawcliffe may offer important persuasive authority in that regard. The statutory references in that opinion parallel those that could be made under Tennessee law.

Parenthetically, while there has been debate and discussion over whether corporate officers owe the same oversight duties as corporate directors, a 2023 Court of Chancery opinion in Delaware, In re McDonald’s Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 289 A.3d 343 (Del. Ch. 2023), held that officers effectively owe the same fiduciary duties of oversight as directors in context. Vice Chancellor Travis Laster’s opinion in the case was clear: “Failing to confirm that officers owe oversight duties would undermine the directors’ ability to fulfill their statutory obligation to direct and oversee the business and affairs of the corporation.” Id. at 367. The In re McDonald’s opinion also “concludes that oversight liability for officers requires a showing of bad faith. The officer must consciously fail to make a good faith effort to establish information systems, or the officer must consciously ignore red flags.”  Id. at 375. Although the TBCA sets forth the same fiduciary duties for officers as for directors, the contextual analysis of officer oversight duties also is an open issue in Tennessee.

Claims of director and officer malfeasance persist. Many of these claims sound in breaches of fiduciary duty. As a result, litigation involving director oversight duties in Tennessee corporations may receive future judicial attention. In that event, this article may establish foundation for any claim in that regard. However, even absent relevant litigation, the analysis shared here may be useful to those advising Tennessee directors and officers on the nature and extent of their fiduciary duties under Tennessee law.

[Republished from the Tennessee Bar Association’s Connect newsletter for the Business Law Section published on July 28, 2025. The original publication is only available to Tennessee Bar Association Business Law Section members.]

Earlier today, Glass Lewis announced that it would pursue litigation against the Texas Attorney General to prevent him from enforcing SB 2337. The firm is pushing back after sustained political opposition. I grabbed a copy of the complaint from BloombergLaw if you want to read it.

Glass Lewis argues in its complaint that Texas’s law is unconstitutionally vague, viewpoint discrimination, content-based discrimination, impedes freedom of association, generally violating the First Amendment, preempted by ERISA, and violates the Dormant Commerce Clause.

This is the message from Glass Lewis:

We are writing today to inform you that Glass Lewis has made the difficult decision to initiate legal action against the Attorney General of Texas. In this letter, we explain the reasons why we are pursuing this legal path to protect our business and, by extension, our clients and the proxy voting industry, as a whole.

Over the last several months, Glass Lewis and other proxy advisors have been targeted by a variety of political detractors and corporate executives critical of our business model and the role we play in supporting institutional shareholders in carrying out their proxy voting responsibilities.

In fact, three states attorneys general have opened inquiries into supposed consumer fraud and antitrust issues (one of which immediately sued us, falsely claiming we had not responded to an earlier letter and another state’s inquiry); the U.S. House Judiciary and Financial Services Committees conducted hearings, one interrogating the “proxy cartel”; and a group of Senators wrote us with a series of questions and document requests.  All of this and more in the last six months.

Texas Senate Bill 2337

The Texas Legislature took these challenges further by enacting Senate Bill 2337, an unprecedented law deeming much of what proxy advisors consider—including governance matters—not to be in the financial interest of investors. The law will take effect September 1, 2025.

Glass Lewis has stated emphatically and publicly that Texas S.B. 2337 is categorically unworkable. It would require a broad range of proxy advice regarding Texas companies to include misleading “warnings” that we believe will expose us to unwarranted lawsuits and open our clients to fiduciary risk.

The law has two sets of requirements:

  1. Whenever proxy advice “takes into account” various factors—including even a single corporate governance factor—the proxy advisor must provide a notice to its clients and the covered company that “conspicuously states that the service is not being provided solely in the financial interest of the company’s shareholders because it is based wholly or partly on one or more nonfinancial factors.”
  2. Whenever a proxy advisor provides different advice to different clients or issues any recommendation on a ballot item that is against management’s recommendation, it must notify its clients, the company that is the subject of the advice, and the Texas Attorney General of that “conflicting” advice. The proxy advisor must also then say which of the conflicting advice was provided solely in the financial interest of shareholders.

