Friend of the BLPB Greg Shill‘s recent article, The Independent Board as Shield, is an engaging, provocative piece on board independence and the business judgment rule.  The abstract provides a taste of his argument and principal related proposal.

The fiduciary duty of loyalty bars CEOs and other executives from managing companies for personal gain. In the modern public corporation, this restriction is reinforced by a pair of institutions: the independent board of directors and the business judgment rule. In isolation, each structure arguably promotes manager fidelity to shareholder interests—but together, they enable manager prioritization. This marks a particularly striking turn for the independent board. Its origin story and raison d’être lie in protecting shareholders from opportunism by managers, but it functions as a shield for managers instead.

Numerous defects in the design and practice of the independent board inhibit its ability to curb managerial excess. Nowhere is this more evident than in the context of transactions that enrich the CEO. When executive compensation and similar matters are approved by independent directors, they take on a new quality: they become insulated by the business judgment rule. This rule is commonly justified as giving legal effect to the comparative advantage

Over the years, I have been contributor to the Texas A&M Journal of Property’s annual oil and gas law survey. This year’s article (available here) took a little longer to post than usual, but given all that’s gone on in the past year, that’s pretty much unavoidable.  For those who wonder what oil and gas law as to do with business law, well, I humbly submit that access to energy is, in the modern world, the foundation upon which virtually all business is built. 

I don’t think that’s overstating it, though it may be overstating the importance of this particular piece. Nonetheless, hopefully it will have value for some folks.  The abstract for my Oil & Gas Survey: West Virginia (2020) follows: 

This Article summarizes and discusses important recent developments in West Virginia’s oil and gas law as determined by recent West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals cases. There were no substantial legislative changes in the covered period.

The discussed cases considered:

(1) whether hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling were allowed when an old lease could not have contemplated such methods were not permissible;

(2) proper interpretation of deed language;

(3) whether all oil and gas leases have implied

In my ongoing work for the Tennessee Bar Association, I was alerted to a recent Delaware Chancery Court decision of note.  The decision is embodied in a December 22, 2020 letter to counsel written by Chancellor Andre G. Bouchard in the case captioned In re WeWork Litigation (Consol. Civil Action No. 2020-0258-AGB).  It offers an illustration of the attorney-client privilege challenges that may exist in business associations that operate within networks consisting of affiliated or associated business firms.

The In re WeWork Litigation letter opinion involves a document production dispute.  The controversy relates to communications engaged in by discovery custodians employed at Sprint, Inc. but working on behalf of SoftBank Group Corp.  Specifically, the Sprint employees assisted SoftBank with document discovery relating to its involvement with The We Company (“WeWork”), a plaintiff in the case.  (Sprint is not involved in any substantive way in the litigation.  However, at times relevant to the chancellor’s opinion, SoftBank owned 84% of Sprint.)  The controversy centers around the conduct of Sprint CEO Michael Combes and a Sprint employee, Christina Sternberg.  Each provided SoftBank’s chief operating officer with document discovery assistance.  As Chancellor Bouchard aptly noted, these Sprint employees “wore multiple hats.”  (This comment in

A recent federal court order gets the basics of entity law representation right, but it’s pretty murky on exactly what entity is involved.  The case involves a claim of trademark infringement in which the plaintiff, International Watchman, Inc., sued OnceWill, LLC.  The order explains: 

In OnceWill’s Motion, OnceWill indicated that it “is a sole proprietorship consisting of proprietor Ryan Sood.” (Id.) OnceWill’s Motion also showed that it was filed by Ryan Sood, acting pro se. (Id.) The Court granted OnceWill’s Motion that same day.

Subsequently, also on November 12, 2020, Plaintiff filed its Motion, requesting that the Court strike OnceWill’s Motion and reconsider its order granting the requested extension of time for OnceWill to respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. No. 13.) Plaintiff asserts that OnceWill is a limited liability company (“LLC”), not a sole proprietorship as OnceWill represented. (Id. at 2.) In support of this assertion, Plaintiff provided a printout from the Washington Secretary of State’s website showing that OnceWill is listed as an LLC. (Id.; Doc. No. 13-1.) As a result of OnceWill’s status as an LLC, Plaintiff argues that OnceWill only can maintain litigation or appear in court through an attorney

Friend-of-the-BLPB Miriam Baer recently posted a draft of her forthcoming book chapter on corporate leniency programs to SSRN.  The abstract follows.

Corporate leniency programs promise putative offenders reduced punishment and fewer regulatory interventions in exchange for the corporation’s credible and authentic commitment to remedy wrongdoing and promptly self-report future violations of law to the requisite authorities.

Because these programs have been devised with multiple goals in mind—i.e., deterring wrongdoing and punishing corporate executives, improving corporate cultural norms, and extending the government’s regulatory reach—it is all but impossible to gauge their “success” objectively. We know that corporations invest significant resources in compliance-related activity and that they do so in order to take advantage of the various benefits promised by leniency regimes. We cannot definitively say, however, how valuable this activity has been in reducing either the incidence or severity of harms associated with corporate misconduct.

