March 2015

Today, part of the assignment for my Securities Regulation students was to read a chapter in our casebook and, as assigned by me, come to class prepared to teach in  a three-to-five-minute segment a part of the assigned reading.  The casebook is Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials by Jim Cox, Bob Hillman, and Don Langevoort.  The chapter (Chapter 7, entitled “Recapitalization, Reorganizations, and Acquisitions”) covers the way in which various typical corporate finance transactions are, are not, or may be offers or sales of securities that trigger registration under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “1933 Act”).  I have used this technique for teaching this material before (and also use a student teaching method for part of my Corporate Finance course), and I really enjoy the class each time.

I find that the students understand the assigned material well (having already been through a lot of registration and exemption material in the preceding weeks) and embrace the responsibility of teaching me and each other.  I am convinced that they learn the material better and are more engaged with it because they have had to read it with a different intent driven by a distinct

The Economist has a helpful brief outline — here — of why oil prices are so low.  I continue to think that oil prices will stabilize in the $55-$65 range, but now that it’s apparent that most Bakken oil is profitable around $42, I would not be surprised to see prices bounce around in that range periodically for a while, too. 

A few things to keep in perspective when you hear about how the energy sector is suffering: 

(1) It’s not very often through the years that anyone would be upset by low energy prices.  That usually is a sign of good things to come in terms of markets because low energy prices can reduce costs of manufacturing, they tend to increase demand (in energy and beyond), and it tends to mean more money in consumers’ pockets. Those are usually very good things. 

(2) Despite layoffs are some energy sector companies, and a dramatic slow down of drilling, if you looked back to 2005 0r 2006 (an even more recently) people would have been thrilled to see the sector with this many jobs. Even another 20-30% slow down represents a strong and viable industry.

(3) Legal work for the sector

Today marks my return to blogging after a brief (3 weeks) respite, and what better way to be welcomed back than with news of a mega-merger?!?  Today, Kraft Foods, a publicly traded company, and H. J.Heinz, owned by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway and Brazilian private equity firm 3G, signed a multi-billion dollar merger agreement to create what will become the third largest food company in North America. 

Under the proposed merger Kraft shareholders will receive 49% of the stock in the newly merged company, plus a cash dividend of $16.50 per share, representing a reported 27% premium on Kraft’s trading stock price as of Tuesday, March 24th which closed at around $61.33/share.  

The stock market reacted positively to the news with Kraft stock opening around $81/share and climbing up to $87 and settling down in the low $80’s (it was trading at $82/share around 2:00 pm). You can track the stock price here.  The immediate bump in price casts some shadows on the Kraft stock premium agreed to in the deal.

Among the possible legal hurdles are antitrust concerns, but the deal doesn’t raise red flags on its face given the little overlap between the two

The JOBS Act requires the SEC to create an exemption for small, crowdfunded offerings of securities. That exemption, if the SEC ever enacts it, will allow issuers to raise up to $1 million a year in sales of securities to the general public. (Don’t confuse this exemption with Rule 506(c) sales to accredited investors, which is sometimes called crowdfunding, but really isn’t.)

The crowdfunding exemption restricts resales of the crowdfunded securities. Crowdfunding purchasers may not, with limited exceptions, resell the securities they purchase for a year. Securities Act sec. 4A(e); Proposed Rule 501, in SEC, Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 9470 (Oct. 23, 2013). Unlike the resale restrictions in some of the other federal registration exemptions, the crowdfunding resale restriction serves no useful purpose. All it does is to increase the risk of what is already a very risky investment by reducing the liquidity of that investment.

Enforcing the “Come to Rest” Idea

Some of the resale restrictions in other exemptions are designed to enforce the requirement that the securities sold “come to rest” in the hands of purchasers who qualify for the exemption.

Rule 147, the safe harbor for the intrastate offering exemption in section

The UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust recently won a battle with Gilead and Vertex to have those companies include on their proxy statements proposals to require them to explain to shareholders the risks of their drug pricing decisions.

Basically, both Gilead and Vertex have come under fire recently for charging extremely high prices for new drugs.  There’s an argument, of course, that this is simply a bad business decision – if your customers can’t afford your drugs, they won’t buy them.  And that’s the official basis for the Trust’s proposal.  The Trust describes, for example, how Sanofi was once forced to dramatically cut drug prices because the initial prices were set unrealistically high.

