For those of you who talk about the recent problems at Volkswagen in your classes, this recently posted article may be useful. I connected with Charles Elson briefly when I lived in Delaware, and he is certainly an authority on corporate governance. The article is available here and the abstract is posted below. 

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Although the primary cause of the emissions scandal at Volkswagen appears to have been misfeasance and malfeasance on a corporate-wide scale, we argue that such a problematic culture existed at Volkswagen because of the composition of the board itself in combination with the unique governance structure known as “co-determination,” that defines many German companies, including VW. There are three major problems from a corporate governance standpoint with the Volkswagen board. First, is the interest-conflicting nature of the dual-class stock held by the dominant shareholding Porsche and Piech families. Second, is the presence of a government as a major shareholder. And third is the organization of its characteristically German “two-tier” board around the principle of co-determination, which mandated significant labor representation. We argue that each of these elements of the VW ownership and governance structure contributed in varying degrees to the board failure of oversight that led

Christopher Bruner recently posted a book chapter entitled The Corporation’s Intrinsic Attributes. I try to read everything Christopher writes, including his excellent Cambridge University Press book, Corporate Governance in the Common Law World, and I am looking forward to reading this new book chapter over spring break next week. The book chapter’s abstract is reproduced below for interested readers:

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Numerous treatises, casebooks, and other resources commonly present concise lists of attributes said to be intrinsic to the modern corporation and/or essential to its economic utility. Such descriptions of the corporate form often constitute introductory matter, conditioning how students, professionals, and public officials alike approach corporate law by presenting a straightforward framework to distinguish the corporate form from other types of business entities. There are two significant problems with such frameworks, however, from a pedagogic perspective. First, these frameworks describe the corporation by reference to purportedly fixed intrinsic attributes, conflicting sharply with the flux and dynamism that have in fact characterized the history of corporate law. Second, these frameworks differ markedly from each other in how they characterize the corporation’s attributes, each embodying a contestable perspective on the nature of the corporate form.

The diversity of perspectives that such inquiry

It’s fun when students are interested in your scholarship.  Yesterday, one of my students engaged me to talk about my work on limited liability operating agreements as contracts.  (I have mentioned this work in class, and the student also is a regular reader of this blog, where I have referenced this work a number of times, including most prominently here.)  He began the exchange with something akin to the following question: “Why is it that we take two full semesters of contract law during the first year of law school and then all but ignore the connection of contract law to business entities once we get to Business Associations?”

I think I know what he means.  While the segregation of legal doctrine by subject matter in law schools enables instructors to focus students narrowly on a single–often new–body of law, it also tends to obscure the interconnections between and among applicable bodies of law, including connections between contract law and the law of business entities.  Admittedly (and I pointed this out to the student), the typical Business Associations course does typically address contracts at several points.  These junctures include, among others, the course segment in which sole proprietorships are distinguished from statutory forms of business

Matthew Bruckner (Howard) recently posted an interesting article on bankruptcy reorganization and universities. Given the challenges facing many schools, his article should be one that attracts attention. The article can be downloaded here and the abstract is below.

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Many colleges and universities are in financial distress but lack an essential tool for responding to financial distress used by for-profit businesses: bankruptcy reorganization. This Article makes two primary contributions to the nascent literature on college bankruptcies by, first, unpacking the differences among the three primary governance structures of institutions of higher education, and, second, by considering the implications of those differences for determining whether and under what circumstances institutions of higher education should be allowed to reorganize in bankruptcy. This Article concludes that bankruptcy reorganization is the most necessary for for-profit colleges and least necessary for public colleges, but ultimately concludes that all colleges be allowed to reorganize in chapter 11.

Next week is our Spring Break and I plan to catch up on some television and movie watching. Many of my former business associations students have raved about the show Billions, described online as follows:

Wealth, influence and corruption collide in this drama set in New York. Shrewd U.S. Attorney Chuck Rhoades is embroiled in a high-stakes game of predator vs. prey with the ambitious hedge-fund king, Bobby Axelrod. To date, Rhoades has never lost an insider trading case — he’s 81-0 — but when criminal evidence turns up against Axelrod, he proceeds cautiously in building the case against Axelrod, who employs Rhoades’ wife, psychiatrist Wendy, as a performance coach for his company. Wendy, who has been in her position longer than Chuck has been in his, refuses to give up her career for her husband’s legal crusade against Axelrod. Both men use their intelligence, power and influence to outmaneuver the other in this battle over billions.

Now that my students are watching it, I feel compelled to do so as well, and not just because Australian papers play up the copious amounts of money and sex depicted in the series. I’m glad that my students are watching any

Our Kentucky “brother,” Tom Rutledge, sent me a link to a super blog post yesterday on Mortgage Grader Inc. v. Ward & Olivo, a limited liability partnership case currently before the New Jersey Supreme Court.  Tom’s focus in his post was the limited liability aspect of the case, which is fascinating–and more than a bit unsettling for those practicing in jurisdictions like New Jersey and Kentucky that require law firms organizing limited liability partnerships to maintain malpractice insurance.  The question before the court: whether, in the absence of an express provision in the partnership statute, the failure of a law firm organized as a limited liability partnership to maintain required malpractice insurance results in the loss of the partnership’s limited liability status.  The trial court ruled that the lapse of malpractice insurance caused a loss of limited liability status; the appeals court reversed.

