July 2014

One of the classic arguments against private securities liability – and in particular, Section 10(b) fraud-on-the-market liability, with its high potential damages – is that it overdeters issuers, thus stifling voluntary disclosures rather than encouraging them.  This was in fact the theory behind the PSLRA’s safe harbor: the statute makes it particularly difficult for private plaintiffs to bring claims based on projections of future performance, in part because of Congress’s fear that expansive liability would dissuade issuers from making projections at all.

Two new empirical studies challenge this common wisdom.

The first, Private Litigation Costs and Voluntary Disclosure: Evidence from Foreign Cross-Listed Firms, by James P. Naughton et al., uses the Supreme Court’s decision in National Australia Bank v. Morrison as a natural experiment.  That decision abruptly removed the specter of private Section 10(b) liability based on securities sold on a foreign exchange.  The authors compare voluntary earnings guidance offered by firms whose securities are cross-listed in the US and abroad before and after Morrison to determine how the diminished threat of liability affects issuer behavior. 

As it turns out, the authors found that earnings guidance decreased for those firms whose securities are cross-listed, as compared to counterparts whose securities

We welcome Eric Orts (Wharton) to the “blawgosphere.”  Professor Orts has begun blogging at Ortsian Thoughts and Theories. I have already added his blog to my favorites, and I am sure I will become a regular reader.  His new book, Business Persons: A Legal Theory of the Firm should be in my mailbox soon, and I am looking forward to reading it as well. (H/T David Zaring at the Conglomerate).     

This post started off as a comment to co-blogger Haskell Murray‘s post Modifying the Law Review Submission and Review Process, and is perhaps overkill, but at least a few of us, thanks in part to Steve Bradford’s post, are finding the conversation fruitful, so here we go:

In response to my suspicion that widespread law review changes could impact promotion and tenure (P&T) processes, Haskell writes: “I am not sure why the expectations for P&T would have to change if law reviews instituted blind review.  It seems that all blind review would do is make the selection process more fair.”  

Maybe he is right, but here’s my thinking: I  believe expectations for P&T would change because I believe that widespread blind review would increase the (already long) turnaround time for getting pieces accepted for publication.  If I am right (an open question) that it would increase the review time, it would make it harder for some faculty to get their pieces accepted, which is often required for it to “count” in the review process. Perhaps this would be a good thing, but I would see it as a potentially significant change. 

This could also impact higher ranked schools

 Given the attention our posts on law reviews received, I thought I would add to my comments on Josh Fershee’s post commenting on Steve Bradford’s post

In short, I think the law review submission and review process could be improved by at least two modifications. 

1. Blind Review. 

Currently, law review editors see, and in fact require, not only the author’s name and employer, but also the author’s entire CV.  This is quite unlike the article selection process in other disciplines where all identifying information is supposed to be stripped. 

If blind-review were adopted by law reviews, Josh Fershee claimed that it might still be possible to find the identity of the author through self-citations.  Authors, however, do not always cite themselves and even if they do, law review editors would have to read pretty carefully to figure out the idenity of the author.  Currently, it is simply not possible for law review editors to read closely all article submitted, so stripping the author’s name would, at the very least, require the editors to dig into each article.  Also, Authors could be instructed to remove, during the review process, identifying phrases like “in previous work I argued…” 

This call for

One of my younger brothers is a PHD Candidate in Literature at University of Alabama.  One of my younger sisters majored in English at the University of Georgia and is working in the media industry.  (Yes, I am a proud older brother, prone to brag about my siblings’ many accomplishments).

Both siblings recently encouraged me to expand my summer reading beyond books about law.  Due to the tall stack of legal books in my “need to read” pile, I usually don’t devote much time to “pleasure reading.”

This summer, however, I am trying to read legal books and, at least some books, which have no noticeable connection to law.  Rick Bragg’s All Over But the Shoutin’ falls into the latter category.  I will let interested readers follow the link for a description of the book, but I only mention it here to say that Bragg writes beautifully.   I finished the 329-page book in two, long, sittings. 