But I find it very hard to believe that the UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust is genuinely concerned about drug pricing in its capacity as a shareholder seeking maximum returns.  Instead, it seems far more likely that the Trust’s concern is, you know, drug prices.  That it has to pay.  For its beneficiaries.  And it’s using its status as shareholder of several pharmaceutical companies to try to influence policy in that regard.  The fact that the SEC is allowing the proposal to be included on the

So, I repeatedly threatened that I’d eventually post a summary of my paper on arbitration clauses in corporate governance documents – and well, now you’re all finally being subjected to it.

This post was originally published at CLS Blue Sky blog, but I’ve made some minor edits and added a new introduction.

For many years, commenters have argued that at least some shareholder disputes can and should be arbitrated, rather than litigated, and that this could be accomplished by amending the corporate “contract” – namely, its charter and/or its bylaws – to require arbitration.  The possibility was raised in articles by John Coffee and Richard Shell in the late 1980s,[1] and the idea has resurfaced many times since then, including this year by Adam Pritchard.[2]  For almost as long as the idea has been kicked around, there have been warnings that if arbitration clauses are “contractually” binding by virtue of their presence in corporate governance documents, then they may be subject to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which would preempt state attempts to regulate/oversee their use.  Coffee discussed that possibility in his 1988 piece on the subject[3]; more recently, Barbara Black[4] and Brian Fitzpatrick[5] have sounded further alarms.

For foes of shareholder litigation, this is a feature, not a bug; though they rarely say so explicitly, whenever anyone relies upon FAA cases to justify the insertion of arbitration clauses in corporate charters and bylaws, they are implicitly advocating the idea that not only are charters and bylaws “contracts” for FAA purposes, but that federal law requires their enforcement, regardless of the preferences of the chartering state.  After the Supreme Court decided AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,[6] the notion was particularly powerful, because it meant that corporations would be free to use arbitration clauses to require that shareholder claims be brought on an individual, rather than class, basis.  Given the economics of shareholder litigation, this would almost certainly mean the death of most shareholder lawsuits.

And that’s where my paper comes in.   

[More under the cut]

Last week, I wrote sports and the problems that could arise from a myopic focus on winning.

I promised to attempt to tie that post to business this week, but because I am running to a lunch meeting and then to the Belmont v. Virginia NCAA tournament basketball game viewing party, I am going to keep this short.

(Also, please indulge a little more bragging about my school. Before the game even begins, I am already incredibly proud of our basketball team. Belmont won the academic bracket for the NCAA tournament teams this year, which is based on academic measures like Academic Progress Rate (APR) and Graduation Success Rate (GSR)).

Anyway, I think there are a number of parallels between sports and business. Sports, done the right way, can teach many valuable lessons, such as the importance of teamwork, diligence, unselfishness, strategy, preparation, etc. In fact, team sport participation was one of the things I looked for when interviewing for law students when I was in practice and it is something I look for now when interviewing research assistants. 

As mentioned in last week’s post, sports can lead participants off-track if there is a myopic focus on winning that

Bernard Sharfman has posted a new article entitled “Activist Hedge Funds in a World of Board Independence: Long-Term Value Creators or Destroyers?” In the paper he makes the argument that hedge fund activism contributes to long-term value creation if it can be assumed that the typical board of a public company has an adequate amount of independence to act as an arbitrator between executive management and the activist hedge fund. He also discusses these funds’ focus on disinvestment and attempts to challenge those in the Marty Lipton camp, who view these funds less charitably. In fact, Lipton recently called 2014 “the year of the wolf pack.” The debate on the merits of activist hedge funds has been heating up. Last month Forbes magazine outlined “The Seven Deadly Sins of Activist Hedge Funds,” including their promotion of share buybacks, aka “corporate cocaine.” Forbes was responding to a more favorable view of these funds by The Economist in its February 7, 2015 cover story.

Whether you agree with Sharfman or Lipton, the article is clearly timely and worth a read. The abstract is below:

Numerous empirical studies have shown that hedge fund activism has led to enhanced returns to investors and increased