Notwithstanding these blind spots, recent developments in the Department of Justice’s stance towards corporate offenders provides valuable insight on the structural design of a leniency program. Message framing, precision of benefit, and the scope and centralization of the entity that administers a leniency program play important roles in how well the program is received by its

Plain Bay alleges that it is a citizen of Florida for diversity purposes as it is a Florida limited liability company incorporated in Florida with its principal place of business in Florida and that Yates is a citizen of California for diversity purposes as he “is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State of California[.]” . . . In order for this Court to properly exercise jurisdiction over a case, “the action must be between ‘citizens of different States.’ ” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

Plain Bay Sales, LLC v. Gallaher, 9:18-CV-80581-WM, 2020 WL 961847, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2020) (emphasis added). 
 
Yates, though, was a UK citizen, who lived in Florida, and thus, “the Court concludes that, for diversity purposes, Yates should be considered a citizen of Florida.” Id. The court eventually determines that Yates would destroy diversity, but Plain Bay removed him as a defendant, and as a dispensable party, diversity was restored. 
 
Okay, but there is a problem here. Two really. First, Plain Bay was not “incorporated” anywhere. It was formed. It is an LLC, not a corporation.  But more important, Plain Bay’s citizenship has not been

The Honorable Aida M. Delgado-Colón made me smile today.  As BLPB readers know, An LLC By Any Other Name, Is Still Not a Corporation. Finally, I received a notice of a court acknowledging this fact and requiring a party to refer to their legal entity correctly. Judge Delgado-Colón writes: 

Pursuant to this Court’s sua sponte obligation to inquire into its own subject matter jurisdiction and noticing the unprecedented increase in foreclosure litigation in this District, the Court ordered plaintiff to clarify whether it is a corporation or a limited liability company (“LLC”).

REVERSE MORTGAGE FUNDING, LLC, Pl., v. THE ESTATE OF ANGEL RAFAEL ANTONINI-NAZARIO, et al, Defendants., CV 16-3092 (ADC), 2020 WL 881019, at *1 (D.P.R. Feb. 20, 2020).  
 
The opinion continues:
Here, the Court cannot ascertain that diversity exists among the parties. Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure holds attorneys responsible for “assur[ing] that all pleadings, motions and papers filed with the court are factually well-grounded, legally tenable and not interposed for any improper purpose.” Mariani v. Doctors Associates, Inc., 983 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990). Despite Rule

Happy holidays! Billions of people around the world are celebrating Christmas or Hanukah right now. Perhaps you’re even reading this post on a brand new Apple Ipad, a Microsoft Surface, or a Dell Computer. Maybe you found this post via a Google search. If you use a product manufactured by any of those companies or drive a Tesla, then this post is for you. Last week, a nonprofit organization filed the first lawsuit against the world’s biggest tech companies alleging that they are complicit in child trafficking and deaths in the cobalt mines of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Dodd-Frank §1502 and the upcoming EU Conflict Minerals Regulation, which goes into effect in 2021, both require companies to disclose the efforts they have made to track and trace “conflict minerals” — tin, tungsten, tantalum, and gold from the DRC and surrounding countries. DRC is one of the poorest nations in the world per capita but has an estimated $25 trillion in mineral reserves (including 65% of the world’s cobalt). Armed militia use rape and violence as a weapon of war in part so that they control the mineral wealth. The EU and US regulators believe that consumers

Prof. Bainbridge recently posted, Here’s the thing I don’t understand about the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. He explains: 

In Bandera Master Funds LP v. Boardwalk Pipeline Partners, LP, C.A. No. 2018-0372-JTL (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 2019), the court reviews the Delaware law of the implied covenant:

“In order to plead successfully a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the plaintiff must allege a specific implied contractual obligation, a breach of that obligation by the defendant, and resulting damage to the plaintiff.” Fitzgerald v. Cantor, 1998 WL 842316, at *1 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 1998). In describing the implied contractual obligation, the plaintiffs must allege facts suggesting “from what was expressly agreed upon that the parties who negotiated the express terms of the contract would have agreed to proscribe the act later complained of . . . had they thought to negotiate with respect to that matter.” Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986). That is because “[t]he implied covenant seeks to enforce the parties’ contractual bargain by implying only those terms that the parties would have agreed to during their original negotiations if they had thought

I’m at the tail end of teaching my summer transactional lawyering course. Throughout the semester, I’ve focused my students on the importance of representations, warranties, covenants, conditions, materiality, and knowledge qualifiers. Today I came across an article from Practical Law Company that discussed the use of #MeToo representations in mergers and acquisitions agreements, and I plan to use it as a teaching tool next semester. According to the article, which is behind a firewall so I can’t link to it, thirty-nine public merger agreements this year have had such clauses. This doesn’t surprise me. Last year I spoke on a webinar regarding #MeToo and touched on the the corporate governance implications and the rise of these so-called “Harvey Weinstein” clauses. 

Generally, according to Practical Law Company, target companies in these agreements represent that: 1) no allegations of sexual harassment or sexual misconduct have been made against a group or class of employees at certain seniority levels; 2) no allegations have been made against  independent contractors; and 3) the company has not entered into any settlement agreements related to these kinds of allegations. The target would list exceptions on a disclosure schedule, presumably redacting the name of the accuser to preserve