Da Lin recently posted Beyond Beholden, a paper tackling a new issue in director independence. Although most corporate law focuses on whether there is a stick a controlling shareholder can use to punish directors if they fail to follow orders, Lin looked to see if she could see any carrots a controlling shareholder could use to lead a director around. This bit from the article captures it nicely:
Corporate governance scholarship focuses extensively on the incentives generated by the controlling shareholder’s ability to retaliate against insubordinate directors. What the literature overlooks, however, is that directors may also be influenced by the prospect of reward. What happens when the controlling shareholder is not angered but instead pleased?
The result, it turns out, is often new opportunities or future benefits from the controlling shareholder to the favored directors. Controlling shareholders can direct their resources or those owned by the controlled company in ways that reward friends.
Lin’s article looks at how controlling shareholders may reward ostensibly independent directors by appointing them to other lucrative board positions under their control. A director who approves a sale of the company may soon find herself out of a six-figure job when the company gets