Writer Pat Conroy said the following of the book and its author:

Rick Bragg writes like a man on fire.  And All Over But the Shoutin’ is a work of art. I thought of Melville, I thought of Faulkner. Because I love the

As many have celebrated or decried, Dodd-Frank turned four-years old this week. This is the law that Professor Stephen Bainbridge labeled “quack federal corporate governance round II” (round I was Sarbanes-Oxley, as labeled by Professor Roberta Romano). Some, like Professor Bainbridge, think the law has gone too far and has not only failed to meet its objectives but has actually caused more harm than good (see here, for example).  Some think that the law has not gone far enough, or that the law as drafted will not prevent the next financial crisis (see here, for example). The Council on Foreign Relations discusses the law in an accessible manner with some good links here.

SEC Chair Mary Jo White has divided Dodd-Frank’s ninety-five mandates into eight categories. She released a statement last week touting the Volcker Rule, the new regulatory framework for municipal advisors, additional controls on broker-dealers that hold customer assets, reduced reliance on credit ratings, new rules for unregulated derivatives, additional executive compensation disclosures, and mechanisms to bar bad actors from securities offerings. 

Notwithstanding all of these accomplishments, only a little over half of the law is actually in place. In fact, according to the

As I explore the future of Berkshire Hathaway in my forthcoming book Berkshire Beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value of Values, one topic I address for Berkshire post Buffett is whether the company should remain public or be taken private.

After all, once Bufffett is gone, you might expect activist shareholders to urge liberalizing its dividend policy (hasn’t paid a dividend in fifty years), divest weaker subsidiaries (it has never sold a subsidiary in forty years), and break-up the diverse conglomerate (engages in hundreds of different lines of business). 

Venture entrepreneurs and seasoned executives alike often weigh the pros and cons of a U.S. company being privately held or publicly listed. That goes for start-ups trying to decide to make an initial public offering as it does for listed companies trying to decide whether to go private.

Everyone considers the transaction costs of such a switch high because IPOs and going private transactions are complicated, requiring paying accountants, appraisers, lawyers and other professionals. They are also time-consuming.

So setting aside transaction costs, let’s highlight the usual pros and cons, to do an IPO or stay public:

Pros:

● access to capital

● liquidity for shareholders

● a currency (stock) to

As someone who teaches and researches both business law and energy law, I often focus on the overlap of the two areas, which I find to be significant.  One of my most recent projects has been to write a new casebook, Energy Law: A Context and Practice Casebook, which will be available for courses taught this fall. I wrote a detailed description of the book in a guest post at the Energy Law Professor blog, but here I wanted to highlight the business aspects of the book. 

The second chapter of my book is titled The Business of Energy Law.  That chapter begins with some key vocabulary, and I then provide students with a client issue to frame the reading for the chapter. The issue: 

Your firm has just taken on a new client who is a large shareholder in many companies. She is particularly concerned about her holdings in Energex, Inc., a publicly traded energy company. Energex was founded in 1977 by a oil and gas man from Louisiana who is still the CEO and a member of the board of directors. The client is concerned that the CEO is taking opportunities for himself that she thinks

Steven Davidoff Solomon, a professor of law at the University of California, Berkeley, has an interesting article on antitrust in the DealBook today:  Changing Old Antitrust Thinking for a New Gilded Age. Professor Solomon argues that a new wave of mergers in the tech and telecommunications industries mirror the consolidation wave of the Gilded Age a century ago which lead to our current antitrust laws.  These mergers leave competition in tact, albeit among a few huge companies, and therefore facially meet the competition requirements under antitrust law.  He argues that “[t]his calculus, however, excludes the political and other power that a concentrated industry can wield with government and regulators.”  Citing to industry-based nonprofits and the ability to participate in political spending in a post-Citizens United world, professor Solomon concludes that antitrust may become a question of power, not just competition. 

“[R]ight now there is simply no real government ability to review the industry consolidation that is occurring today in which industries become dominated by a handful of major players. Yet it is becoming increasingly apparent that size and industry concentration affect American society even if competition still exists.”

I think that this is an interesting lens through which

Steve Bradford yesterday posted a thoughtful (as is usual for his posts) critique of law reviews. I had drafted a comment, but Steve suggested that I should post links to my prior posts separately, so here goes, along with (what has turned out to be a lot of) additional commentary.

I think Steve has some valid (and compelling) points. As I have written before, though, I can’t go as far as he does.  I won’t rehash all that I have written before on this subject, but one of my earlier posts, Some Thoughts for Law Review Editors and Law Review Authors covers a lot of that ground.  Please click below to read more: