In June, at the National Business Law Scholars Conference in Knoxville, I sat in on a paper panel featuring Sarah Williams’s work in process, Regulating Congressional Insider Trading: The Rotten Egg Approach. A draft of the resulting paper, forthcoming in the Cardozo Law Review, has been made available on SSRN. The abstract is copied in below.
A 2004 study revealed that the stock portfolios of members of Congress were consistently outperforming those of the investing public. The financial success of federal lawmakers was statistically correlated to the use of nonpublic information obtained in connection with the performance of legislative responsibilities – reasonably characterizable as insider trading. Cries of dismay over such profiteering by lawmakers have been echoing in the public domain since Samuel Chase, Maryland’s representative in the Continental Congress, cornered the flour market in 1788 after learning that copious quantities of the product would be purchased by the government to support the Continental Army. Notwithstanding efforts to apply insider trading law to curb this behavior and the enactment of the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (“STOCK”) Act, fortuitous securities transactions by members of Congress continue to occur in connection with headlining national events; it was recently observed