But Tom also mentions another aspect of the case in his post that I want to call out here.  Specifically, he notes references in the appellate court opinion to the conversion of a partnership to a limited liability partnership.  Here’s what he says on that point:

One potentially disturbing aspect of the language used by the Court of Appeals and in the oral argument is the notion that the loss of LLP status and the treatment of the firm as a general partnership is some sort of conversion. But it isn’t. An LLP is a general partnership that has elected into a special status – it is still a general partnership but for the rule of partner limited liability. . . .

This comment reminded me of co-blogger Josh Fershee‘s super-helpful obsession (maybe too strong a word?) with “limited liability corporation” as an incorrect judicial (and other) descriptor of the limited liability company business form.  (See, e.g., his December 2015 post here.)  And far be it from me to disagree with either of these guys in making their respective points about these labeling inaccuracies!  

As a separate point, I want to call out the fact that this area of partnership law can be important both for bar examinations (thinking of all those folks suffering through that test this week . . .) and IRL.  In fact, I was asked a question recently about the Tennessee provision on limited liability elections by a BARBRI student.  (Little-known fact: I teach the Tennessee BARBRI segments on agency, unincorporated entities, and personal property.)  The student’s question did not inappropriately refer to a conversion of a partnership into a limited liability partnership, but it did point out several differences in Tennessee law in this area that I want to mention.

I was fortunate to hear Angela Walch (St. Mary’s) present on this paper at SEALS last summer. Her article, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk, has now been published in the NYU Journal of Legislation and Public Policy and is available on SSRN. The abstract is reproduced below:

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“Blockchain” is the word on the street these days, with every significant financial institution, from Goldman Sachs to Nasdaq, experimenting with this new technology. Many say that this remarkable innovation could radically transform our financial system, eliminating the costs and inefficiencies that plague our existing financial infrastructures, such as payment, settlement, and clearing systems. Venture capital investments are pouring into blockchain startups, which are scrambling to disrupt the “quadrillion” dollar markets represented by existing financial market infrastructures. A debate rages over whether public, “permissionless” blockchains (like Bitcoin’s) or private, “permissioned” blockchains (like those being designed at many large banks) are more desirable.

Amidst this flurry of innovation and investment, this paper enquires into the suitability of the Bitcoin blockchain to serve as the backbone of financial market infrastructure, and evaluates whether it is robust enough to serve as the foundation of major payment, settlement, clearing

I am looking forward to presenting at this conference next month. Looks like a great group of academics and practitioners.

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University of Cincinnati College of Law

The 29th Annual Corporate Law Center Symposium – Corporate Social Responsibility and the Modern Enterprise

March 18, 2016

8:45 a.m. – 3:30 p.m.

Hilton Netherland Plaza

Pavilion Ballroom

This event is free. CLE: 5.0 hours, pending approval.

Presented by the University of Cincinnati College of Law’s Corporate Law Center and Law Review.

Symposium materials will be available on March 14 at: law.uc.edu/corporate-law-center/2016-symposium

Please register by contacting Lori Strait: email Lori.Stait@uc.edu; fax 513-556-1236; or phone 513-556-0117

Introduction, 8:45 a.m.

Keynote, 9:00 a.m.

Clare Iery, The Procter & Gamble Company

Social Enterprises and Changing Legal Forms, 9:30 a.m.

Mark Loewenstein, University of Colorado Law School

William H. Clark, Jr., Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP

Haskell Murray, Belmont University College of Business

Russell Menyhart, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP

Sourcing Dilemmas in a Globalized World, 11:00 a.m.

Steve Slezak, University of Cincinnati College of Business

Marsha A. Dickson, University of Delaware Department of Fashion & Apparel Studies

Tianlong Hu, Renmin University of China Law School

Anita Ramasastry, University of Washington School of Law

CSR

I love your most recent post, Josh, and have been truly enjoying the ensuing commentary/conversation. I took on the “is it a contract?” issue in the LLC context because of questions similar to those raised in your post and in the comments it generated. I admit that the partnership issue on which you posted has fascinated me for quite some time. (I first encountered it when I undertook to teach Business Associations almost 16 years ago . . . .)

I have to push back on your analysis a bit, however.  In particular, here’s the part of your post with which I have some trouble:

There must be an agreement to associate for a purpose. To me, that requires consideration and assent.  If one has associated sufficiently under the law to make one both a partner and an agent of another (and thus liable for the partner), I don’t see how there is a lack of sufficient consideration or assent to form a contract.

Why does an association for a purpose require an agreement? To “associate” is to combine, connect, or link. The concept of an association builds from that: “connection or combination” or “an organization of people with a common

I am posting this at the request of our Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Alex Long:

The University of Tennessee invites applications for a possible visiting professor for the fall or spring semester in 2016-17. The position would involve teaching Business Associations and one other business-related course (including, perhaps, Contracts I or II). If interested, please submit a CV and cover letter via email to Alex Long, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of Law at along23@utk.edu. Prior teaching experience (law school or broader university teaching) is strongly preferred. The closing date for applications is Monday, February 29, 2016.

I also am happy to respond to questions about this opening.