Glass Lewis Has Decided to Take Legal Action

Glass Lewis always tries to work constructively with policy makers. We attempted that here, but Texas legislators chose not to engage with us or the broader institutional investor community in developing their new, unprecedented law.

Therefore, on July 24, 2025, Glass Lewis filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas against Ken Paxton, the Texas Attorney General. The complaint seeks an order declaring S.B. 2337 unlawful and an injunction against its enforcement by the Attorney General. At the same time, Glass Lewis filed a motion for preliminary injunction asking the court to enjoin, or stop, enforcement of the law before it becomes effective on September 1, 2025.

We assure you that this decision was not made lightly. However, given the law’s extreme measures and serious flaws, we believe that trying to comply with it would impose significant and pointless costs on us and our clients, force us to provide highly misleading warnings to our clients, as well as subject Glass Lewis and its clients to the risk of unwarranted litigation by private parties and the Texas Attorney General. We therefore felt compelled to take this step to defend our ability to continue to serve our clients in the manner they expect.

For more information on Texas S.B. 2337 and the reasons for our concerns, please see our blog post. 

As Glass Lewis always does, we will work to keep our clients as informed as possible throughout the process. In the meantime, thank you for your support,

Sincerely,

Your Glass Lewis Team

This will be an interesting case to watch.

I speak of Epicentrx, Inc. v. Superior Court, a case that I previously blogged about here.

Delaware entity, doing business in California.  A minority investor sues in California, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of contract.  Defendant corporation and controlling stockholder move to dismiss, on the grounds of a Delaware Chancery forum selection clause in both the charter and the bylaws.  Investor argues that California’s constitution confers a jury right that – per California precedent – cannot be contractually waived pre-dispute.  Therefore, investor claims, a forum selection clause that functionally results in a jury waiver (because the Court of Chancery sits without a jury) must also be invalid.  Investor also argues that the charter and bylaws are not binding because the internal affairs doctrine has no application here (fraud claims, for example, are not governed by the internal affairs doctrine), and the forum selection clauses were not freely adopted.

Since this is a topic I’ve written about (and written about and written about), the case had my attention.  In my previous post, I wrote, “one factor that makes constitutive documents noncontractual is that, as Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013) recognized, Delaware managers are subject to fiduciary duties when they enforce them, and I don’t even know how you ask whether it’s a violation of fiduciary duty to enforce a bylaw that causes a shareholder to forfeit a jury right.  In any event, all I really want is for the California Supreme Court to take these questions seriously.”

Well, now the California Supreme Court has issued its decision, and it took the questions so seriously that it refused to answer them on the ground that the petition for review – and the only issue ruled upon in the court below – concerned whether California’s jury right prohibited pre-dispute forum selection agreements that functionally act as jury waivers.  The court concluded it does not.  

In other words, you cannot, predispute, contract to waive your right to a jury, but you can, predispute, contract to have your case heard in a forum that does not employ juries. But as for the rest of it – internal affairs, the binding nature of charter forum selection clauses on non-internal affairs claims – the court remanded to the lower courts to decide those issues in the first instance.

That said, the opinion also makes clear that not only was this a private company, but the investor-plaintiff also had board representation.  That’s important because, while I do not believe that charters and bylaws are “contractual” with respect to, say, secondary market purchasers trading over an exchange, there’s probably a greater case to be made that they are actual, ordinary, Restatement (Second) of Contracts contracts when the investor has this level involvement in the company. 

So … I wait to see if any of this is addressed in future proceedings.

And another thing.  On the most recent Shareholder Primacy podcast, Mike and I talk about the threatened Caremark lawsuit against Paramount, and Cracker Barrel’s creative advance notice bylaws.  Here at Apple; here at Spotify; and here at YouTube.

The University of Iowa College of Law seeks applicants for one or more tenure-track faculty positions. We have a strong interest in applicants who possess excellence in their academic and professional backgrounds. Entry-level and lateral candidates are welcome to apply.

The College of Law’s primary hiring interest is in business, corporate, and commercial law.

Consistent with the mission and responsibilities of a top-tier public research university, we are interested in candidates who are recognized scholars and teachers and who will participate actively in the intellectual life of the College of Law. In addition, we desire candidates with a demonstrated ability to maintain effective and respectful working relationships with the campus community to uphold a standard of cultural competency and respect for differences. We also desire candidates who would bring significant new scholarly strengths to the College of Law. Candidates who can contribute to these goals are encouraged to apply and to identify their strengths in these areas.

To apply, candidates should submit a letter of interest, CV, a list of three references, a law school transcript, and teaching evaluations (if applicable) through Jobs@UIOWA, https://jobs.uiowa.edu, refer to Requisition #75664.

Successful candidates will be required to self-disclose any misconduct history or pending research misconduct investigation including but not limited to sexual misconduct in prior employment and provide a related release and will be subject to a criminal background and credential check.

For questions, please contact Joseph Yockey, chair of the Faculty Appointments Committee at joseph-yockey@uiowa.edu.

The University of Iowa is an equal opportunity employer. All qualified applicants are encouraged to apply and will receive consideration for employment free from discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color, religion, national origin, age, sex, pregnancy (including childbirth and related conditions), disability, genetic information, status as a U.S. veteran, service in the U.S. military, sexual orientation, or associational preferences. In addition to abiding by the UI Nondiscrimination Statement, the College of Law also abides by the Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools of the American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, which additionally prohibits discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, gender, gender identity and expression, and military status. The College of Law affirms its commitment to providing equal opportunity without discrimination on the same bases. Persons with disabilities may contact University Human Resources/Faculty and Staff Disability Services, (319) 335-2660 or fsds@uiowa.edu, to inquire or discuss accommodation needs. Prospective employees may review the University Campus Security Policy and the latest annual crime statistics by contacting the Department of Public Safety at 319/335-5022.

If you’re coaching a contract drafting or negotiation team this Fall, here’s a unique opportunity to kick off the year with real-world practice, prizes, and a complimentary Bootcamp that goes way beyond the classroom.

The ’Canes Contract Drafting & Negotiation Challenge takes place Saturday, September 6, 2025, at the University of Miami School of Law. In this one-day competition, students from around the country will step into the shoes of junior associates to draft, negotiate, and advocate for their client in a simulated transaction.

Competition Highlights

  • Hybrid format: students draft their contracts in advance, then negotiate in person with opposing counsel.
  • Simulates real client representation, with attorney and judge reviewers using detailed rubrics.
  • Awards for Best Drafted Agreement and Best Negotiation Performance.
  • Designed for both transactional and commercial litigation students—anyone who needs to read, write, or argue contracts.

Registration Info

  • Teams: 2–4 students, at least one must be a law student. Coaches welcome.
  • $100 for 2-person teams / $200 for 4-person teams.
  • Only 12 team slots available — registration closes August 20 at 11:59 PM ET (or when full). We only have a few slots left.
  • Contract problem released upon registration or August 1, whichever comes later.
  • Contract drafts due August 28.
  • Bootcamp on Friday, September 5 | Competition on Saturday, September 6

To register, click here.

But wait! We’re sweetening the deal even more. Participating teams will receive free admission to our day-long Bootcamp held Friday, September 5, 2025. Every session will be hands-on—participants will engage in small group exercises, real-world simulations, contract redlining, strategic discussions, and practical analysis. Participants will also receive optional pre-reads so they can hit the ground running, especially for the financial and business literacy portion.

Whether it’s drafting clauses, analyzing financial statements, negotiating deal terms, or using AI tools effectively, participants will walk away with actionable insights, real templates, and frameworks they can apply in class, in practice, or at the next client meeting. It’s a great way for your students to sharpen their skills and learn directly from experienced lawyers.

Bootcamp Sessions Include:

The Bootcamp is open to the public, but student spots are limited and reserved only for registered competition teams.

  • AI Prompt-a-thon: Prompting with Purpose — Strategy, Ethics, and Efficiency
  • Beyond the Law: Business, Financial & Insurance Literacy for Legal Professionals
  • Building Blocks of a Contract: What Every Lawyer Needs to Know About Core Clauses
  • Core Contracts Every Business Lawyer Must Master
  • Deal or No Deal? Ethics on the Edge of Negotiation
  • Closing the Loop: Lessons, Tools, and Takeaways
  • Closing Time: Where Deals Meet Dialogue Networking Reception

To request more information, contact me at mweldon@law.miami.edu (or find me at SEALS ) or reach out to our Program Coordinator, Aleyda Mejia, at akmejia@law.miami.edu.

We hope to welcome your students to Miami this fall—for sun, strategy, and serious skill-building.

The University of California College of the Law, San Francisco (“UC Law San Francisco,” formerly “UC Hastings”) seeks to hire an entry-level or lateral tenure-track or tenured faculty member to be a productive and impactful scholar and to establish and teach an in- house transactional clinic. As part of UC Law’s Community Justice Clinics, the clinic should serve disenfranchised and disempowered clients or communities while teaching students about the law, legal practice and the role of the law in the quest for social justice. The start date for the position is July 1, 2026. We are interested in applications from entry-level candidates and from professors with clinical teaching experience in the academy.

Applicants should have a serious interest in UC Law San Francisco and living in the San Francisco Bay Area. Candidates should send a CV, statement of research and teaching interests, a one- to two-page transactional clinic proposal, prior course evaluations (from the three most recent years of teaching, if available), and representative publications in .pdf format to Professor of Law Abe Cable, Appointments Committee Chair (appointments2025@uclawsf.edu), with the subject heading “Faculty Position.” The clinic proposal should address in appropriate detail the candidate’s vision for the clients the clinic would serve, the range of matters to be handled, the content and approach of the clinic seminar, and the clinic’s student learning objectives. All candidates must hold a J.D. or equivalent degree prior to start date and either be licensed to practice as an attorney in California or licensed in another state and willing to sit for the California Bar Exam.

Salary will be commensurate with qualifications and experience. As reference points, please note that the Step 1 salary for entry level candidates is $161,474.90 and the midpoint of our current step scales is $210,669.23.

We will conduct initial screening interviews for select candidates via Zoom and/or on- campus, with a second round of on- campus interviews for leading candidates. We will consider applications on a rolling basis, beginning as early as July 1, 2025.

UC Law San Francisco was founded in 1878 as the original law department of the University of California. Our mission is to serve “society as a center of higher learning committed to exceptional teaching, influential scholarship, and exemplary public service. We provide a rigorous, innovative, and inclusive legal education that prepares diverse students to excel as professionals, advance the rule of law, and further justice.” The law school has one of the top-ranked clinical programs in the country and a vibrant clinical teaching community.

UC Law San Francisco prohibits discrimination against any person employed; seeking employment; or applying for or engaged in a paid or unpaid internship or training program leading to employment with UC Law San Francisco on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, age, sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender expression, gender identity, gender transition status, sex- or gender-stereotyping, pregnancy, physical or mental disability, medical condition (cancer-related or genetic characteristics), genetic information (including family medical history), ancestry, marital status, citizenship, or service in the uniformed services, including protected veterans. This policy applies to all employment practices, including recruitment, selection, promotion, transfer, merit increase, salary, training and development, demotion, and separation.

A copy of this position announcement can be found here: www.uclawsf.edu/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/…